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effect, except to take the money across the streets and bring it back again, it would have been a most pernicious effect. She had her eighteen millions of currency to sustain. She could not keep all her sails set, and throw all her ballast overboard. She was obliged to meet the payment by curtailing her discounts, by calling upon her own debtors. This was the only safe or prudent course for her to take. When a bank calls upon her debtors to return a part of the amount due to her, every individual debtor who has a deposite in the bank, will necessarily draw upon it. Two and two do not always make four in a bank curtailment. The curtailments of the bank made in August, were in part met by the withdrawal of a portion of the private deposites from the bank. Mr. B. then showed that the curtailment made by the bank in August, of four millions of discounts, drew from the community less than one million. The reduction might be very large and the effect very small; and the bank, in his opinon, ought to strengthen herself: yet the curtailments which had been made tended very little to that object. The whole amount of reduction from August to January increased the means of the bank only to the amount of the sum which the Government took away.

They are right, who say that the removal of the deposites from the bank did not produce the distress; but it was the universal want of confidence and stagnation produced by the measures necessarily taken by the bank to pay the public deposites. The object might have been accomplished with less embarrassment to the community, if the Treasury Department had rendered it certain at what time, and when the money should be paid. But the bank found that it had to deal with an enemy, who sought to come upon it by surprise, and in the dark. The daily and weekly lists of sums deposited by the Government, were discontinued, and large drafts were sent without notice. Some of these were drafts to be paid on certain contingencies, beyond the knowledge or control of the bank. Every reflecting man must say that the course of the Secretary of the Treasury, in keeping these drafts hovering between Baltimore and Boston, to the amount of three millions, was alone sufficient to account for the alarm of the bank, and to render advisable a much larger amount of curtailment than was resorted to. When the removal of the public deposites to a State bank in Philadelphia was made, it was found not to be so valuable a present as was at first supposed. The private deposites lessened in the proportion that the Government deposites increased; for private individuals found that the Government was a preferred depositor, and, in case of any difficulty, would sweep the whole. Several other views he presented, to show that the State banks could not, so well as the United States Bank, discount upon the public deposites. The days of one and one and a half per cent, were days of disaster to both borrower and lender. There was (he spoke from personal knowledze) a vast amount of private capital in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, ready to be loaned at five per cent., upon security of stocks; but the universal want of confidence kept it out of the market. The great amount of money in the country was employed in bringing the crops to market, and in transporting merchandise in exchange for the

crops.

I ask, what was the structure of the bank, that it could provide at every point for the wants of the Government, and, at the same time, promote the interests of the country, by carrying on their exchanges? But the bank having no share in the deposites removed, but being obliged to distribute them at any point, she must diminish her assistance to the community. The State banks, he contended, could not pay the public deposites, and at the same time assist the community. Let them try it, and in three months' time they will give it un, or, in violation of their charters, consolidate their relics into a United States Bank. The rem edy that was to be applied for this state of things Was apparent to every one-the restoration of the deposites. But the gentleman from Tennessee wants a sifting inquiry, before he acts upon the question; a sifting inquiry must be had into the miserable driblets of printing accounts, and into the fact whether the National Intelligencer belongs to the bank or not; while, in the meantime, the

great interests of the country are set aside and
neglected.

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the sufficiency of these reasons, and ought to have their justice examined into by the House. He The question for the consideration of the House, found that this very right of the House was conwas, whether the reasons adduced by the Secreta- ceded, in the communication read in the debate, ry of the Treasury were such as ought to be sat- from Secretary Crawford to the House-one of the isfactory to Congress? If not, then whether they charges made against him was, that he had removed were not bound to consider if there was any, and the deposites from the United States Bank to the what remedy should be applied to avert the dangers Bank at Chilicothe, without communicating his that were now more than apprehended to fall on reasons for such removal to Congress. Well, then, the country in consequence of his removal of the did the Secretary of that day assume the ground deposites? It was necessary for him, then, to take now taken? Did he not say, rather in terms, that them as given; and here he would observe, and it the omission was owing to inadvertence? And what could not have escaped observation, that the Sec- further? That this very provision-the submitting retary of the Treasury had submitted various the reasons to Congress-" was intended for the propositions as the basis of his action, with a state- benefit of the bank." Mr. Secretary Crawford ment of some particular facts, by which he justi-again admits that the reasons were to be commufied that action. The arguments in the statement of nicated to Congress. Why? Because, it was nefacts, made for his justification were large and nu- cessary that Congress should know where the merous enough; whilst for the groundwork, the public money should be deposited. He concluded, basis, there was no argument at all, neither had therefore, and maintained, that the assertion that they been enlightened on this point, by the honor- the power of the Secretary was absolute and unable member [Mr. POLK] who had preceded him conditional was not made out; was in the face of (Mr. B.) in the debate. The Secretary broadly this former precedent of Secretary Crawford; and asserted, that whether he was right, or whether had only arisen from the very poverty of the case. he was wrong, he alone was authorized to remove He trusted that Congress would not sauction such the deposites. The bank, by the removal, were, principle, as that, in a case of actual contract, after in legal parlance, put out of court-in fact, they a bonus had been paid by the bank, and services were not entitled to a hearing as a party in the rendered by them, estimated at nearly 200,000 dolcause. For this, however, no reason was given. lars per annum, the Secretary could, for insufHe next asserts, as another of his propositions, ficient reasons, thus commit what was a breach of that Congress tied themselves up by the act incor- the contract for which this bonus and services were porating the bank, and in which they had given paid; and Congress supposing his reasons to be inhim alone the absolute and unconditional power of sufficient, had not power to bring the subject back, removal. So that if this assertion was founded and reverse a decision which might be proved to be correctly, it must follow, as a matter of course, contrary to a sense of common justice. The House that Congress could not interfere, with even the had the right to inquire into these reasons and into best reasons in the world for doing so-the very their justice. They were bound to do this, lest safety of the deposites themselves-they could not they might have been dictated by caprice, and thus take this money from the bank. Another propo- the public faith had been violated, and the bank sition submitted by him was, that the removal hav- turned away from the enjoyment of what was their ing even a tendency towards public convenience, purchased rights. was sufficient for him in making the removal; and he went further to say, that the power to remove, conferred the power to place the public money elsewhere. But to sustain these various propositions, no argument was given; they rested on mere dogmas, and he could only, therefore, in the absence of any argument to sustain them, proceed to discuss them negatively, and to show that if they were examined into attentively and admitted, it would be conceding that which he believed the House never would sanction. Mr. B. here proceeded to review at length the reasons of the Secretary, and read from his letter to Congress the passages in which it was stated that, by repeated adjudications, the charter granted to the bank was in the nature of a contract, and by which it was alleged by the Secretary that the power reserved to the Secretary over the deposites should not be restricted to any particular contingency, but was absolute and unconditional; and thus, as he (Mr. B.) contended, he must be supposed as assuming the ground that, be his reasons for the removal right or wrong, it could be no breach of the contract to remove the deposites.

The Secretary admits that the bank obtained their privileges for a consideration, paid by them in money and services; he must admit also that the bank is still performing services in various ways. He says that the power is absolute, although it is stated that the charter was in the nature of a contract, one part of which was, that he was obliged to report to Congress his reasons for any use of the power given to him; but he (Mr. B.) asked what fair construction could be put on that obligation, if it was not that Congress had a right to consider those reasons? Why else was it required that they should be given at all? This was the commonsense doctrine, and which is the legal doctrine, because the law says expressly, that the reasons shall concern the party whom they affect; and if this be so, how could the Secretary be correct in asserting that the bank had no concern in the reasons, which he was bound to furnish, by the terms of what he admits is a contract—a pecuniary contract, between the stockholders on the one part, and the sovereignty (the United States) granting it? He contended that the bank, being thus the admitted party to a contract made, by which the Secretary was bound to furnish his reasons, he in compliance with that obligation, done no more than his duty; the bank then were the party who were only concerned in

The next proposition assumed by the Secretary, which he meant to discuss, was, that the power reserved to the Secretary did not depend for its exercise on the safety of the money, or the fidelity with which the bank had conducted itself, but that he (the Secretary) had the right whenever the public interest required it. Mr. B. would, however, defer this until the next day, if favored by the House with an adjournment. Mr. MERCER rose and submitted a motion to that effect; which prevailed.

IN SENATE.
WEDNESDAY, January 8, 1834.
Mr. ROBINSON, from the Committee on En-
grossed Bills, made a report.

Mr. TOMLINSON gave notice that he should ask leave to-morrow to introduce a bill, the nature of which could not be understood.

Mr. WEBSTER, from the Select Committee, reported a bill, with an amendment, on the subject of French spoliations prior to 1800; which was read, and on motion of Mr. W., was made the special order of the day for Wednesday, the 5th of February.

Mr. MORRIS made a report from the Committee on Engrossed Bills.

Mr. WAGGAMAN introduced a letter from the Governor of Louisiana, enclosing the following resolutions, which were read:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of Louisiana, in General Assembly convened, That our Senators in Congress be instructed, and our Representatives requested, to support such measures as they may deem expedient to terminate equitably the disputes existing between occupants of land in the county of Feliciana, who claim under titles derived from the Government of the United States, and those claiming the same land under grants from the Spanish or other authorities.

And be it further resolved, &c., That the Governor be requested to transmit copies of these resolutions to our Senators and Representatives in Congress. ALCEE LABRANCHE, Speaker of the House of Representatives. C. DERBIGNY, President of the Senate.

Approved December 19, 1833.

A. B. ROMAN, Governor of the State of Louisiana.

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Mr. RIVES presented a memorial of the representatives of General Thomas Nelson, deceased, praying compensation for services in the revolutionary war; which was referred to the Committee on Revolutionary Claims.

Mr. RIVES also presented the memorial of certain citizens of Virginia, asking relief for damages sustained by French spoliations prior to 1800, which he declined sending for the present to the select committee on that subject, they having made a report this morning, and moved that the memorial be laid upon the table.

Mr. HENDRICKS reported a bill for the relief of George Kinn; which was read and committed. The Senate then proceeded to the consideration of the special order of the day.

THE REMOVAL OF THE DEPOSITES.

The question being on the motion of Mr. BENTON to strike out Mr. CLAY'S second resolution and insert the amendment

Mr. SOUTHARD said that he desired

Biddle's testimony, as well as that of any other person. He could have it by the

appointment of a committee of investiga tion. But while the Senator from Missouri was considering the reasons of the Secretary, he concludes his speech of four day's continuance, by moving a question which was in no way connected with the subject. He thought the Senator [Mr. SOUTHARD] was right in desiring to disentangle this from the great subject, and therefore he hoped an immediate question would be taken upon the amendment, which he considered frivolous. where it was, it might, indeed, be said to be ridiculous, because it placed the Senate in the attitude of a grand jury, impannelled to try certain charges against the officers of the United States Bank.

Placed

He

hoped the Senate would either get rid of or adopt the proposition, so that an inquiry might be had into the sufficiency of the reasons of the Secretary of the Treas

to express his views on this question, but a resolution had been interposed as an amendment, on which he had no wish to say anything. Any remarks which he might be disposed to make now, ought,ury for the removal of the deposites. Mr. FORSYTH said, that the Senator agreeably to parliamentary usage, to be not now in his seat, could not have anticiupon the amendment, and therefore it was

his desire that the question should be put on the amendment, and he would therefore reserve what he had to say on the general question until that should be disposed of: he therefore asked the yeas and nays on the amendment.

Mr. FORSYTH said that this question had come up very unexpectedly. The route, and the number and amount of forfeitures gentleman who offered the amendment

enforced by him in consequence of those failures, during the same period.

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

The resolution of Mr. LINNThat the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads be instructed to inquire into the expediency of transporting the mail from Louisville, Kentucky, to St. Louis, Missouri, in steamboats;

And the resolution of Mr. KING, of Alabama, That the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads be instructed to inquire into the expediency of making an appropriation for the completion of the post road from Line Creek to the Chattahoochee

Were taken up and adopted.

Petitions and memorials were presented by Messrs. TOMLINSON, FRELINGHUYSEN, BIBB, WAGGAMAN, LINN, and PORTER, which were referred to appropriate committees.

Mr. WILKINS presented a petition from the Board of Trustees of Alleghany College, in Pennsylvania, stating that they proposed incorporating manual labor with collegiate studies, and asking Congress to grant them lands to carry into effect their object; which, on motion of Mr. WILKINS, was referred to the Committee on Public Lands.

The following bills from the House of Representatives were ordered to be engrossed and read a third time:

A bill for the relief of John Haggerty and David Austin. [This bill was improperly stated yesterday as having passed.]

A bill for the relief of Benjamin G. Minturn. A bill for the relief of John Hone and Sons, of New York.

A bill for the relief of Enoch Spencer.

A bill for the relief of Phineas Sprague and others.

A bill for the relief of John Harter.

A bill for the relief of the widow and heirs of Felix Adrain.

A bill for the relief of Ebenezer Lobdell. A bill for the relief of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company.

A bill for the relief of the heirs of Robert Labarr.

[Mr. BENTON] was not in his seat, and as he could not possibly have expected this state of things, he would move to lay the subject on the table.

Mr. CLAY hoped not. Mr. GRUNDY did not feel willing to He would lay the matter on the table. rather the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. BENTON] should be present, but yet he thought the motion of the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. SOUTHARD] a very proper one. He (Mr. G.) had no desire to say a word on the main question, but he wished that the Senate might be full. The gentleman [Mr. B.] lived very near the Capitol, and if the Senate would delay a few minutes, he thought he would be in. The motion to lay on the table was lost.

Mr. KING, of Alabama, said he thought the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. SOUTHARD] was not right in his view. The whole subject was open for discussion on the motion to strike out, and he hoped the gentleman would take up the subject as he proposed to do.

Mr. POINDEXTER said he had a single remark to make. The great subject under consideration grew out of the reasons of the Secretary of the Treasury for his removal of the Government deposites. The amendment of the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. BENTON] has no relevancy to this question whatever. It was a distinct substantive proposition, and one in which he would certainly succeed if it were made agreeably to parliamentary usage. The gentleman could have Mr.

pated that such would be the fate of his resolution. He hoped to hear the remarks of the Senator from New Jersey; he desired no delay, but he trusted that this proposi tion would not be hurried on when it had been thus violently assailed by the gentleman, [Mr. POINDEXTER.] But he, Mr. F., would say that the proposition has relation begged leave to call attention to it. Mr. to the question before the Senate. He

F. read the amendment.

Now, sir, said Mr. F., what is the subject before the Senate? It is a condemnation of the reasons of the Secretary of the Treasury for an official act. And among those reasons, there was a charge against the Bank of the United States for the im

proper curtailment of its discounts, and the improper manner of doing it, and that tuted its means for political purposes. it had interfered in elections, and prosti Now, has it not relation to the subject? As respects the propriety of the proposed course of calling witnesses to the bar of the Senate, that was a very different ques tion. He was not quite satisfied that it

was correct.

But the proposition was certainly in order, and it ought not to excite the surprise of the gentleman from curred in some respects with the views of Mississippi [Mr. P.] He, Mr. F., conthe gentleman, [Mr. BENTON,] but he was

not satisfied to take the statements of the Secretary of the Treasury.

Mr. F. was here told that Mr. BENTON was in the Chamber, and he then resumed his seat. The VICE PRESIDENT having stated the question,

Mr. KANE asked for a division of it, to end with striking out.

The VICE PRESIDENT read the rule, to show that the motion was not in order.

Mr. BENTON said, he did not wish to embarsuggested his readiness to modify it by a motion rass gentlemen by pressing his amendment, but to strike out and afterwards to insert, but he did not consider it material.

The question being on the adoption of the amendment, in lieu of the second resolution,

Mr. CHAMBERS demanded the yeas and nays, which were ordered, and are as follows, to wit:

YEAS-Messrs. Benton, Brown, Grundy, Hill, Kane, Linn, Morris, Shepley, Tallmadge, Tipton, White, and Wright-12.

NAYS-Messrs. Bell, Bibb, Black, Calhoun,
Chambers, Clay, Ewing, Forsyth, Frelinghuysen,
Hendricks, Kent, King of Alabama, King of
Georgia, Knight, McKean, Mangum, Moore,
Naudain, Poindexter, Porter, Prentiss, Preston,
Rives, Robbins, Robinson, Silsbee, Smith, South-agent or agents are to be appointed by the Secre-
and, Sprague, Swift, Tomlinson, Waggaman,
Webster, Wilkins-34.

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Mr. SOUTHARD said, that as the question recurred upon the reasons of the Secretary of the Teasury for the removal of the deposites, and the resolutions of the gentleman from Kentucky founded upon them, he would endeavor to meet it. It presented a serious and very important Question. For sixteen years past, the money of the people had been deposited in the place selected by Congress and the laws for its reception, and it Las now been removed and deposited in places where Congress has not directed it to be placed, | to wit: in some twenty or thirty of the State banks. It was, before the removal, in the place which Congress had created, and it is now where Con-, gress has no control over it. It therefore presents a question most intimately connected with the sity, welfare, and best interests of the country. kwas not a question of office or of place, or whether the Bank of the United States should be rechartered or not. It is a question placed far a ove it; it rises higher, and fixes and determines forever after, the powers delegated to a high funcmary of the Government; and when political" aspirants shall be forgotten, and the scramble for olice shall be at an end, it will stand in bold relief before posterity as the assumption and exercise of an enormous power. It becomes us, therefore, to consider the subject with calmness and deliberation, and he proposed to consider, first, what the Secretary has done; second, the principles by which he has been governed; and third, the reasons he has given for doing the act.

Ist. What has the Secretary done? He has ordered the inferior officers and debtors of the Government to place the money of the Government in places which he has selected, so that hereafter, the money shall he placed there according to his orders, and on terms which he has prescribed, and these terms are to be found in the agreement made with the banks where the moneys are to be deposited. In page 40 of the pamphlet copy of the report, we find the terms, or the agreement, which has been made with the banks to receive the money. To know what is done, and how it has been done, it is necessary to refer to that agreement. The first item is, that "the said bank ates to receive and enter to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States all sums of money tered to be deposited on account of the United States, &c., whether in gold or silver, or notes of the Bank of the United States or branches, in notes of any bank which are convertible into coin in its immediate vicinity, or in notes of any bank which it is, for the time being, in the habit of receiving." Which it is in the habit of receiving! Let it be remarked that these receiving banks confine themselves to a particular specified kind of money, which they receive in their immediate Venity. The second item is, that, if the depostes in said bank shall exceed one half of its capital stock actually paid in, it is agreed that collateral *security shall be given," &c. Then let it be observed, too, that here is no present security for the people's money. It has been placed in certain Links, without first taking the necessary security, even if the Secretary possessed the power to do 30. And if hereafter it should be taken, it must e done by the Secretary, not by Congress. The Secretary has not obtained the security, and he could not possibly know the necessity for it, for he says expressly he has not seen the charters of the selected banks. And he was in such a hurry to effect the removal, that one of the banks was actually incapable of receiving them. Another dem is, that the banks are to make transfers of the pule moneys from place to place on reasonable notice given. And what is to be understood by reasonable notice? Suppose an order should be Issued to transfer $200,000 to a particular place

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in five days: is that reasonable notice? and would the bank notified agree that it was reasonable notice? Another item is, that all the services required of these banks are to be performed in their immediate vicinity. And here there is a perfect surrender of the rights which Congress should possess of transferring the money to any point in the country. Another item is, that an ⠀ tary of the Treasury, and the compensation and expenses of this agency are to be fixed by him, paced under the control of the Secretary, and as to the banks, why they are to pay for it. And, sir, the consequences are apparent. The seventh item authorizes the Secretary to dismiss the receiving banks at his will and pleasure. But the Secretary has omitted to tell us when contracts were made with most of the banks. The dates of some he has given, hit as to the others the time at which they were entered into be has altogether omitted to state. Sir, when the Secretary was about to give his reasons for the act in question, was it ingenuous, was it honest, to conceal from Congress when these contracts were made as going to operate on those very reasons? There was another thing, the solvency or insolvency of the selected banks, which the Secretary had not inquired into, and therefore he could know nothing about it. He had not seen the charters, but was so imprudent as to act without the necessary information; and now Congress was called on to justify him in an act which affects the treasury of the nation. The time selected by him, the period at which the action took place, manifests too truly that he did not desire this information. On the 18th September he determined to remove the deposites. The action upon this determination took place on the 26th; and was there time to make the necessary inquiry, which in justice to the country the importance of the act rendered it necessary should be made? But, perhaps, it may be suggested that everything necessary to be known was known, because a negotiating agent had been appointed on this subject the August preceding. But his report could have been made only a few days preceding the action of the Secretary, and, by the well-known course of time and distance, it could only have been known as to two or three banks in the cities in this vicinity. But as to the banks from Maine to Louisiana it could not have been known. It is true the Secretary assures us that the banks are of undoubted credit. He (Mr. S.) was not disposed to impeach the word of the Secretary; but when we were called on to act on this important question, he could not take the dictum of the Secretary. He wished to know the fact, and without obtaining it the Secretary has been guilty of a most gross and palpable violation of his duty. He tells us he was obliged to draw money out of the Bank of the United States and give it to the State banks for the purpose of sustaining them, and yet he says they are of undoubted solvency. It may be so. But when they are given duties to perform not authorized by their charters, their very act becomes an act of insolvency. In regard to what the Secretary did in making the contract, he was not satisfied; but there was another greater and paramount cause of dissatisfaction: it was the power to make these contracts. If the Secretary is invested with no power to make the contract, the contracts are void. this was a question which it was unnecessary to argue, because, unless authority can be shown for it, it is void, except so far only as it depends upon the honor of those with whom he has made the contract. He would like to know and be informed of the power and authority given to the Secretary for making these contracts, which affect the whole treasure of the United States. He could find none, and he had searched carefully. But, on the contrary, he had found something the very opposite of it-something directly against it. He referred to the act read by the gentleman from Kentucky, passed in May, 1820. He would ask, does that act mean what that gentleman contended for, or not? He had heard the construction given to it by that gentleman, and perfectly coincided with him in it. But there was another remark which he had to make on the Secretary's argument on this subject. The Secretary says that the power to remove necessarily draws after it the power to fix the place of deposite. Sir, it is a non sequitur.

But

It does not follow of course. The Secretary is the agent of the law, and can act only by the law. The Secretary of the Treasury is to decide as to the general management of the treasure of the Union. But the Treasurer himself is the offcer designated by Congress to perform express acts to be done in the disbursement of the public moneys. He hoped to be able to show that it was the Treasurer, in the absence of all laws to the contrary, who was to select the places for the safe"keeping of the public moneys. There was another thing to be considered-the influence which this act was calculated to exert upon public sentiment in relation to the extent of delegated powers. Looking into it as the act of the Secretary, and he would ask if it was not a power enormous in itself, and dangerous to the institutions of the country? This agreement places the receiving banks at the will and mercy of the Secretary. He can destroy them all at a single blow; he may require payments to be made agreeably to his own direction; he may determine when, how, and in what time, they shall transmit money from place to place. He may retain, dismiss, or discharge them, whenever he sees fit, and this from other motives than should govern a public officer in the discharge of his duties. He may show favor and partiality to whom he pleases, for by this act he has created an army of sycophants and supporters. Sir, have we not seen the answer of one of these banks to the notification of its selection? The president says: "I take the occasion to express the high sense of honor conferred upon the bank by so distinguished a mark of your confi'dence;" thus stooping and cringing to the dispenser of favors. All this is not according to the laws of the land, but the authority of the Secretary, and he says, "I am under the President of the United States." He has no official will of his own, and all this power is to be in the hands of the President. If Senators are willing to have it there, let them do so; but if not, he hoped they would say so. Congress had regulated the inter

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course between the Government and the Bank of the United States; but as to the banks selected in its stead as the public depository, at the whim of the Secretary, they were taken out of those regulations, and placed under his sole control; and would Senators countenance such acts? But the Secretary has done another act. He has recommended that the holders of public money, disbursing officers, who are under bond for the safekeeping of that money, and its faithful disbursement, to deposite those moneys in certain banks, (and this act is approved by the President in page 41-2 of the pamphlet.) Sir, by this act the President has violated his duty. He has directed the Secretary to do an act by which he has placed all the disbursing officers of the Government at his own will and discretion. What, he would inquire, would be the consequence of that act on every such officer of the Government? Suppose three or four large disbursing officers here had been in the habit of placing their money in the Patriotic Bank, and the order of the Secretary should be received to remove them from the Patriotic Bank and place them in the Bank of the Metropolis, and afterwards supposing they should be lost: what would the consequences be? If the Bank of the Metropolis should not safely keep it, the officers would be released from their bonds, or if not released, they would be placed at the mercy and under the power of one man, and an officer of the law not empowered to interfere with them. The Secretary has ordered the deposites to be made to the credit of the United States, but he has made no contract that the money placed in the receiving banks shall be secured to the United States. has drawn the public money from the Bank of the United States and the Treasury of the United States, in direct violation of law. He has given drafts in favor of the Union Bank of Maryland, the Girard Bank, the Mechanics' and Manhattan Banks of New York, for sums amounting to nearly three millions of dollars. How much more to other banks we do not know; and these drafts are not countersigned by the Comptroller in the usual way. And as to the time when they were drawn, that is not known; but after they had been issued some time, it was discovered that they had been out and in the hands of the cashiers of these banks a month before they were presented for payment.

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Mr. HARPER, a bill making an appropriation for the erection of a marine hospital at Portland, Maine;

Mr. MANN, a bill for the relief of W. L. Cockerill; and

Mr. SUTHERLAND, a bill for the relief of James Marsh;

All which bills were severally read twice and committed.

Mr. POLK, from the Committee of Ways and Means, reported that that committee had agreed to the amendments made by the Senate to the bill making an appropriation in part for the service of Government for 1834; and the bill was then committed to the Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union.

6

REMOVAL OF THE DEPOSITES.

The House having resumed the consideration of the motion to refer the Secretary of the Treasury's report on the deposites to the Committee of Ways and Means, and the question being upon the mo tion of Mr. McDUFFIE to add to the motion for reference the following instructions to the said committee:

"With instructions to report a joint resolution, 'providing that the public revenue hereafter col

'ted States, in compliance with the public faith, pledged by the charter of the said bank;"

it from one man and giving it to another it should
be lost, the Government loses it and not the
bank. It is an entire change of the responsibili- ||
ties of the agents, and the moment the bank loses
possession of the money, it loses its liabilities.
The transfer must always be made where the le-
gal responsibility is the same in the agent to which
it is transferred, as in that from which it is taken.
While he viewed the subject in this light, he must
believe, and he must vote too, that there has been
here a most shameful abuse of power and viola-
tion of official duty by the Secretary. There is no
relief for the act to be found, in saying that Con-
gress has placed no guard around the treasury,
and therefore it can be done. Congress has pro-
vided ample guards. He viewed it as a direct vi-
olation of law. The law has directed the manner
in which the money should be taken out of the
treasury, and its directions have not been pursued.
The proofs offered by the gentleman from Ken-
tucky were, to his mind, conclusive. And he felt
impelled to say, that the time when this act was
done drew none of his respect towards it. It was
done when the Secretary knew he could not ac-
complish the act and the purposes designed, unless
done before the meeting of Congress. He knew
it was a question of momentous interest and im-lected shall be deposited in the Bank of the Uni-
portance; that if deferred, it must agitate Congress
in their deliberations, while they were making ar
rangements for depositing the public money else-
Mr. BINNEY rose and said, that in the
where. He knew that he would be insulting Con-
gress, and that Congress would not approve of the remarks which he had the honor to ad-
act. Recollect, almost the last act of the repre- dress to the House yesterday, he had con-
sentatives of the people, when called on by thecluded what he had to say upon the first
highest authority to act, was to express their
opinion, as the representatives of the people, that
of the general propositions to be found in
the public money was safe in the United States the letter of the Secretary of the Treasury,
Bank; and yet, in six months, and within sixty but which was not sustained by any argu-
days of the next meeting of Congress, a Secretary ment from him. He would now proceed
of the Treasury is found disregarding the opinion to discuss the second proposition, which
of Congress, and it may be said, acting in direct
violation of their instructions. The Secretary was one affecting, as he viewed it, the
knew all this-ay, more; he knew that if the mo- House as a component part of the legis
ney was once removed, it would require a law, or lature, and affecting also their whole legis-
a joint resolution of Congress, to restore it.
knew, and he believed, too, if he could get the
lative power in the most critical and vital
money out, that unless two-thirds of both Houses parts, as would appear from the statement
could be obtained in favor of the restoration, a of the Secretary, itself. It was in terms
single word from the President would veto it. Sir, that the power reserved to the Secretary
it was to prevent the legislative action that this
of the Treasury does not depend for its
act was done. And is there a parallel to it in his-
tory? Is there in all history an instance of greater exercise, merely on the safety of the pub-
scorn towards the legislature? No, sir! A Sec- lic money in the hands of the bank, nor
retary does an act within sixty days of the meet-
ing of Congress, and by this act bereaves Congress
upon the fidelity with which it has con-
of their whole power over the treasury of the
ducted itself; but that he has the right to
Union. He (Mr. S.) stood here to maintain the remove the deposites, and it is his duty to
authority of Congress, and he would maintain its remove them, whenever the public interest
or convenience will be promoted by the
change; that even although Congress
should be convinced that the depository
was unsafe, or that the interests of the
people imperiously demanded the removal,
he alone, not they, had any control in the
matter. These were the terms of the
Secretary himself, and the House must
perceive, that this must be their plain
meaning; and for thus stating it so plainly,
he acknowledged that much benefit was
thereby procured for those gentlemen who
were disposed to controvert him; for if his
propositions had not been put so plainly,
or had been given in an ambiguous man-
ner, when they discussed the subject, it
might be alleged, that, what they urged,
was not an answer to the proposition at
all. Now, he called on the House to re-
collect, that this proposition denied the
power of the House, and was put forward
by the Secretary as a justification of his
own acts. This was a question as to the
interpretation to be given to the terms of
a statute; it was a question of the exten-
sion of authority or restraint to be ascer-
tained from the reasons and within the

Where had the Secretary told us that he had placed
these sums at the disposal of the banks for their
relief? Nowhere. He has concealed it, and it
was a most disingenuous concealment. We know
it now from the correspondence of the banks with
the Treasurer. But the drafts are said to be con-
tingents, and that the banks should use the money
if pressed by the United States Bank. He has
drawn this money, or made it subject to be drawn,
and placed it on a contingency to be judged of by
the banks to whom they were given. What, then,
is this but a loan to these banks to support their
eredit? What else could it be? Was it for the
purpose of doing what the laws required? Are
Senators prepared to say that the Secretary could
loan the people's money to the banks for their own
use, and this done, too, without security? Where
is the security? Is it in the bond of the cashier?
Would the bank itself have been bound to answer
to the Government for this money? Certainly not,
until it was placed within its vaults? The cashier
might have drawn it and gone off with it, and not
a single dollar of it could ever have been recovered
-it would have been thrown on the waves without
the means of ever reaching it again. And while
these drafts were in the cashier's hands, what was
the situation of the books of the treasury? They
would have shown the transfer, and if it had been
lost, the loss would have been on the Treasurer
himself. This act of the Secretary is a most ex-
traordinary transaction, and he would only say,
that if the Secretary can do this, and Congress has
been so negligent of its duty, and has provided no
guards to the public treasury, it becomes us now
to repair the defect, and if anything had been omit-
ted, he hoped it would be so no longer. But Con-
gress has not neglected its duty. It has secured
guards enough around the treasury. But we are
told that new guards have been placed round it to
save it from plunder. And what are these new
guards? The mode of sending notices to the banks
of drafts, to prevent frauds. Sir, the mode of
drawing money out of the Treasury has always
been a uniform one. Four years ago, we heard
much about these treasury guards. And this is
only another instance to the many preceding it, of
trifles lighter than air, being used for political
effect, and to promote political objects. The drafts
were in violation of the charter of the bank and of
the laws. They were secret. The officers had not
the courage, or if they had they had not the hon-
esty, to announce the possession of them. And
the danger impending from that cause over the
public treasure, and the imprudence of the act,
were not creditable to the sagacity of the Secretary.
Two millions of drafts were in the hands of cash-
iers totally irresponsible, which might have been
presented at a moment's warning, and yet we are
told that the Bank of the United States acted dis-power over the treasury of the country.
honestly and oppressively in guarding against
them. That in these very guards it had violated its
charter and been guilty of gross misconduct, be-
cause it had placed a shield around itself to avoid
the assaults of those who ought to protect and sus-
tain it. Sir, said Mr. S., if the Senate will sustain
the reasons of the Secretary, there are no longer
any guards upon the public treasury. The Pres-
ident of the United States and Secretary of the
Treasury may take it when and to where they
please, and he would ask, was the Senate prepared
to justify the act? But an apology had been offered
for this act of the Secretary, that they were transfer
drafts. And what, he would ask, is a transfer draft?
It is simply this: the money of the Government is
in a particular place where it is not wanted, and
they wish it transferred to a place where they do
want it for disbursement. For instance, the money
is in the bank at Philadelphia, and it is wanted in
Norfolk. A draft is drawn on the bank in Phila-
delphia to place it in Norfolk, to meet the demands
of the Government there. It is a mere letter of
advice to place it where the Government wants it.
It is not properly a draft to take money away from
the bank on which it is drawn, but merely to change
its place of disbursement. When was this transfer
draft ever used to place the people's money in the
hands of other banks for their own use? Never.
Was it ever to be used to take money from one
part of a town to another part? The object of the
Government is to pay its debts, and nothing else.
And what is the effect of this transfer, according
to the doctrine of the Secretary? Why, if in taking

Here Mr. SOUTHARD yielded the floor to Mr.
FRELINGHUYSEN, upon whose motion the
Senate adjourned.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
WEDNESDAY, January 8, 1834.
The SPEAKER laid before the House the fol-
lowing letter from Mr. BULLARD:

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
January 8, 1834.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that my
seat in the House of Representatives of the United;
States, over which you preside, has become va-
cant, by resignation addressed to the Executive of
the State of Louisiana.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your
obedient servant,
H. A. BULLARD.
Hon. ANDREW STEVENSON,

Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Which was laid on the table.

Mr. WHITTLESEY reported a bill for the re-
lief of François Suzor;

Mr. GHOLSON, a bill for the relief of Henry and Robert Sewell;

Mr. McKIM, a bill for the relief of the crew of the brig Sarah George;

Mr. SELDEN, a bill making an appropriation for the improvement of the Hudson river;

Mr. R. M. JOHNSON, a bill to provide for the support of the widows and orphans of such officers of the army as die whilst in the service of the United States;

scope presented. What, then, must be the surprise of the House at finding in the letter this remarkable expression, "that the power over the place of deposite would seem properly to belong to the legislative department of the Government;" further adding, "that it was diffi'cult to imagine why the authority to withdraw it from this bank was confined to the Executive." Difficult to imagine! thinks the Secretary, why Congress should deprive themselves of this power? But, to any person accustomed to the interpretation of statutes, their surprise must be, that he had not come to a contrary conclusion that the House did not deprive themselves of it, regarding him as their officer, and their power over the money, supreme; it is to remain where placed, until drawn from, by appropriations, made in conformity to law.

therefore, was, that nothing is placed in the hands of the Executive but what the Constitution has there.

put

The gentleman from Tennessee assumes that the President may exercise entire power over the Treasury Department in virtue of his power of

removal. This suggested a theme so vast that he could but barely touch some few of its points. Mr. B. then argued at considerable length, against the position of the member from Tennessee, that the power of removal was incidental to the appointWho directs the marshal in the discharge of his ment. In illustration of his views, he put a case. duties? The court. Who appoints and removes the marshal? The court? Certainly not. does it follow that the courts are therefore unable to give directions to the marshal? The doctrine contended for was a political absurdity. He admitted that the President had the right of direction, || but it did not result from his power of appointment and removal, but from official connexion and sub

But

ordination. Again, it is said, that all power must be judicial, ministerial, or executive; that this power is not ministerial nor judicial, and is, therefore, executive. But there were certain acts pertaining to one department, which were oftentimes committed to another department. Again, it was The Secretary says, that the charter de- said, that the President has power to demand the volves upon the Executive the exclusive opinion, in writing, of each head of department, power of removing the deposites. Mr. B. and that this must be for the purpose of giving submitted that the power was given not to directions in regard to the subject of the opinion the Executive, nor to an agent of the Ex-ident's organization of his cabinet; but if he was called for. He had nothing to do with the Presecutive, but to the agent of Congress. not misinformed, the Attorney General and the He then passed to the consideration of Postmaster General were members of it. The arguments drawn from the acts organizing cabinet was not made by the Constitution. The President had no power from the Constitution to and regulating the departments. The first ask the opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury act was passed in 1788. This regards the which at all interfered with his argument. The department of Foreign Affairs. It provides Attorney General and Postmaster General were that the head of this department shall per- executive officers by the Constitution. cabinet officers, but they were not recognised as form and execute such duties as shall be The Constitution says that the President may devolved upon him, from time to time, by require the opinion of the principal executive offithe President, and shall conduct the busi- cers in each department, &c. If the Treasury Deness in such manner as the President shall, the President has no power to ask the opinion of partment was not an executive department, then from time to time, prescribe. The next act the Secretary of the Treasury. So we may leave established the War Department, and pro- this provision out of the question. Finally, it was vides that the Secretary of War should ex- said by the gentleman from Tennessee, that it was ecute such duties as the President, in purthe duty of the President to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; and from this he derived suance of the Constitution, should devolve the power of the President over the Treasury Deupon him. When they came to establish partment. It was a good rule in logic, that what the Department of the Navy, they did it in proves too much proves too little. This argument the same words. But when they came to goes beyond the concerns of the departments, and gives the President the power of directing the Suestablish the Department of the Treasury, preme Court in the discharge of their duty. It we see that they changed the title of the turned the whole structure of the Government upact and its whole language. It was, as side down-fused all departments into one. He first reported by the committee, entitled officer who wilfully disobeyed the law. The clause admitted the power of the President to remove an an act to establish an Executive Depart-in question was given, not to enlarge the powers ment, &c., but the title was subsequently changed. This act makes it the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to propose plans to be submitted to Congress for raising and collecting the revenue, to prescribe the form of keeping accounts, and to execute such duties as by law might be reIf his view was generally true, how much clearer was the truth in regard to the matter in hand-the quired of him. All the three other deremoval of the deposites. The Secretary was to partments are presidential departments, give reasons for their removal. Whose reasonsbelonging to the office of President. Now his own, or the President's? Doubtless his own. How does that square with his responsibility to the Treasury Department was not a depart- the President? If he is responsible to the Presiment of the executive branch of the Gov-dent, must he not give his reasons to the President? ernment in name or design. To have placed the public money in an executive department, under the control of the President, would have been a solecism in the Constitution. The money was to be drawn from the treasury by warrant alone. Such a thing as making the treasury an executive department, and at the same time giving Congress the sole power of appro

priations, would have been a solecism and constitutional absurdity. His position,

of the President, but to remove all obstructions to the discharge of the duties devolved upon him by other clauses of the Constitution. He assumed, therefore, as to the right of removal, that it gave the power of direction over such officers as preferred office to duty; but that it left the question at

issue where it found it.

To his own master he must answer, and not to another. The right of removal was, moreover, a charter regulation-a regulation by compact. Look at the language of the charter. There were authorities given to the President, and authorities given to the Secretary of the Treasury. If all these duties were to be performed by the President, they would all have been assigned to him by the charter. But a portion was given to the President by name, and a portion to the Secretary by name.

The powers of the President are, to appoint direct

ors on the part of the Government, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and to direct the issue of a scire facias, to ascertain whether the Bank had

violated its charter. The powers of the Secretary were, to direct transfers of the public funds, and to withhold from the bank the public deposites.

I repeat, said Mr. B., that the entire and exclusive control of the public deposites is inherent in Congress, except so far as it is given to the bank. Here he did not confound power with right. Congress, he contended, had absolute right over the deposites to the whole extent to which they had not parted with it to the bank. Congress is the treasurer of the people. It represents the people priating it to the public service. It gives certain in raising revenue, in guarding it, and in approrights to the bank, subject to a covenant. If the bank violated the covenant, there was an equivalent discharge from obligation on the other side. If the bank violated the agreement, the right reverts to Congress to dispose of the deposites as it pleases. Now, gentlemen might make the rights of the bank as broad or as narrow as they please; as soon as one part of the agreement was violated, Congress could resume the whole power. The object of Congress was to provide for the safety of the deposites. The instant the bank ceases to perform her duty, that instant Congress might act. Here, in the charter, the power is given to the possible that Congress could act that is, when Secretary of the Treasury to act when it was imCongress was not in session. The dangerous consequences of the doctrine contended for, must strike every one. It stripped Congress of all power over the public money. Shall we stain the memory of the Congress of 1816 by supposing that they intended to give away this money to the bank and the Secretary of the Treasury, to enable them to hold it and control it as long as they mutually connived at each other's conduct, while Congress stood by with their hands tied?—for the doctrine comes to this. Did the Congress of 1816 intend to act in this manner? No, sir. They made a plain, obvious, and useful provision, giving the Secretary the power to withhold the deposites from the bank in a certain case, because, from his situation, he would necessarily be apprized of any approaching danger to the public money. This by the terms of the charter to the revision of Conact was implicitly and almost expressly subjected

gress.

So much for the proposition that Congress cannot interfere.

[The remainder of Mr. BINNEY's remarks for this day are unavoidably omitted.]

IN SENATE.

THURSDAY, January 9, 1834.

Mr. KANE, from the Committee on Private Land Claims, reported a bill for the relief of the heirs and legal representatives of Thomas H. Boyle; which was read a first and second time.

Mr. KANE also, from the same committee, reported a bill for the relief of the legal representatives of Lawrence Whitaker, deceased; upon which a similar order was had.

Mr. POINDEXTER, from the Committee on Public Lands, reported a bill for the relief of Calvin Smith, with an amendment.

Mr. POINDEXTER, from the same committee, also reported a bill to enable the assignee of Joshua Mills, to make a location of land; which bills were read and committed.

Mr. ROBINSON made a report from the Committee on Enrolled Bills.

Mr. ROBBINS, from the Library Committee, reported a resolution for the purchase of a bust on the part of Congress, of the late Chief Justice Ellsworth.

Mr. TOMLINSON, in conformity with notice given yesterday, asked and obtained leave to introduce a bill for the relief of Ithiel Town; which was read; and

On motion of Mr. TOMLINSON, referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. WHITE, from the Committee on Indian Affairs, made a report unfavorable to the petition of Matthew Irwin, which was concurred in.

Mr. MANGUM, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, moved that Enos Leavy have leave to withdraw his memorial and accompanying papers; which was agreed to.

Mr. SHEPLEY presented a petition of David

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