leading members of the cabinet, who held their places only so long as they could command a majority therein. The king had no more control over the public purse than the Sovereign of England or the President of the United States. All the expenditures of the government required an appropriation by the Chamber of Deputies, the immediate representatives of the people, who exhibited the reluctance to vote money which such bodies invariably do, when they are composed of two parties, one in power, the other ambitious of power. Mr. Rives and the king, when they signed the treaty of 1831, were aware that the real difficulty had yet to be encountered. Mr. Rives, however, in the flush of his diplomatic triumph, could not be expected to enlarge upon this branch of the subject in his communications to his government. He had done his duty; let the chambers do theirs. He came home in triumph, and said nothing calculated to disturb the impression that the instalments would be paid, as a matter of course, as soon as they were due. The 2d of February, 1833, the day on which the first instalment was due at Paris, arrived. The administration deigned to employ the services of the United States Bank on this occasion, although even then the removal of the deposits was in agitation at the White House. On the 7th of February, a draft upon the French Minister of Finance, drawn in favor of the cashier of the Bank of the United States, was signed by the Secretary of the Treasury. The American Chargé des Affaires notified the French Government, in due form, that such a draft was on its way. This draft was purchased by the Bank of the United States, and its proceeds were immediately placed to the credit of the government. The bank sold the draft to parties in England, who, on the 23d of March, presented it to the French Minister of Finance for payment. The Minister informed the bearer of the draft, that no money had been appropriated by the deputies for the American indemnity, and it could not be paid. The financial complication resulting from the non-payment of the draft, involving the English holders, the Bank of the United States and the American government, can be readily imagined. I spare the reader the recital of the President's new quarrel with the bank which arose when Mr. Biddle attempted to adjust the matter with the Secretary of the Treasury. I will merely say, that the dishonoring of a bill in Paris drawn by the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, was an event not calculated to lessen the disgust felt by General Jackson at the neglect of the French government to provide for the fulfillment of the treaty. It is not difficult to account for that neglect. The treaty of 1831, which was such a feather in the cap of Mr. Rives, which was so complacently announced in the President's message, and so highly extolled in the party newspapers, was not regarded in France as an affair of the first importance. The king was occupied in securing his always shaky throne; the ministry in battling with an active and able opposition; the Chambers in the questions of the hour and the strife for place. The news of the ratification of the treaty reached Paris in April, 1832, five days before the expiration of the session of the Chambers; and neither king, ministry, nor deputies thought of providing money to meet an instalment due in February, 1833. In November, the Chambers were again in session, and sat until April, 1833. But as there was no American minister in Paris to press the claim of the United States, the bill to provide for the first instalment was not introduced till near the close of the session; was not then made a ministerial measure; was not supported by the ministry either with unanimity or with vigor; and was not acted upon by the Chamber of Deputies. It was a fault in the administration of General Jackson to leave the French mission vacant at such a time; but upon receiving the news that the draft of February, 1833, had been dishonored, the administration hastened to atone for its error in a striking manner. Mr. Edward Livingston, the Secretary of State, resigned his office, accepted the appointment of minister to France, and was despatched to his post in a national vessel. He was accompanied by his son-in-law, Mr. Thomas P. Barton, who was appointed Secretary of Legation. In October, 1833, Mr. Livingston presented his credentials to the king, who received him with particular cordiality. "The king's answer to my address," wrote Mr. Livingston, was long and earnest. I can not pretend to give you the words of it, but, in substance, it was a warm expression of his good feeling toward the United States, for the hospitality he had received there. As to the convention, he said, 'assure your government that unavoidable circumstances alone prevented its immediate execution, but it will be faithfully performed. Assure your government of this,' he repeated; the necessary laws will be passed at the next meeting of the Chambers. I tell you this not only as king, but as an individual whose promise will be fulfilled."" The king was mistaken, and Mr. Livingston was disappointed. At the next session of the Chambers, the bill appropriating the money due to the United States was lost by a majority of five-the Minister of Finance himself voting against it! The ministry in general not only would not stake their places upon carrying the measure, but gave it a languid support that invited and justified opposition. The king, there is every reason to believe, was sincerely desirous to pay the money. He expressed to Mr. Livingston great regret at the failure of the appropriation. He did more than that. In confidential conversations with the American minister he intimated clearly enough his opinion that the only way left to induce the Chamber to vote the money was for the President of the United States to insert a passage in his next message which should show that the American government was in earnest in the matter, and was resolved to insist upon the prompt payment of the indemnity. Mr. Livingston communicated these conversations to his government, and, accordingly, the message of 1834 con *It is due to the reader to state that some of the facts recorded in this chapter, not to be found in the public documents, I received from surviving members of Mr. Livingston's family. To Mr. Thomas P. Barton, of this city, the reader is under particular obligations for interesting information communicated to me in the most obliging and agreeable manner. tained a strong passage respecting the unpaid indemnity. This message was prepared with unusual care, and was written with great ability. It gave a history, full and exact, of the late proceedings of the French legislature; and concluded the discussion of the subject with five short and quiet paragraphs, which electrified two continents. The President said it was a principle of international law, that when one nation refused to pay a just debt, the aggrieved nation might "seize on the property" belonging to the citizens of the defaulting nation. If, therefore, France did not pay the money at the next session of the chambers, the United States ought to delay no longer to take by force what it could not get by negotiation. Nay, more. "Since France," said the President, "in violation of the pledges given through her minister here, has delayed her final action so long that her decision will not probably be known in time to be communicated to this Congress, I recommend that a law be passed authorizing reprisals upon French property, in case provisions shall not be made for the payment of the debt at the approaching session of the French Chambers. Such a measure ought not to be considered by France as a menace. Her pride and power are too well known to expect any thing from her fears, and preclude the necessity of the declaration that nothing partaking of the character of intimidation is intended by us. She ought to look upon it as the evidence only of an inflexible determination on the part of the United States to insist on their rights." Such words as these, I need scarcely say, were not such as the King of the French expected to read in the message. His idea of "strong language" and a "high tone" differed from that of General Jackson. When he suggested to Mr. Livingston to advise the President to employ strong language in speaking of the indemnity, he used those words in a European and diplomatic sense. Nothing could be further from his thoughts than such terms as "reprisals," "seizures," "sequestration," and "taking redress into our own hands." Members of General Jackson's own cabinet deemed the paragraphs quoted above needlessly irritating and menacing, but the General would not consent to abate a word of them. "No, gentlemen," he exclaimed, one day, during a Kitchen Cabinet discussion of the message, "I know them French. They won't pay unless they 're made to.” The French King, alive to all the importance of the subject, was so anxious to obtain the message at the earliest moment, that he sent a courier to Havre to await the arrival of the packet, and convey the document to Paris. Louis Philippe, therefore, received the message before it reached the American Ambassador, and was the first man in Paris who read it. I am enabled to state, that the king read the message with much surprise, but more amusement. He thought it a capital joke. He was amused at the interpretation put upon the advice he had given Mr. Livingston. The language of the message, which a Tennessean deemed eminently moderate and dignified, sounded in the cabinet of the Tuilleries, like a fiery declaration of war. Upon the whole, however, the king was pleased and satisfied with the message, because he thought it calculated to produce the effect upon the deputies which he desired it should produce. The next day, the editors of Paris received their files of American newspapers. The press of France under Louis Philippe was not the tool of despotism which it must be under any man of Bonapartean lineage. With one voice, the Parisian newspapers, ministerial, opposition, and neutral, denounced the message as an insult to France, so gross, that it would be infamy not to resent it. A clamor arose, the violence of which can not be overstated. The excitement was increased when, shortly after, American newspapers arrived containing the extracts from Mr. Livingston's confidential correspondence which are alluded to above. Imagine the embarrassment of the king, the disgust of the American Minister, the exultation of the opposition, the indignation of the people, the comments of the press, upon the publication of despatches which showed the King of the French attempting to gain influence in the Chamber of Deputies by inciting the President of the United States to act upon its fears! The French government, weak because the King was |