the government heretofore exercised by the company was transferred to the crown, and was henceforth to be exercised in its name.

In recent years the African companies chartered by the European states seeking African dominions have had very elastic charters in which the home governments have generally reserved the right to regulate the exercise of authority as occasion might demand. These companies advance and confirm the spheres of influence of the various states, govern under slight restrictions great territories, and treat with native states with full authority. The British South Africa Company, chartered in 1889, was granted liberal powers of administration and full capacity, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, to treat with the native states. The field of operations of this company was extended in 1891, so that it now includes over six hundred thousand square miles of territory. Of this company Lawrence says: Clearly then it is no independent authority in the eye of British law, but a subordinate body controlled by the appropriate departments of the supreme government. Like Janus of old, it has two faces. On that which Looks towards the native tribes all the lineaments and attributes of sovereignty are majestically outlined. On that which is turned towards the United Kingdom is written subordination and submission."1 The acts of these companies become the basis of subsequent negotiations among the various European states, and the companies have a very important influence in molding the character of African development.

66

1 Lawrence, p. 82, § 54.

§ 26. Individuals

Without entering into discussion of "the doctrine of the separability of the individual from the state," it is safe to affirm that individuals have a certain degree of competence under exceptional circumstances, and may come under the cognizance of international law. By the well-established dictum of international law a pirate may be captured by any vessel, whatever its nationality. General admiralty and maritime procedure against a person admit the legal status of an individual from the point of view of international law. The extension of trade and commerce has made this necessary. This is particularly true in time of war, when individuals wholly without state authorization, or even in contravention of state regulations, commit acts putting them within the jurisdiction held to be covered by international law, as in the case of persons brought before Prize Courts. The principles of private international law cover a wide range of cases directly touching individuals.

§ 27. Insurgents

(a) Definition. Insurgents are organized bodies of men who, for public political purposes, are in a state of armed hostility to an established government.

(b) Effect of Admission of Insurgency. The practice of tacitly admitting insurgent rights has become common when the hostilities have assumed such proportions as to jeopardize the sovereignty of the parent state over the rebelling community, or seriously to interfere with cus

tomary foreign intercourse.1 The general effect of the admission is shown as follows : 2

(1) Insurgent rights cannot be claimed by those bodies seeking other than political ends.3

(2) Insurgent acts are not piratical, as they imply the pursuit of "public as contrasted with private ends.”4 (3) The admission of insurgent rights does not carry the rights of a belligerent, nor admit official recognition of insurgent body.5

(4) The admission of insurgent rights does not relieve the parent state of its responsibilities for acts committed within its jurisdiction.

(5) When insurgents act in a hostile manner toward foreign states, they may be turned over to the parent state, or may be punished by the foreign state."

(6) A foreign state must in general refrain from interference in the hostilities between parent state and insurgents, i.e. cannot extend hospitality of its ports to insurgents, extradite insurgents, etc.8

(7) When insurgency exists, the armed forces of the insurgents must observe and are entitled to the advantages of the laws of war in their relations to the parent state.9

1 Wheat., D., note 15, p. 37.

2 For full discussion see Wilson,

Naval War College, 1900.

66 Insurgency' "lectures U. S. 3 Hall, § 5, p. 31, ff.

43 Whart., § 381; United States v. "Ambrose Light," 25 Fed. Rep. 408. Snow, 206, "Montezuma."

5 President Cleveland's Message, Dec. 2, 1885. U. S. For. Rel. 1885, pp. 254, 273.

6 Parl. Papers, 1887, 1 Peru, 18. 833 Albany Law Jour., 125.

73 Whart., § 381, "Huascar." 9 Lawrence, § 162.

NOTE. During the struggles between the parties in the United States of Colombia in 1885, the President of Colombia decreed: (1) That certain Carribean ports held by the opposing party should be regarded as closed to foreign commerce, and trade with these ports would be considered illicit and contraband, and that vessels, crews, etc., involved in such trade would be liable to the penalties of Colombian laws. (2) That as the vessels of the opposing party in the port of Cartagena were flying the Colombian flag, it was in violation of right, and placed that party beyond the pale of international law.1

The United States refused to recognize the validity of the first decree unless Colombia should support it by an effective blockading force.2 (For similar. position on part of Great Britain, see Parl. Deb. H. C., June 27, 1861.)

The United States also refused to recognize that the vessels of the insurgents were beyond the pale of international law or in any sense piratical.

The United States did not deny that closure might be a domestic measure similar to blockade in accord with municipal law, but emphatically maintained that effective blockade only could close a port in time of such insurrection.

It was further maintained that "The denial by this [U.S.] Government of the Colombian proposition did not, however, imply the admission of a belligerent status on the part of the insurgents." Message Pres. Cleveland, Dec. 8, 1885.3

The President's messages of Dec. 2, 1895, and Dec. 7, 1896, distinctly mention a status of insurgency as existing in Cuba.

During the rebellions in Chili in 1891 and in Brazil in 1894, the insurgents, while not recognized as belligerents by third powers, were nevertheless given freedom of action by these powers.

1885, For. Rel. U. S. 252, 264. 2 1885, For. Rel. U. S. 254, 273. 8 See 3 Whart., § 381; Bluntschli, § 512; Hall, § 5, p. 34; U. S. For. Rel. (1885), 252, 254, 264, 273.

(a) Definition.

§ 28. Belligerents

A community attempting by armed hostility to free itself from the jurisdiction of the parent state may, under certain conditions, be recognized as a belligerent.

(b) The general conditions prior to recognition are: (1) that the end which the community in revolt seeks shall be political, i.e. a mere mob or a party of marauders could have no belligerent rights, (2) the hostilities must be of the character of war and must be carried on in accord with the laws of war, (3) the proportions of the revolt must be such as to render the issue uncertain and to make its continuance for a considerable time possible, (4) the hostilities and general government of the revolting community must be in the hands of a responsible organization.

As each state, including the parent state, must judge as to the fact whether the conditions warranting recognition of belligerency exist, there may be great divergency of opinion in cases of recognition,1 but the question of belligerency is a question of fact and never a question of theory.

(c) A community carrying on, in accord with the rules of war, an armed revolt of such proportions as to make the issue uncertain and acting under a responsible organization may not be recognized without offense to the parent state except upon certain grounds. The generally admitted ground is, that the interests of the recognizing state be so far affected by the hostilities 1 See numerous references in 51 Br. and Fr. St. Papers; also Hall, § 5, p. 39.