the safety of my troops, it would be consonant with the views and wishes of Government that I should do so.

I had a considerable body of troops; and, with much pains, had collected a reserve of upwards of six months' provisions. I felt assured of support, and of the receipt of the ammunition and stores I stood in need of, from Sinde or India; I knew that Jellalabad was in our possession, and that it was the resolution of Government to maintain it; that large reinforcements were preparing for its support; I could not over-estimate the value of this powerful diversion in my favour, nor could I shut my eyes to the fact, that the abandonment of Candahar by me, must have an unfavourable effect upon the measures in progress for the retention of our position at Jellalabad. Under these circumstances, I never had a moment's hesitation as to the course I ought to pursue, so long as discretionary power was left to me; and all my arrangements have, consequently, been made with a view to the present maintenance and future extension, should such prove desirable, of our power in this country.

But, could I have foreseen that so immediately following their proclamation of the 31st of January, Government would have determined on withdrawing their troops from Jellalabad, excepting on the occurrence of "unforeseen circumstances," I should most probably have regarded this resolution of theirs, as distinctly pointing to their intention of evacuating the country altogether, and have taken measures accordingly.

Now, however, the position of the troops at Candahar is so far fixed, that I consider retirement

would not only be disadvantageous, but almost impracticable, until the autumn; and I trust that my hav ing determined on remaining may ultimately prove fortunate; but the state of uncertainty into which I am now thrown, regarding our present position at Jellalabad, and the probable future policy of Government, must preclude my acting with full confidence in mea sures calculated to restore British influence in the country, by force of arms. I am also become doubtful of the propriety of retaining Kelat-i-Ghilzye as a separate garrison; for there is but too much reason to fear, that the sacrifice of the garrison at Ghuznee must closely follow on the abandonment of our position at Jellalabad.

As long as both the positions of Candahar and Jellalabad are occupied by us, the attention of the insurgents in Affghanistan is distracted. No general or combined movement can be made by the Affghans while they are threatened from both these points; but if one source of apprehension be removed by the withdrawal of our troops from Jellalabad, the undivided force of the people, backed by success, and inflamed by religious enthusiasm, will be at liberty to concentrate its energy against our position at Candahar.

I believe that many people have been prevented from joining the rebel chiefs, now in arms against us near Candahar, from a feeling that we meditate the re-occupation of Cabul from the side of Jellalabad,-an impression that has been confirmed by the non-arrival of succour from Cabul, since the deputation of Atta Mahomed, on the first outbreak of the insurrection in that city. While we maintain an imposing attitude at Jellalabad,

even supposing no advance takes place beyond that post, it is my opinion that but few troops and no artillery will be sent from Cabul in aid of the rebel cause at Candahar; but if Jellalabad be abandoned, I not only look forward to having to contend with a force from Cabul, much better equipped than is ordinarily the case with Affghan troops, but I anticipate a general movement against us from every part of the country.

If Government intend to recover, even temporarily, and for the saving of our national honour, their lost position in this country, even if doubtful of the policy that it may be deemed expedient to pursue, I earnestly hope that, before any immediate retrograde step is made in either direction, our whole position in Affghanistan will be attentively viewed; and that the effect which a hasty retirement would certainly and instantly have on the whole of Beloochistan, and even on the navigation of the Indus, will be taken into consideration. At the present time, the impression of our military strength among the people of this country, though weakened by the occurrences at Cabul, is not destroyed; but if we now retire, and it should again become necessary to advance, we shall labour under many disadvantages, the most serious of which, in my opinion, will be a distrust of their strength among our soldiers, which any admission of weakness is so well calculated to induce; and in what

other light could a withdrawal from Jellalabad or Candahar be viewed?

If retirement should become necessary, it should take place simultaneously, and at a proper season. If Government should select Candahar as the point whence future operations against Cabul are to be directed, still the retention of a position at Jellalabad in considerable force, will be of the most essential service in all future contemplated operations. In the sanguine hope that some unforeseen circumstance may have occurred to postpone the execution of the Government order for the evacuation of Jellalabad, I have thought it incumbent on me to address this letter to you.

Before closing my letter, I may mention that I am now in expectation of the march of Brigadier England from Quetta, with supplies for Candahar. I have no correct information regarding the probable date of his quitting that post, nor of the strength of his force; but there is room for apprehension that the convoy he has to escort will be but weakly guard. ed, and every probability that it may be attacked. I am at present, therefore, compelled to remain at Candahar, prepared to move with a sufficient body of troops to the Brigadier's support, whenever I may receive certain intelligence of his movements.

I have, &c.

W. NOTT.

ship's letter of the 4th instant; having looked at the difficulties in every point of view, and reflected

on the advantages which would at tend a successful accomplishment of such a move, and the moral influence it would have throughout Asia; I have come to a determination to retire a portion of the army under my command, via Ghuznee and Cabul. I shall take with me, not a large, but a compact and well-tried force, on which I can rely. Your Lordship may rest assured that all prudence, and every military precaution, shall be observed; there shall be no unnecessary risk; and, if expedient, I will mask Ghuznee, and even Cabul. But, if an opportunity should offer, I will endeavour to strike a decisive blow for the honour of our arms.

The greatest difficulty I am likely to experience will be the want of forage in the neighbourhood of Cabul, and thence to Jellallabad, in consequence of the large bodies of horse, which have so long consumed, and still continue to consume it. I therefore, hope that measures will be taken to have supplies of forage, and a few comforts for the European troops stored at Jellalabad, which place I shall endeavour to regulate

my march so as to reach the first week of October.

I have commenced arrangements for the remainder of the force retiring upon Sukkur, under the command of Major-General England, who will receive the necessary instructions for his gui dance in withdrawing the troops from Candahar, and the different posts between this and Shikarpore.

I am most anxious, notwithstanding the conduct of the Affghan chiefs, that our army should leave a deep impression on the people of this country, of our cha racter for forbearance and humanity.

All our guns, also six brass pieces, belonging to the late Shah Shooja-ool-Molk, shall be taken to Sukkur. All unserviceable articles, not worth the carriage, will be destroyed.

Having now acquainted your Lordship of my determination, I shall not fail to keep your Lordship constantly informed of my proceedings.

I have, &c.

W. NOTT.

Camp, near Killa Abdoolla,
August 19, 1842.

Sir, I have the honor to report, for the information of the right hon. the Governor-General in Council, that the British force at Candahar having evacuated that city on the 7th and 8th, I moved from my encampment, near its walls, on the 10th, pursuant to instructions, with the detachment

mentioned in the margin*, en route to Quetta, and that I arrived on this ground yesterday.

2. It was communicated to me on the 9th, and subsequently, that

One troop late Shah's Horse Artillery, seven guns drawn by bullocks, two rissalahs Irregular Horse, one rissalah Poonah ditto, 25th Bombay Native Infantry, late Light Battalion ditto, 1st, 2nd, and 5th regiments late Shah's Infantry.

the insurgents were preparing to attack the column and convoy under my charge in its passage, and especially that they would make efforts to intercept it in the strong country of the Kojuck range, at the northern extremity of which I arrived, with little molestation, on the morning of the 16th.

3. Whatever might have been the intention of the enemy, it was ascertained by reconnoitering, that the highest points of the mountain were not yet occupied by them, and I thought it right, therefore, notwithstanding that the troops had just completed a night march of twenty-four miles, to push forward a light column to seize the summit at once.

4. This operation was performed by three battalions, and the most important ridge, and all the peaks commanding the principal passes were gained by the troops before dark.

5. On the following morning, the insurgents began to appear in small bodies on different hills, but the route being flanked, they did little mischief, and the baggage, artillery, and immense retinue

under the protection of this camp, including 9,000 or 10,000 beasts of burden, began the ascent, covered by a rear-guard of two battalions and the cavalry; and I was soon made aware of our good fortune in having seized the heights on the previous evening, for the number of the enemy gradually increased, but all their efforts to capture the baggage, or indeed to interrupt us to any serious extent, were frustrated, and the passage across the Kojuck mountains may be said to have been perfected by noon on the 18th.

6. I have had the highest reason to be gratified with the exertions of all the officers and troops on this occasion, and it is entirely owing to their incessant efforts in duties of great fatigue, under a privation of water, both in climbing up the extreme points of the range to drive off the enemy whenever they appeared, and in dragging thirteen pieces of artillery over the ridge, that this service has been accomplished with so little loss on our side of life or of convoy.

I have, &c.,
R. ENGLAND.

Camp, Gonine, 38 miles S.W. of

Ghuznee, October 31, 1842. Sir, I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the right hon. the Governor-General of India, that Shumsoodeen, the Affghan governor of the fortress of Ghuznee, brought nearly the whole of his army, about 12,000 men, into the vicinity of of my camp yesterday, at three o'clock, P.M.

I moved out with one-half of my force; the enemy advanced in the most bold and gallant manner, each division cheering as they came into position, their left being upon a hill of some elevation, their centre and right along a low ridge until their flank rested on a fort filled with men: they opened a fire of small arms, supported by two six-pounder horse artillery guns, which were admirably served