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from every possibility of relief, and could foly have held out some days, when a capi-it, were not objected to by the five distin

tulation was granted to it, September the 2d, as favourable as the Convention of Cintra to the army of Junot (of 24,000 French, and 6000 Russians), and perfectly similar in all the chief articles of men, baggage, artillery, conveyance, &c.; also, that the same terms had been previously granted to the garrison of Cairo, under much the same circumstances. By these two conventions, or capitulations, about 20,000 French evacuated Egypt, and the British army was left disposable for other purposes. On the whole it appears, that the operations of the army under sir Arthur Wellesley, from his landing in Mondego Bay the 1st of August, until the conclusion of the action at Vimiera, the 21st of August, were highly honourable and successful, and such as might be expected from a distinguished general, at the head of a British army of 13,000 men, augmented on the 20th and 21st to 17,000, deriving only some small aid from a Portuguese corps (1600 men), and against whom an enemy, not exceeding 14,000 men in the field, was opposed; and this before the arrival of a very considerable reinforcement from England, under lieut.-general sir John Moore, which, however, did arrive and join the army, from the 25th to the 30th of August. It appears a point on which no evidence adduced can enable the board to pronounce, with confidence, whether or not a pursuit after the battle of the 21st, could have been efficacious; nor can the board feel confident to determine on the expedience of a forward movement to Torres Vedras, when sir Harry Burrard has stated weighty considerations against such a measure. Further, it is to be observed, that so many collateral circumstances could not be known in the moment of the enemy's repulse, as afterwards became clear to the army, and have been represented to -the board. And considering the extraor dinary circumstances under which two new commanding generals arrived from the ocean, and joined the army (the one during, and the other immediately after, a battle, and those successively superseding each other, and both the original com"mander within the space of 24 hours), it is not surprising that the army was not carried forward, until the second day after the action, from the necessity of the generals being acquainted with the actual state of things, and of their army, and proceeding accordingly.It appears that the Convention of Cintra in all its progress and conclu

guished lieutenant-generals of that army; and other general officers who were on that service, whom we have had an opportunity to examine, have also concurred in the great advantages that were immediately gained, to the country of Portugal, to the army and navy, and to the general service, by the conclusion of the Convention at that time. -On a consideration of all circumstances, as set forth in this Report, we most humbly submit our opinion, that no further military proceeding is necessary on the subject. Because, howsoever some of us may differ in our sentiments respecting the fitness of the convention in the relative situation of the two armies, it is our un animous declaration, that unquestionable zeal and firmness appear throughout to have been exhibited by lieut.-general sir Hew Dalrymple, sir Harry Burrard, and sir Arthur Wellesley, as well as that the ardour and gallantry of the rest of the officers and soldiers, on every occasion during this expedition, have done honour to the troops, and reflected lustre on your majesty's arms.

All which is most dutifully submitted.(Signed) DAVID DUNDAS, general.-MOIRA, general.-PETER CRAIG, general.-HEATHFIELD, general.-PEMBROKE, lieut.-gen.G. NUGENT, lieut.-gen.-OL. NICOLLS, lieut.-gen.

Judge Advocate General's Office, Dec. 27, 1808. In consequence of the following letter from his royal highness the commander-in-chief to genral sir David Dundas, as president, viz.

Horse Guards, Dec. 25, 1808.

Sir, The judge advocate general having delivered to me to be laid before his majesty, the several papers and documents, containing all the examinations and proceedings taken before the Board of Inquiry, of which you are the president, together with your report and opinion upon the whole of the late operations of his majesty's forces in Portugal, as connected with the armistice and subsequent convention of Cintra, I think it ipcumbent on me to state to you, that although the Report is fully detailed, and perfectly explanatory of all the transactions as they appeared in evidence before you; yet upon a due consideration of the whole matter, it certainly appears that your opinion upon the conditions of the armistice and convention, which the words of his majesty's warrant expressly enjoin should be strictly examined, inquired into, and reported upon, has been altogether omitted.-I feel it my duty, therefore, to call your attention to these two

the battle of the 21st, and take up a strong
defensive position.-OL. NICOLLS, L. G.
I think, considering the great increase of
our force, from the first suspension of hos-

tion, added to the defeat the enemy had
suffered, sir Hew Dalrymple was fully enti-
tled to have insisted upon more favourable
terms.-OL. NICOLLS, L. G.

principal features of this important case, the armistice and convention, and to desire that you may be pleased to take the same again into your most serious consideration, and subjoin to the opinion which you have al-tility to the definitive signing of the convenready given upon the other points submitted to your examination and inquiry, whether, under all the circumstances which appear in evidence before you, on the relative situation of the two armies, on the 22d of August, 1808, it is your opinion that an armistice was advisable, and if so, whether the terms of that armistice were such as ought to have been agreed upon; and whether, upon a like consideration of the relative situation of the two armies subsequent to the armistice, and when all die British forces were landed, it is your opinion that a Convention was advisable, and if so, whether the terms of that convention were such as ought to have been agreed upon. I am the more desirous that you should resume the consideration of these two points, the armistice and convention, as it appears upon the face of your Report, that a difference of opinion exists among the members of the board, which may probably produce a dissent from the majority upon these very questions. You will be pleased, therefore, to desire such of the members as may be of a different opinion from the majority upon these two questions, to record upon the face of the proceedings their reasons for such dissent.-I am, Sir, yours, (Signed) FREDERICK. Commanderin-chief-Gen. Sir D. Dundas, K. B.

The board met this day at the judge-advocate general's office, when the said letter having been read, they agreed that the following questions should be put to each of the members of the board.

Do you, or do you not, approve of the armistice as concluded on the 22d of August, 1808, in the relative situation of the two armies ?

Approve.-Lt.-gen. Nicolls; It.-gen. sir G. Nugent; earl of Pembroke; lord Heath field; general Craig; gen. sir D. Dundas.

Disapprove.-Earl of Moira.

Do you, or do you not, approve of the convention as concluded upon the 31st of August, 1808, in the relative situation of the two armies?

Approve.-Lt-gen. sir G. Nugent; gen. lord Heathfield; general Craig; gen. sir D. Dundas.

Disapprove.-Lt.-gen. Nicolls; earl of Pembroke, earl of Moira,

(Signed) DAVID DUNDAS, President. My reason for considering the armistice as advisable on the 22d of August was, because the enemy had been able to retire after

I approve of the armistice after a due consideration of the relative situations of the two armies on the evening of the 22d of August, but I cannot fully approve of the whole of the convention, after a due consideration of the relative situation of the two armies at that time; because it does not appear to me that, in the progress of the negociation, sufficient stress was laid upon the great advantages which had resulted, or were likely to result, from the former successful operations of the British army in the field, from the considerable reinforcements which had joined it, subsequent to the commencement of the negociation, from the cause in which the British army was engaged being the cause of Portugal, which gave good reason to reckon upon the goodwill, if not upon the active assistance, of the majority of the inhabitants; and, also, from the unusual readiness which, as it appears to me, was manifested by general Junot to enter into negociation, and by the French negociator to accede to terms as they were pro posed, and to such construction as lieutenantgeneral sir Hew Dalrymple put upon them in some instances, where they might have borne a difference of interpretation. I therefore think it probable, for the above reasons, that if less favourable terms to the French army had been insisted upon, they would have been acceded to.-PEMBROKE, lieut.-gen.

I feel less awkwardness in obeying the order to detail my sentiments on the nature of the convention, because that I have already joined in the tribute of applause due in other respects to the officers concerned, My opinion, therefore, is only opposed to theirs on a question of judgment, where their talents are likely to have so much more weight, as to render the profession of my difference, even on that point, somewhat painful. The duty is, however, imperious on me not to disguise or qualify the deductions which I have made during this investigation.An armistice simply might not have been objectionable, because sir Hew Dalrymple, expecting hourly the arrival of sir John Moore's division, might see more advantage for himself in a short suspension of hostilities, than what the French could

draw from it. But as the armistice involved, and in fact established the whole principle of the convention, I cannot separate it from the datter.- Sir A. Wellesley has sta ted, that he considered his force, at the commencement of the march from the Mondego River, as sufficient to drive the French from their positions on the Tagus. That force is subsequently joined by above 4000 British troops, under generals Anstruther and Ack land. The French make än attack with their whole disposable strength, and are repulsed with heavy loss, though but a part of the British army is brought into action. It is difficult to conceive that the prospects which Sir A. Wellesley entertained could be unfavourably altered by these events, even had not the certainty of speedy reinforce. ments to the British army existed.It is arged, that had the French been pushed to extremity, they would have crossed the Tagus, and have protracted the campaign in such a manner as to have frustrated the more important view of the British generals -namely, sending succours into Spain.

This measure must have been equally feasible for the French, if no victory had been obtained over them; but I confess that the chance of such an attempt seems to me assu aned against probability. Sir Hew Dalrymple notices what he calls "the critical and embarrassed state of Junot," before that general has been pressed by the British army; and, in explanation of that expression, observes, that the surrender of Dupont, the existence of the victorious Spanish army in Andalusia, which cut off the retreat of the French in that direction, and the universal hostility of the Portuguese, made the situation of Junot one of great distress. No temptation for the translation of the war into Alentejo presents itself from this picture

nor does any other representation give ground to suppose that Junot could have contemplated the measure as holding forth any prospect but ultimate ruin, after much preliminary distress and disgrace. The strongest of all proofs as to Junot's opinion, arises from his sending, the very morning after the battle of Vimiera, to propose the @vacuation of Portugal; a step which sufficiently indicated that he was satisfied he could not only make no effectual defence, but could not even prolong the contest to take the chance of accidents. He seems, indeed, to have been without any real re source. It appears in evidence, that of the 'troops left by him in Lisbon and the forts,

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a considerable proportion were of very doubful quality. Those troops on whose fidelity he could confide, had been dismayed by a signal defeat, and they were sensible that they had no succour to look to from abroad. To the British generals it was known, when the armistice was granted, that 10,000 men under Sir J. Moore, as well as the 3d and 42d regiments of foot, with the 18th dragoons, might be immediately reckoned upon; and although much advantage had not been drawn from the Portuguese troops, their support and the general violence of the country against the French, cannot be laid out of this calculation.-The disparity of force and of circums stances was, then, such as could leave no doubt that the issue must be favourable tous. I do not omit advertence to the difficulties urged as possible to occur in furnishing the British army with bread. But, putting aside the obvious solution, that such a tem porary privation is not ruinous to an army where cattle can be procured in the country, this difficulty cannot be well pleaded, if admission is to be given to the speculation, that the heavy cannon necessary for battering forts St. Julien and Cascaes were to be got ashore in the bays of the Rock of Lisbon. The question then come to this, whether the convention did (as has been asserted) secure all the objects which were proposed in the expedition. If it did not, it was not what his majesty was entitled to expect from the relative situation of the two armies.— I hembly conceive it to have been erroneous to regard the emancipation of Portugal from the French, as the sole or the principal object of the expedition.-Upon whatever territory we contend with the French, it must be a prominent object in the struggle to destroy their resources, and to narrow their means of injuring us, or those whose cause we are supporting. This seems to have been so little considered in the convention, that the terms appear to have extrica ted Junot's army from a situation of infinite distress, in which it was wholly out of play, and to have brought it in a state of entire equipment, into immediate currency, in a quarter too, where it must interfere with our most urgent and interesting concerns.— Had it been impracticable to reduce the French army to lay down its arms uncondi tionally, still an obligation not to serve for a specified time might have been insisted upon, or Belleisle might have been prescribed as the place at which they should be landed, (To be continued)

Printed by Cox and Baylis, Great Queen Street; published by R. Bagshaw, Brydges Street, Covent Gaiden, where former Numbers may be had: sold also by J. Budd, Crown and Mitre, Pall-Mall.

VOL. XV. No. 2.] LONDON, SATURDAY, JANUARY 14, 1809.

[Price 10d.

"The foolishest of all hopes (to say nothing of the wickedness of it) is, that Napoleon will be beaten, and "that then, the Spaniards will quietly return to submission to their former government. There are, f " am afraid, people enough, who entertain such hopes; but, if they reflect for one moment, they must "be convinced, that it can never be accomplished; for, to resist Buonaparte will require, such language, "such sentiments, such active measures as to rank and property, as well as to warlike preparations, as "will so completely annihilate the old government, that it can never be restored."-POL. REGISTER, Vol. XIV. page, 105.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS. MR. HERBERT.This gentleman's address to the electors of Hampshire, a copy of which will be found immediately below* contains matter worthy of the notice, not of the people of Hampshire only, but of the whole nation. For the purpose of saving time, I have numbered the paragraphs. The FIRST Contains nothing of general interest. Not so the SECOND and THIRD, which may be looked upon, and evidently was intended as an answer to the pledge demanded by me, and which pledge will be found in the last volume of the Political Register at page 841.It is something, at any rate, to hear a candidate declare, that he never will accept of a pension or sinecure, and this declaration Mr. Herbert has distinctly made, in a manner the most likely to be remembered. I, therefore, conclude, that he means, un

* Mr. Herbert's Address to the Gentlemen, Clergy, and Freeholders of the County of Southampton, dated, Highclerc, Dec. 21,

1805.

II.-I SHOULD have thought myself very deficient in respect to those, whom I once had the honour of calling my constituents, if upon a vacancy, when no candidate appeared in the field against me, I had not renewed the humble offer of my services. It is most pleasant to my feelings, that some, who were formerly hostile to my pretensions, should have spontaneously tendered their support; and I shall ever remember with gratitude and pride, that at a premature and surreptitious nomination, which the sheriff was persuaded to call without due notice, (though an ac tive personal canvass had been undertaken by my opponent, with all the advantage of ministerial influence, though the greater part of my friends knew not of the meeting till the day was passed), the shew of hands in my favour should have been so numerous and respectable, that the sheriff

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der all possible circumstances, to adhere to this promise, and in that conclusion I have, I must confess, great pleasure. It is one step, at least, in the right path; and it is a step, which, with the sole exception of Lord Cochrane, no one, of late times, has, as far as I have observed, thought proper to take. But, from place Mr. Herbert will not debar himself by any pledge. This he calls foregoing the prospects of fair ambition, and binding himself to take no share in the administration of public affairs.The pledge, which I demanded, as the only terms, upon which I would give my vote, had no such object in view. As will be seen by reference to it, all that I wished to accomplish was this, that persons, once chosen to be the guar dians of the people's money, never should during their whole lives, pocket, either by themselves or their relations and depen

should have paused for a time, and not without hesitation have pronounced his judgment. I must express my thanks for the profound attention with which the whole meeting, with which both parties. heard my refutation, of a most unjust and unfounded misrepresentation, of any conduct in parliament, and for the universal expression of approbation at the part I bad acted on that occasion.II. Called upon at that meeting to declare that I would accept no office or pension, I pledg ed myself to reject every offer of a pension or sinecure, and to exert myself in parliament to dry the sources of corruption; and I applaud the motives that prompted the request. But further urged to debar myself from the prospects of fair and honourable ambition, and bind myself, at no future period to take any share in the administration of public affairs, I felt it my duty, not to myself' only, but to the body of electors, but to the nation at large, to refuse a pledge, which if universally extorted from candidates would

B

dents, any part of that money. I said no- | thing about prohibiting any one from becoming a minister, or filling any office, upon any future occasion; but, then, I clearly meant, that, supposing him to fill any office, he should do it without pay, which, in many cases, at least, a man qualified to be a member of parliament, may very well do.-But, I confess, that my wish would be, that men who are chosen members of parliament, should never become servants of the king. A man cannot serve two masters; and, it matters very little, whether he be nominally the servant of both at one and the same time; or whether he be the nominal servant of one of them, while he is paving his way for being taken into the service of the other. But in his THIRD paragraph, Mr. Herbert lets us see, that he thinks it right, and even necessary for the public good, that members of parliament should, at the same time, be servants of the king; that they should, in one and the same hour, ask for money in the latter capacity, and vote it in the former. This opinion being so directly at variance with plain common sense, it is worth while to examine into the reasons, upon which it is founded. He says, that, if members were to lose the right of questioning the ministers face to face, the debates would become unimportant; that the censures of the House would be little worth,and passed with

be subversive of the constitution, and fatal to the liberties of the country.- -III. If the ministers of the crown are to be excluded from parliament; if members are to lose that which is the best privilege of the representatives of the people, the right of questioning those ministers face to face before the public assembly; their debates would be frivolous, uninteresting, and unimportant; their censures would be little worth, and passed without a hearing; the advisers of the king, who, if they have erred through guilt or incapacity, must tremble at the awful moment when they are called upon publickly to account for their misconduct, would lull themselves in silent security, without the necessity, without even the means of justifying themselves to the nation. The dread of meeting an able minority front to front in parliament, is in these days almost the only check upon the actions of ministers.ÏV. With sentiments most hostile to the corruption that preys upon the vitals of the kingdom, most eager for satisfactory investigation of public misconduct, I offered myself to

This

out a hearing; that evil counsellors, who must tremble at the awful moment when they are publickly called to account, would lull themselves in security, without the necessity and even without the means of justifying themselves to the nation; and, that the dread of meeting an able minority front to front, is, in these days, almost the only check upon the actions of ministers.- "In these days" is an important phrase; for, it is precisely because the "days" are what they are, that I wish for a change. Mr. Herbert's doctrine is in direct opposition to the Act of Settlement, which declares persons holding places of profit under the Crown to be incapable of serving as members of parliament. act, till base and corrupt ministers found it troublesome, remained in force, and no inconvenience was experienced from it. Nay, when the act, as far as related to this important point, was repealed, the repealers, though most profligate men, had not the impudence to do it without an appearance of preserving the principle; and, therefore, they enacted, that, if a member accepted of a place of emolument after his election, his seat should, in consequence thereof, be vacated, in order to give the people who elected him when he had no place, an opportunity of rejecting him on account of his having a place.-Now, will Mr. Herbert say, that the object of this law was, and is, really what it professes to

your notice; but ministers cannot tolerate such freedom, and all the influence of government was armed against me, in favour of a gentleman not eligible to represent the county. With a majority, even under those circumstances, of independent electors in my favour, as the nomination on the 23rd appeared to witness, I was advised not to harass the county by the prolongation of a poll, which was deemed superfluous, when the only eligible opponent felt himself unable to cope with me, and declined the contest. I am grateful for the free and zealous friendship I have experienced, and that strong support which has deterred any eligible candidate from persevering at the poll. I trust that I shall be seated as your representative in parliament; and I hail the dawn of bet ter days in this county, from the unsolicited assurances of support, in the present and any future contest, which I have received from freeholders connected with the dock-yard, who would not resign their mental independence, though harassed and persecuted by the agents of government.

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