Mendel v. School District, 121 Wis. 80. Cassius C. Ward held the personal property. Hogan offered. no evidence of ignorance on his part. We must sustain this finding of fact also. We thus reach the conclusion that the judgment, having support in findings not themselves contrary to the evidence, is correct. By the Court.-Judgment affirmed. MENDEL, Appellant, vs. SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER Six of THE TOWN OF WAUWATOSA, Respondent. February 26-March 22, 1904. School Districts: Contracts: Evidence. 1. A contract for the employment of a janitor for a district school can be made only by the district board at a meeting thereof duly called and held. 2. The best evidence of the acts of a school board is the record of its meetings, kept by the clerk. APPEAL from a judgment of the superior court of Milwaukee county: J. C. LUDWIG, Judge. Affirmed. For the appellant there was a brief by W. C. Zabel, attorney, and W. B. Rubin, of counsel, and oral argument by Mr. Zabel. For the respondent there was a brief by Wheeler & Perry, and oral argument by L. G. Wheeler. WINSLOW, J. The plaintiff sued for damages for breach of a contract to serve defendant as janitor. He claimed that he was employed by the district board in the latter part of November, 1899, to serve as janitor for the balance of the school year beginning December 11, 1899, at the rate of $25 per month. It was admitted that he served for one month Mendel v. School District, 121 Wis. 80. beginning December 11, 1899; that he was paid in full for that month; and that the district board refused to allow him to work longer, although he held himself in readiness to do so. The trial court nonsuited the plaintiff because he failed to prove the entire contract which he claimed, and there can be no question as to the correctness of the ruling. No written contract was produced, but the plaintiff proved that in the latter part of November, 1899, the plaintiff's wife, acting as his agent, handed to the director of the district a written bid to do the work of janitor of the school for $25 per month; that a meeting was held by the board two or three days later, and that after the meeting the director met the plaintiff's wife, and told her that the bid was accepted, and the plaintiff went to work on the 11th of December, and did the work for a month, and was paid therefor. This was substantially all of the plaintiff's proof. It does not show or tend to show the entire contract, which the plaintiff must show in order to recover. The contract could only be made by the board, and the board could only act at a meeting duly called and held. Sec. 432, Stats. 1898; School Dist. v. Baier, 98 Wis. 22, 73 N. W. 448. The best evidence of the acts of the board must be the record of its meetings, kept by the clerk. The record was not offered, nor was its absence explained. It would be a novel idea that the acts of a public board could be proven by the unsworn statements out of court of one of the members of the board. Authorities need hardly be cited to refute such an idea. By the Court.-Judgment affirmed. VOL. 121-6 Kraniger v. Schmidt, 121 Wis. 82. KRANIGER, Appellant, vs. SCHMIDT and another, Respond ents. February 26-March 22, 1904. Deeds: Undue influence: Appeal: Questions of fact: Written decision. 1. A finding of the trial court that a conveyance of land was not executed as the result of undue influence, is held not against the clear preponderance of the evidence. 2. Ordinarily, where the only question raised on an appeal is whether the findings of fact are against the clear preponderance of the evidence, and that question must be answered in the negative, the filing of a decision in writing in strict compliance with sec. 2410, Stats. 1898, is all that is required or advisable. APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee county: ORREN T. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Affirmed. Action to set aside a deed upon the ground of undue influence. The issues raised by the pleadings will sufficiently appear from the findings of fact. The court determined that upon these circumstances the legal rights of the parties depended: February 23, 1903, at the age of seventy-two years, Henry Schmidt died. He left surviving him the plaintiff, Mary Kraniger, his only child, who resided with her husband in a home of her own, she having two lawful children, Frank aged fifteen years, and Josephine aged seven years; Anna, a grandchild aged twenty-two years and unmarried, who was also his adopted daughter and had resided with him. from infancy; a brother, defendant Berthold Schmidt, aged sixty-two years, having a family of seven and not able to work; and Emanuel Schmidt, a half-brother, who was also married and had a large family. His wife died in August, 1902. At the time of his decease he possessed real estate described, worth $7,500. His wife died seised of certain real estate described, worth $2,800. At one time she was possessed Kraniger v. Schmidt, 121 Wis. 82. of other realty which, prior to her decease, without the knowledge of her husband, she conveyed to a religious association. She was the beneficiary named in a $2,000 policy of life insurance upon her husband's life, which, in case she did not survive her husband, was made payable to the daughter Anna. Henry was appointed administrator of his wife's estate, and executed the trust till he died. At her death plaintiff became the owner of the real estate of which the former died seised, subject to Henry's right by curtesy. He claimed that all the realty of which she died seised, and that which she theretofore conveyed away as aforesaid, was purchased with his money and really belonged to him. He insisted thereon when he was informed that she had made the conveyance, and up to the time of his last sickness, when he was endeavoring to induce the grantee to deed the property to him. Anna did not become his adopted daughter till after his wife's death. In January, 1893, he was in failing health. He had suffered a stroke of paralysis. He made an ineffectual attempt to make a will January 17, 1903. The next day he informed his nephew, Berthold Schmidt, his halfbrother and others, that he desired to provide for the disposition of his property, and asked them to be with him the next day accompanied by a notary for that purpose, indicating what disposition thereof he intended to make. Accordingly such persons, accompanied by a notary and the daughter Anna, attended Henry as requested. He then made a deed to Anna of the land in controversy, subject to a charge of $1,500 in favor of defendant Berthold Schmidt. The deed was duly delivered and was thereafter duly recorded. At the time the deed was made the deceased also made a will. devising all the realty of which his wife died seised to the plaintiff, and the realty conveyed by his wife as aforesaid, in case it should be recovered, to his daughter Anna, and in form bequeathed to plaintiff the $2,000 policy of life insurance, requiring her to pay out of the proceeds thereof a Kraniger v. Schmidt, 121 Wis. 82. $900 mortgage on the land conveyed to Anna. He did not in the will attempt to dispose of the land so conveyed. At the time of making such will and conveyance he was of sound mind and competent to make the disposition of his property which he attempted to make, and was not moved in the matter by undue influence. The conclusion of law reached was that the deed made to Anna vested in her a good and indefeasible title to the land described therein, subject to the $1,500 charge in favor of Berthold Schmidt, and that defendants were entitled to a judgment accordingly, and dismissing the complaint with costs. Judgment was so rendered, from which this appeal was taken. For the appellant there was a brief by Sheridan & Wollaeger, and oral argument by J. A. Sheridan. For the respondents there was a brief by Timlin & Glicksman, attorneys, and W. L. Gold, of counsel, and oral argument by Mr. Gold. MARSHALL, J. No new question of law is presented, nor old one applied, which is in controversy. We have only to deal with the question of whether the deed given by the deceased to his daughter Anna was the result of undue influence. The disposition of the policy of life insurance is not involved. Whether the judgment respecting the deed is right depends solely upon whether the findings of fact are against the clear preponderance of the evidence. No good will result, directly or indirectly, from a discussion of the evidence for the purpose of justifying the conclusion at which we have arrived. It is considered that ordinarily, where there is no other question raised upon an appeal than that of whether the findings of fact are against the clear preponderance of the evidence, and it appears that such question must be answered in the negative, the filing of a decision in writing in strict compliance with sec. 2410, Stats. 1898, is |