Standard Mfg. Co. v. Slot, 121 Wis. 14. found, as a general rule, to be that the ignorance was in the particular case excusable, testing the conduct of the wronged. party by the duty of every one to pay reasonable attention to his own interests. That difficulty is also largely attributable to the tendency of some authors to select such eloquent. passages for their text instead of carefully deducing from the decision the rule of law applied in the case. A good illustration of that is the quotation relied upon by respondent's counsel from 1 Bigelow, Fraud, § 523: "If the representation were of a character to induce action, and did induce it, that is enough. It matters not, it has well been declared, that a person misled may be said, in some loose sense, to have been negligent (in reality negligence is beside the case where the representation was calculated to mislead and did mislead); for it is not just that a man who has deceived another should be permitted to say to him, 'You ought not to have believed or trusted me,' or 'You were yourself guilty of negligence.' That was taken from the opinion of Justice DICKEY in Linington v. Strong, 107 Ill. 295. The point presented for decision was whether the court erred in giving the following instruction: "The law requires every person to exercise reasonable prudence in business affairs, and before relieving a party from. the obligations of a contract upon the ground of fraud, it must appear that he exercised reasonable care and prudence. to learn the nature of the contract before executing it; if the defendant could read and had an opportunity to read the contract before signing, it was his duty to do so, unless induced not so to do by wilfully false statements of the plaintiffs, or one of them, as to its being a copy of the original; and if the defendant had full opportunity to read the contract before signing it, and was not induced to sign it by false statements made by plaintiffs, or either of them, the defendant would not be permitted to deny knowledge of the contents thereof." The instruction was approved. It will very clearly be seen that it states the law quite differently from what might Standard Mfg. Co. v. Slot, 121 Wis. 14. be gathered from the quotation incorporated into the text by Mr. Bigelow. We should say in passing that it is immaterial in such a case whether the statements were wilfully false or not, or whether the party making the false statements at the time thereof had any specific intent to deceive. In that respect the quoted instruction was open to serious criticism. The language of the learned judge in the opinion, which influenced the framing of the text we have taken the liberty to criticise, was evidently used forgetting for the moment the well known maxim, "Vigilantibus, et non dormientibus succurrunt jura" (the law assists the vigilant, not the careless). That under some circumstances the law leaves a party where it finds him, and that one of such circumstances is where one appeals for redress who is guilty of an inexcusable fault in falling into the difficulty complained of, is well settled. Applying the foregoing to this case, admitting for the purposes thereof that there is some evidence tending to show false representations, it seems that respondent, upon his own testimony, was inexcusably ignorant of the contents of the paper he signed. He testified, in effect, that his eyesight was good, and the evidence shows that he was a business man of average intelligence and of considerable experience. A casual glance by such a person at the few lines in close connection with the signature would have acquainted him with the fact that he was not making a commission contract. A casual observation of the two lines immediately above his signature would have drawn to his attention the fact that he was signing a stipulation that he had read the contract and knew its contents and was satisfied therewith. Failure to observe those features, under the circumstances, leads to the conclusion that respondent in effect closed his eyes to what was plainly before him. He admitted over and over again that he was requested to read the paper; that the reason why he did not was because he was busy; and he said, as before ་ Standard Mfg. Co. v. Slot, 121 Wis. 14. shown, that no one prevented him from reading it. There was nothing about the relations between him and the agent to lull him into security. They were entire strangers to each other, and respondent and appellant were likewise strangers. The evidence shows that he was pressed to make the deal to such a degree as should have suggested the advisability of taking time to learn what was contained in the paper before affixing his signature thereto. To sign it as he did, after being requested to read it, when a mere glance at that portion immediately connected with where his pen rested on the paper would have informed him of the nature thereof upon the vital point, and the laying of the paper away and not looking at it when he had opportunity to do so, shows inexcusable inattention to his own interests in a high degree. His excuse that it was not customary for him in signing such papers to read them, instead of tending to show that his conduct was consistent with proper care, rather indicates habitual negligence. If under the circumstances stated appellant saw fit to shut his eyes not only when he signed the paper, merely because he was busy and it was customary for him to take that course, but thereafter when there was no reason of that kind to deter him from reading the instrument, relying upon the statement of a mere stranger acting in an adversary capacity as to what it contained, he cannot well complain if the courts have not time to open their doors to afford him relief. The judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered. If counsel for appellant had moved the court below to change the answers to the special questions so as to conform to the evidence on the subject of respondent's negligence, the case might go back for judgment in appellant's favor. Under the established practice a mere motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is no more than a motion for a directed verdict or a motion for a nonsuit, or a motion to set the ver dict aside and grant a new trial, as regards a final disposi Saveland v. Connors, 121 Wis. 28. tion of the case without a new trial, upon the judgment entered adverse to such motion being reversed upon appeal. By the Court. The judgment appealed from is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial. SAVELAND, Appellant, vs. CONNORS and another, imp., Respondents. February 24-March 22, 1904. Jurisdiction: Defendants fraudulently decoyed into state: Dismissal of action: Evidence: Frauds other than that in suit. 1. Where plaintiff by fraud decoyed the defendants into this state for the purpose of bringing them within the jurisdiction of its courts, the action may, in discretion, be dismissed on that ground; and it is immaterial that plaintiff intended at first merely a criminal prosecution and not a civil action, or that, after service of process in the civil action, defendants entered appearances therein or otherwise submitted to the jurisdiction. 2. In an action to recover damages for fraud perpetrated in connection with a prize fight, defendants cannot properly be questioned, on cross-examination, as to their knowledge of, or connection with, other fraudulent sporting events. APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee county: LAWRENCE W. HALSEY, Circuit Judge. Affirmed. Appeal from an order setting aside the service upon the defendants and dismissing the action. It appeared that the plaintiff, in July, 1902, had bet money upon a prize fight in Springfield, Illinois, apparently with the understanding that by collusion between the participants the one upon whom he bet was to win, but that in fact the convention between them was the reverse of his understanding, whereby his champion. lost the fight and plaintiff his money; that he considered de Saveland v. Connors, 121 Wis. 28. fendant Connors, who was stakeholder, as having been in the conspiracy to delude and defraud him; that in March, 1903, thereafter, he again visited Springfield, and had an interview with Connors about joining in drawing some Milwaukee acquaintance of plaintiff into a similar operation to their mutual benefit, and to the partial or complete reimbursement of the plaintiff. The witnesses differ as to who suggested this plan, but agree that it was then talked over, and plaintiff admits that when it was suggested he thought he saw opportunity to get Connors, and perhaps some of his confederates, to Milwaukee, where he thought they might be dealt with in a less friendly spirit than that which shielded them in Springfield. Defendants claim that at that time plaintiff met defendant McCarren, and arranged to have him come to Milwaukee to endeavor to put the scheme in operation, though plaintiff denies this. However, late in March, McCarren, who was a foot racer, and one Henderson, also a foot racer, did come to Milwaukee and call upon plaintiff, whose attorney then notified the police of their presence and purpose, and plaintiff engaged with them in an ostensible. scheme to draw an acquaintance of his into betting considerable sums upon a proposed foot race between them, to be run at Rochester, New York. Plaintiff, however, desired to reach Connors, and therefore got into communication with him by telephone, and insisted on his coming to Milwaukee to aid to "skin up a sucker." Connors responded with celerity, and appeared the next forenoon. He, together with the other two Springfield men, were put in communication with plaintiff's friend, and opened up their plan of a collusive foot race to him, and were decoyed into the hands of the police, who held them, upon charges of vagrancy or otherwise, in jail, for some time. Immediately after their arrest, however, summons and complaint were served upon them in this action, seeking to recover damages for fraud perpetrated on the plaintiff in the Springfield transaction. They also were |