nize to be best attained through the State-hence its organization, which, with its regulation, he explains as follows:

Men with respect to physical and mental ability are born essentially equal. At least, there is so much native equality among men "as that though there be one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he." Now, out of this essential equality of ability arises an equality of hope with reference to the attainment of ends; hence, when the same thing is desired by any two men, which cannot, however, be possessed by both, enmity arises between them. The outcome is, that in the pursuit of these ends, which concern self-preservation and commodious living, men attempt the subjugation or destruction of one another." Hence, in a state of nature, where society is not organized in the form of the State, men are in a condition of war. Every man is against every man. In such a state of nature the life of man is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." 3 Furthermore, under such circumstances, there is no such thing as justice or injustice, right or wrong. These

Hobbes's theory of the ends that men naturally seek and his standard for determining their natural rights. This latter is never Pleasure simply, but always Preservation - though on occasion he enlarges the notion of 'preservation' into 'preservation of life so as not to be weary of it." " Outlines of the History of Ethics, pp. 164-5.

1 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. XIII.; also, De Corp. Pol., Pt. I., chap. I.; also, Philosophical Rudiments, chap. I. 2 Ibid.

"But

3 Bluntschli (The Theory of the State, p. 267, trans.) says: these expressions of Hobbes (and Spinoza) are to be understood rather as a logical statement of what would be the condition of man apart from civil society, than as distinctly implying a historical theory. They err from ignoring history rather than from asserting false history. The word 'natural' is used merely in the negative sense of non-civil' or 'non-political.'" Still Hobbes, while disclaiming a belief that there was ever a time when this state of nature as a state of mutual warfare universally existed, distinctly says, "there are many places where they

are nonentities where civil law does not exist. They are the creatures of the State. Where civil government does not exist there is no mine and thine distinct from each other. That is mine which I can acquire and keep against the strength and wit of others.1

From such a horrible condition of things as the state of nature presents, men emerge by means of their passions and reason. Men possess certain "passions" which incline them to peace, such as the fear of death, a desire of the things necessary for commodious living, and a hope of attaining them by industry. Men also possess "reason" which dictates the means by which this peace may be secured. Reason dictates certain articles of peace on which men may agree, which articles Hobbes calls "Laws of Nature." Of these laws he mentions twenty or more, only three of which,

live so now," and refers to "the savage people in many places in America." Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. XIII. This conception of man as essentially anti-social in his nature is contrary to the conception taken by many historians and anthropologists. Tylor, Anthropology, chap. XVI.; Bagehot, Physics and Politics, p. 136; Sir Henry Maine, Ancient Law, p. 126; Ratzel, The History of Mankind, trans., Vol. I, § 12, seem to think that the evidence warrants the opposite view. Also McLennan, Primitive Marriage, chap. VIII., 1st ed., who holds the tribe rather than the family to be the original "social unit," says: "All the evidence we have goes to show that men were from the beginning gregarious." He says: "The geological record exhibits them in groups," and that "this testimony is confirmed by all history. We hear nothing in the most ancient times of individuals except as being members of groups." If this be so, it indicates the essential sociality of man. This testimony is confirmed also by psychology. A true psychological analysis reveals social feelings which are constitutional with man. Such critics of Hobbes as Cumberland, Shaftesbury, and Butler specially emphasized this point in their opposition to him.

1 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. XIII.; also De Corp. Pol., Pt. I., chap. I.; also Philosophical Rudiments, chap. I.

2 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. XIII.; also De Corp. Pol., Pt. I., chap. II.; also Philosophical Rudiments, chap. II. The reader will find an interesting chapter, "On the History of the Idea of Nature' in Law and Politics in Professor Ritchie's work on Natural Rights, chap. II. See also Maine's Ancient Law, chaps. III. and IV.; also Woolsey, Political Science, Vol. I., Pt. I., chap. III.; also Salmond, Law Quarterly Review, April, 1895; also Willoughby, The State, chap. V.

however, it is necessary to note here. The first or fundamental law of nature is "to seek peace, and follow it." But joined to this law as the second part of a general rule of reason is what is called "the sum of the right of nature,” which may be designated as the imperative of self-preservation, which Hobbes expresses in these words: "by all means we can, to defend ourselves." The right of nature which every one possesses in a state of nature is the right to use every means at one's command to preserve one's life—even another man's body. In short, in a state of nature every one has a right to everything. "And because the condition of man . . . is a condition of war of every one against every one; in which case every one is governed by his own reason; and there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemies; it followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a right to everything; even to one another's body." This right of nature is still more baldly stated elsewhere: "Every man by nature hath right to all things, that is to say, to do whatsoever he listeth to whom he listeth, to possess, use, and enjoy all things he will and can. Now, of course, the outcome of every man's possessing a right to everything is a state of insecurity, and, as man desires life and "the means of so preserving life as not to be weary of it," it becomes a principle, or "general rule of reason," "that every man, ought to endeavour peace as far as he has hope of attaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps and advantages of war." In the preceding explanation of the fundamental law of nature, one cannot fail to note the egoistic motive underlying it, the self-preservation of the individual and the enjoyment of life.

:3

1 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. XIV.; also Philosophical Rudiments, chap. II. 2 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. XIV.

3 De Corp. Pol., Pt. I., chap. I.

In this connection Hobbes says: "that irresistible might, in the state of nature, is right."

4 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. XIV.

1

The second law of nature is derived from the fundamental law and reads as follows: "that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth, as for peace, and defence of himself he shall think it necessary; to lay down this right to all things, and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself." The reason for this law he thinks apparent, for so long as every man enjoys the right of doing anything he likes, so long is the condition of mutual warfare continued. However, if other men will not consent to lay down their right to all things, also, then there is no reason why he should, for that would subject him to the prey of others, which is not obligatory upon him. Hobbes calls this the Golden Rule of the Gospel: Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them.2 To fully understand this second law, we must find out what Hobbes means by laying down a right to all things. Every man in a state of nature having a right to all things, A, in laying down this right to B, or to B, C, D, and others, simply removes the hindrances which, in asserting his right, he would place in the way of B or others in seeking their right to all things. This does not mean that A gives to B or others a right which they were not in possession of before, for in a state of nature every man has a right to all things. It simply means that A stands out of the way of B or others, so that they may enjoy their right to all things without hindrance on the part of A, who originally has the right also to all things. A man may lay down a right in

1 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. XIV.; also De Corp. Pol., Pt. I., chap. II.; also Philosophical Rudiments, chap. II.

The

2 The careful student of Christian ethics would hardly admit the identity of the Golden Rule and Hobbes's second law of nature. Golden Rule, neither in letter nor in spirit, can be interpreted with such qualifications as are embodied in Hobbes's second law. It does not read nor mean that we should do unto others, when they are willing to reciprocate, whatsoever we would have them do unto us. Neither does it give as the underlying motive of obedience to the command, self-defence and self-enjoyment.

two ways: by simply renouncing it, caring not to whom the benefits of such a renouncement may accrue; and by transferrence, intending that the benefits should accrue to some particular person or persons. After a man abandons his right in either manner, he is then obliged not to hinder those to whom it has been surrendered from enjoying the advantages accruing. The reason why a man lays down his right is in consideration of a like performance on the part of another or others or for some good which he hopes to attain. This is evident because it is a voluntary act, "and of the voluntary acts of every man the object is some good to himself." And the "good" which he hopes to attain by such a renunciation or transferrence of rights "is nothing else but the security of a man's person in his life, and in the means of so preserving life as not to be weary it." Here the egoism of Hobbes, which his psychological analysis revealed, forms the basis of his doctrine of laying down of rights, which lies at the foundation of his theory. of the genesis and development of the State.

of

Then follows his explanation of contract, which is the mutual transferrence of rights. When one of the contracting parties performs his part of the contract, and permits the other party to postpone performing his part until some specified time, trusting him meanwhile, then we have a covenant. This brings us to the third important law of nature: "that men perform their covenants made." If they do not, then the covenants are of no account, and all men, still possessing the right to all things, will continue in a state of war. This law Hobbes calls "the fountain and original of JUSTICE." 2 There are other laws of nature, also, such as equity, gratitude, modesty, mercy, etc., all of which may be summed up in one, viz.: Do not that to another, which thou

1 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. XV.

2 Ibid.; also De Corp. Pol., Pt. I., chap. III.; also Philosophical Rudiments, chap. III.