Sir,

Allahabad, May 4, 1842.

The Governor-General was in expectation that, in pursuance of the request contained in his Lordship's letters to the Commanderin-Chief of the 19th ultimo, (of which a copy was communicated to you,) his Excellency would probably have addressed instructions to you, founded upon the more recent and accurate knowledge of your situation, which his Excellency's position at Simla enables him to obtain ; but his Lordship is now informed that his Excellency has not deemed it necessary to issue any such further instructions, relying upon your discretion in acting upon the instructions you already have, contained in the letter of the Governor-General in Council to his Excellency, dated the 15th of March.

2. You have since received, in the letter of the 19th ultimo above referred to, a further indication of the views of the Governmentviews which have been in no respect varied by the demise of Shah Shooja, or by the victory of Sir Robert Sale.

3. On the contrary, that victory, in conjunction with your success, going far towards the re-establishment, in the minds of the Affghans, and of our troops, and subjects, and allies, of that sentiment of confidence in our military superiority, which it is so essential to preserve; and the decease of Shah Shooja having manifestly relieved the British from all such enagagements as might have been deemed to be of a personal character with him, it is in reality, and it will be

in the opinion of all men, more easy for you to withdraw your troops from the advanced position they occupy, than it would have been, had political considerations of great importance appeared to require other and ulterior operations.

4. The most recent accounts which have been received of the difficulty experienced by you in obtaining supplies at Jellalabad, and in bringing forward supplies from Peshawur; and the very deficient means of movement, as well as of provision, which you possess, induce the Governor-General to expect that you will have already decided upon withdrawing your troops within the Khyber Pass, into a position wherein you may have easy and certain communication with India, if considerations, having regard to the health of the army, should not have induced you to defer that movement.

5. The Governor-General is satisfied that you will have felt that no great object can be accomplished by any army having deficient means of movement and supply, and that nothing but a great object could justify the incurring of great risks.

6. His Lordship is too strongly impressed with confidence in your judgment to apprehend that you will ever place the army under your command in a situation in which, without adequate means of movement and supply, it could derive no benefit from its superior valour and discipline, and might be again subjected to a disaster which, if repeated, might be fatal to our power in India.

7. The first object of the Go

vernor-General's anxiety has ever been to withdraw, with honor, into positions of security, the several corps of the army which he found scattered and surrounded in Affghanistan. That object may now be accomplished as respects the army under your command; and the Governer-General could expe

rience no higher satisfaction than that of hearing that, the health of that army, in whose welfare he takes so deep an interest, having been presevered, it was in a secure position, having certain communication with India. I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

Allahabad, July 4, 1842. General,-You will have learnt from Mr. Maddock's letters of the 13th May and 1st of June, that it was not expected that your movement towards the Indus could be made till October, regard being had to the health and efficiency of your army.

You appear to have been able to give a sufficient equipment to the force you recently dispatched to Kelat-i-Ghilzie, under Colonel Wymer; and, since his return, you will have received, as I infer from a private letter addressed by Major Outram to Captain Durand, my private secretary, a further supply of 3,000 camels.

I have now, therefore, reason to suppose, for the first time, that you have the means of moving a very large proportion of your army, with ample equipment for any service.

There has been no deficiency of provisions at Candahar at any time; and, immediately after the harvest, you will have an abundant supply.

Nothing has occurred to induce me to change my first opinion, that the measure, commanded by considerations of political and military prudence, is to bring back the armies now in Afghanistan at the

earliest period at which their retirement can be effected, consistently with the health and efficiency of the troops into positions wherein they may have easy and certain communication with India; and to this extent the instructions you have received remain unaltered. But the improved position of your army, with sufficient means of carriage for as large a force as it is necessary to move in Affghanistan, induces me now to leave to your option the line by which you shall withdraw your troops from that country.

I must desire, however, that in forming your decision upon this most important question, you will attend to the following considerations.

In the direction of Quetta and Sukkur, there is no enemy to oppose you at each place occupied by detachments, you will find provisions: and, probably, as you descend the passes, you will have increased means of carriage. The operation is one admitting of no doubt as to its success.

If you determine upon moving upon Ghuznee, Cabul, and Jellalabad, you will require, for the transport of provisions a much larger amount of carriage; and you will be practically without communica

tions, from the time of your leaving Candahar. Dependent entirely upon the courage of your army, and upon your own ability in directing it, I should not have any doubt as to the success of the operation; but whether you will be able to obtain provisions for your troops during the whole march, and forage for your animals, may be a matter of reasonable doubt. Yet upon this your success will turn.

You must remember that it was not the superior courage of the Affghans, but want, and the inclemency of the season, which led to the destruction of the army at Cabul; and you must feel as I do, that the loss of another army, from whatever cause it might arise, might be fatal to our Government in India.

I do not undervalue the aid which our Government in India would receive from the successful execution by your army of a march through Ghuznee and Cabul, over the scenes of our late disasters. I know all the effect which it would have upon the minds of our soldiers, of our allies, of our enemies in Asia, and of our countrymen, and of all foreign nations in Europe. It is an object of just ambition, which no one more than myself would rejoice to see effected; but I see that failure in the attempt is certain and irretrievable ruin; and I would endeavour to inspire you with the necessary caution, and make you feel that, great as are the objects to be obtained by success, the risk is great also.

If you determine upon moving by Ghuznee, and entirely give up your communications by Quetta, I should suggest that you should take with you only the most efficient troops and men you have,

securing the retreat of the remainder upon Killa-Abdoolla and Quetta.

You will, in such case, consider it to be entirely a question to be decided by yourself, according to circumstances, whether you shall destroy or not the fortifications of Candahar; but, before you set out upon your adventurous march, do not fail to make the retirement of the force you leave behind you perfectly secure, and give such instructions as you deem necessary for the ultimate retirement of the troops in Sinde upon Sukkur.

You will recollect that what you will have to make is a successful march; that that march must not be delayed by any hazardous operations against Ghuznee or Cabul; that you should carefully calculate the time required to enable you to reach Jellalabad in the first week in October, so as to form the rearguard of Major-General Pollock's army. If you should be enabled by a coup-de-main to get possession of Ghuznee and Cabul, you will act as you see fit, and leave de cisive proofs of the power of the British army, without impeaching its humanity. You will bring away from the tomb of Mahmood of Ghuznee, his club, which hangs over it; and you will bring away the gates of his tomb, which are the gates of the Temple of Somnaut. These will be the just trophies of your successful march.

You will not fail to disguise your intention of moving, and to acquaint Major-General Pollock with your plans, as soon as you have formed them. A copy of this letter will be forwarded to Major General Pollock to-day; and he will be instructed, by a forward movement, to facilitate your advance; but he will probably not

deem it necessary to move any troops actually to Cabul, where your force will be amply sufficient to beat anything the Affghans can oppose to it. The operations, however, of the two armies, must be combined, upon their approach, so as to effect, with the least possible loss, the occupation of Cabul, and keep open the communications be tween Cabul and Peshawur.

One apprehension upon my mind is, that in the event of your deciding upon moving on Jellalabad by Ghuznee and Cabul, the ac

have, in the most emphatic manner, repeated the order before given for that withdrawal.

Some risk I deem it justifiable to incur for the recovery of the guns and of the prisoners, and with the view of exhibiting the triumphant march of a British army over defeat; but I consider the preservathe ground on which it once suffered essential to the preservation of our tion of the army in Affghanistan world might forgive or applaud me, empire in India; and, however the I should never forgive myself, if I exposed that army to any material and serious danger, for the possible accomplishment of any object now to be obtained in Affghanistan.

My hope and expectations are that, without incurring such danger, I shall effect, through the instructions I have given, every object now desired by the people of England.

I have, &c.

ELLENBOROUGH.

Allahabad, July 23, 1842. General,-I am in hopes that Major-General Nott, will to-day be in possession of my letter of the 4th instant, and that you will, very soon after you receive this letter, be made acquainted with the Major-General's intentions.

My expectation is, that MajorGeneral Nott will feel himself sufficiently strong, and be sufficiently provided with carriage, to march upon Ghuznee and Cabul.

I have taken the precaution of instructing Major Outram to send up to Candahar every disposable camel, and all the treasure at Quetta, about five or six lacs; and I have likewise instructed Major Leech, who may have reached Quetta, to return to Candahar. Major Leech's local knowledge will be of much use to Major-General Nott, if he should advance on Ghuznee and Cabul.

Major-General Nott, looking forward to the difficulties of the march, and the uncertain time it may occupy, and necessarily impressed with a deep sense of the importance of terminating the whole combined operations, and bringing off the two armies into the plains before the commencement of severe weather, will hasten his preparations for leaving Candahar, and I anticipate his being able to do so by the 15th of August.

I do not apprehend that between Candahar and Ghuznee any obstacles will be offered to his march, by an enemy disheartened by repeated discomfiture, and completely taken by surprise; and I look forward to the army from Canda har being to the north of Ghuznee by the 10th of September.

I have used every exertion in my power to complete the equipment of your army with carriage. From fifteen to twenty lacs of treasure will be forwarded to you, in addition to the ten already transmitted; and the Commissariat has been directed to provide the means of carriage for provisions for 7,500 men beyond the amount of your present force, such carriage being equal to the transport of fourteen days' supply.

I am assured by Mr. Clerk, that the requisite carriage will be furnished by the time fixed-that was, originally, the 1st of October; and since, the 21st of September.

I am hardly sanguine enough to think that all I have directed to be done, will be done by that earlier day; but I certainly entertain the expectation that, leaving, as you probably will, the 2nd regiment of Native Infantry, and 200 Irregular Cavalry, in the Khyber Pass, to occupy that position, and leaving likewise a garrison in Jellalabad, you will possess sufficient carriage to move the remainder of your army in advance, to support the march of Major-General Nott upon Cabul.

Mahomed Akbar Khan will probably retire from Cabul, on the appearance of the combined army.

The expectations of its advance will revive and invigorate the factions opposed to that chief; and it is not altogether improbable, that the result may be his overthrow, and the nominal establishment of a royal government, in the person of some other chief, or of the Prince Futteh Jung.

You are already authorized to treat with a de facto government