sending and receiving ambassadors, salute of flag, etc., or informal, by implication through the grant of an exequatur to a consul from the new state, or other act which indicates an acknowledgment of international rights and obligations.1 It should be observed, however, that the appointment by, or reception within, an existing state of agents to carry on necessary intercourse between the existing state, and the aspirant for recognition does not constitute recognition. It may be essential to have relations with a community the statehood of which is not established, because of commercial and other matters pertaining to the rights of the citizens of the existing state whose interests, or who in person may be within the jurisdiction of the unrecognized community.2 The definite act of recognition is, however, in accord with the decision of the internal authority to which this function is by state law ascribed. As foreign states usually take cognizance of the acts of the executive department only, it is the common custom to consider recognition as an executive function, or as a function residing in the head of the state. In the United States, the President is for foreign affairs the head of the state, and has the authority to recognize new states in any manner other than by those acts, which by the Constitution require the advice and consent of the Senate, as in the conclusion of treaties, and appointment of ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls. President Grant, in his second annual message, Dec. 5, 1870, said, “As soon as I learned that a republic had been proclaimed at Paris, and that the people of France had acquiesced in the change, the minister of the United States was 2 I. Rivier, §§ 44, 125. 11 Whart., HEALD directed by telegraph to recognize it, and to tender my congratulations and those of the people of the United States."1 As President Jackson had in his message in December, 1831, and in the official correspondence with Buenos Ayres denied that country's jurisdiction over the Falkland Islands, Justice McLean said, in rendering his opinion in Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Company, "And can there be any doubt that when the executive branch of the government which is charged with our foreign relations, shall, in its correspondence with foreign nations, assume a fact in regard to sovereignty of any island or country, it is conclusive on the judicial department? And in this view it is not material to inquire, nor is it the province of the court to determine, whether the executive be right or wrong. It is enough to know that in the exercise of his constitutional functions he has decided the question."2 "The President is the executive department." 3 (d) Recognition may be premature and the recogrized community may not be able to maintain its place in the international circle, or in case of a struggle with another state may be defeated. The recognizing state must assume in such case whatever consequences may come from its misjudgment, and the parent state may justly question the right of the recognizing state in its action, e.g. the recognition by France of the United 1 See on this subject 1 Whart., § 70. 2 13 Pet., 415. See also Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202; Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet., 253. 8 State of Mississippi v. Johnson, President, 4 Wall., 475, 500. For late review of the question, see 32 Amer. Law Rev., 390, W. L. Penfield. States in 1778 could justly be regarded by England as premature and as a hostile act. (e) The recognition of a new state is the recognition of the existence of certain political conditions. This recognition of the state carries with it the acknowledgment of sovereignty, independence, equality, etc. It is an essential condition to just recognition that the new aspirant possess these qualifications absolutely or potentially to a reasonable extent. (f) From its nature, recognition is irrevocable and absolute, unless distinctly conditional. Even when conditional, if the recognition is prior to the fulfillment of the condition by the recognized state, the recognition cannot be withdrawn because of non-fulfillment of the condition, but the recognizing state may resort to any other means which would be admitted in international law as justifiable against any other state failing to fulfill its obligations, e.g. suspension of diplomatic relations, retorsion, reprisals, or even war.1 In the case of Belgium, the definition of its boundaries and establishing of permanent neutralization was an act subsequent to the recognition of its international statehood, and in case of violation of the treaty stipulations, Belgium would not lose its position as a state, but would be liable to such measures of reparation as the other parties to the treaty might employ.2 If recognition could be withdrawn, it would work injustice to the recognized state, and to other states who, as third parties, will not permit their rights to be subject to the will of the recognizing state or states. 1 I. Rivier, "Droit des gens," §§ 3, 11. 2 Hall, § 26*, note 1, p. 93. (g) The consequences of recognition immediately touch the relations of (1) the recognizing state, (2) the recognized, (3) the parent state if the new state is formed from an existing state, and (4) in a minor degree other states. (1) The recognizing state is bound to treat the new state in all respects as entitled to the rights and as under duties accepted in international law. (2) The recognized state is, as related to the recognizing state, entitled to the rights, and under the obligations prescribed in international law. As it is a new person in international law, it is entitled to full personal freedom in entering into relations with other states. So far, however, as the territory within the new state was under local obligations, these obligations are transferred to the new state. The general obligations resting on the parent state, by reason of treaties and responsibilities of all kinds which have been assumed by the parent state in the capacity of a legal unity, are not transferred, because the identity of the parent state remains intact.1 (3) The parent state, in cases where the new state is formed by separation from one already existing, is, as regards the recognizing state, on the same international footing as the new state. Both states are entitled to equal privileges, and under like obligations. The relations to other states are are not necessarily much changed. (4) The relations of the states other than the recognizing, recognized, and parent states are changed to the extent that they must respect the de facto relations set 1 Hall, § 27, p. 100. |