Fort William, Feb. 19, No. 16, 1842.

Honorable Sirs,

In continuing the narrative of events in Affghanistan since the date of our latest despatch on that subject of the 22nd of last month, we have to deplore the occurrence of heavy calamity to the British arms, and at the same time to lament the great obscurity which still hangs over many of the most important circumstances connected with the causes and course of the disasters which have been suffered. 2. In our despatch of the 22nd ultimo, we stated, that the last date of our intelligence, then received from Cabul, was the 25th of December, when Major Pottinger reported the murder of Sir Wm. Macnaghten, and the continuance of negotiation for the retirement of our troops from that place.

3. From the papers now sent, your honourable Committee will learn, that on the 28th of December Major Pottinger wrote to Captain Macgregor at Jellalabad, stating the arrangement with the leaders at Cabul to be still incomplete. That on the 29th of December, Major Pottinger and Major-General Elphinstone wrote of ficially to Captain Macgregor and Major-General Sir Robert Sale, directing them, in pursuance of stipulations made at Cabul, to retire from Jellalabad to Peshawur, that on the 4th of January letters were received at Jellalabad from the cantonment at Cabul, announcing that a march towards the former place was immediately intended, and that on the 6th of January the troops actually marched, devoid, as far as we learn, of all provision for food, for shelter,

or for safety; and that thus exposed to the attacks of enemies in the mountain defiles, and in the worst severity of a winter season, they became, after two or three marches, dispirited and disorganised, and were as a military body, ultimately wholly destroyed or dispersed.

4. We do not know the strength in effective men that marched from Cabool on this melancholy retreat, but the force there must have been greatly reduced by the casualties of a protracted contest; and we should believe that the retiring body could scarcely have exceeded 4,000 men fit for service, and placed at much disadvantage by the loss of many officers killed or wounded.

5. The details of which we are in possession regarding this disastrous march, will be learned by your honourable Committee, from the private letters of Captain Macgregor at Jellalabad, of the 13th January, and subsequent dates, and from a private letter from Captain G. St. P. Lawrence, late Military Secretary to Sir William Macnaghten, to his brother, writ ten from a fort in the Lughman country, near to Jellalabad, where he, with other British offi cers and some ladies, were prisoners, under the care of Mahomed Akhbar Khan, the son of Dost Mahomed Khan, whose prominent participation in the struggle was stated in our dispatch of the 22nd ultimo; but your honourable Committee will remember that these details proceeding from single parties, cannot in any degree be regarded as furnishing us with an authentic and complete narrative

of events, and are not to be referred to as being of authority, be yond the testimony given to events happening under the immediate observation of the writers.

6. We learn from the letter of Captain Lawrence, that MajorGeneral Elphinstone, who commanded the Cabul force, was also a prisoner in the same fort at Lughman; but we have no communication from Major-General Elphinstone of any kind, nor have we received any since the disturbance at Cabul first commenced.

7. In a letter from Jellalabad, of the 25th of January, Captain Macgregor refers to the receipt of two long letters from Major Pottinger, likewise a prisoner at Lughman, copies of which Captain Macgregor intended to send on to Peshawur on the next day; but these communications have not yet reached us, and we fear that the transit of letters between Jellalabad and Peshawur may have become interrupted.

8. We would point the attention of your Committee to a statement in the private letter of Captain Lawrence, which gives the first clear intimation of a division of the force at Cabul, that must most dangerously have impaired its strength. It appears, that immediately after the insurrection broke out, nearly two corps of infantry, with a troop of horse artillery, were thrown into the Bala Hissar, where the king resided, and which we understand to be a position that could not have been successfully assailed by an enemy unprovided with an efficient force in guns. The extensive works of the cantonments were thus left with only three tegiments of infantry to guard them, and to be directed against

an enemy without, and almost the only effective portion of the field artillery which was at that time at Cabul, was diverted from the service on which it could apparently have been most usefully employed.

9. We do not wish to prejudge proceedings of which we know so little, but it is at the same time right to mark such facts in the correspondence before us, as seem to be of obvious importance.

10. Your honourable Committee will remember that the battery of foot artillery with horses, under the command of Captain Abbott, had left Cabul before the insurrection, and formed a portion of Sir Robert Sale's force proceeding to Jellalabad.

11. For the artillery that remained at Cabul, there were abundant supplies of ammunition of all kinds calculated for a year's use. It is to the absence of any sufficient force, in the different arms, held available for action beyond the line of our defensive works, and to the early loss of the unprotected commissariat stores, that we must attribute, in a great measure, the ultimate triumph of the enemy.

12. The letter from Lieutenant Conolly at Cabul, of the 17th of January, sent with Captain Macgregor's letter from Jellalabad, of the 24th January, gives the latest intelligence of the state of affairs at the capital after the departure of our troops. It will be perceived that Shah Shooja had been accepted as king by the chiefs of the insurgents generally, and that Mahomed Zemaun Khan Barukzye, a brother of Dost Mahomed Khan, who had been placed as leader of the insurrection, had resigned the name at least of the authority to which he had been raised, and

been appointed to the post of chief minister under the Shah. There are conflicting parties of Barukzye and other Dooranee chiefs at Cabul, and it is not probable that this compromise or union of interests, supported as it would seem to have been by an expenditure of money on the part of the Shah, can be of long continuance.

13. In a letter from Shah Shooja to Captain Macgregor, sent with a letter from the latter officer, of the 22nd January, your honourable Committee will find a statement by the Shah with respect to his own position and views. It will be seen that he asks for pecuniary aid to enable him to maintain his authority.

14. From the 13th to the 25th of January, which is our last date from Jellalabad, no attack has been made on that post, which is stated to have been then supplied with two months' provisions for the troops, though only with one months' forage for the cattle. The spirit and fortitude with which the position at Jellalabad has been held and strengthened, for a period of two months, under circumstances of pressing difficulty and discouragement, have entitled our officers and troops there, under the command of Major-General Sir Robert Sale, and aided by the able and determined political management of Captain Macgregor, assistant to the Cabul mission, to our highest admiration.

15. Mahomed Akhbar Khan had no strong force with him near to Jellalabad, and it is not known whether any effective means and materiel will be sent to him from Cabool; but we must regard the position of the gallant garrison of Jellalabad with very deep anxiety. It appeared to be the plan of Ma

homed Akhbar Khan to proceed to the Khyber defiles in order to prevent the approach of succour to Jelialabad by troops moving from Peshawur.

16. The efforts at first made by the detachment of British troops, consisting of four regiments of native infantry, with some details of irregular horse, and a native company of foot artillery, using four inefficient guns, obtained from General Avitabile, at Peshawur, to advance through the Khyber Pass for the relief of Jellalabad, or to hold the Pass in strength so as to cover the retirement of the Jellalabad garrison to Peshawur, have unhappily ended in failure.

The despatches in the political and military departments, connected with this subject, are sent as inclosures to this letter; and we will refer your honourable Committee to them for all details. Two papers of remarks, by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, in regard to no guns having been sent from Ferozepore, with either of the two detachments in which these regiments marched, are also amongst the inclosures, and will engage the particular attention of your honourable committee. We certainly see much reason to regret that some guns were not attached both to the second detachment of these regiments, and to the brigade which subsequently marched with Major-General Pollock; with this last brigade three 9-pounders were indeed sent, but we cannot feel confident that they will prove sufficient for the service required from them. We shall communicate a copy of this paragraph to his Excellency.

17. At the same time we think it right to add, that the instructions given by his Excellency to

Brigadier Wild, commanding the four regiments of native infantry, in regard to the circumstances under which he was to venture into the Khyber Pass, previously to the arrival of Major-General Pollock, with the strong reinforcement accompanying him, appear to us to have been in all respects suitable and judicious. These instructions were forwarded to your honourable Committee, with our dispatches of the 22nd ultimo.

18. Major-General Pollock, with a fresh brigade, will have reached Peshawur in the first week of this month, and we expect daily to hear from him respecting his first views and intentions.

19. Meanwhile we have to lament that the post of Ali Musjid has been for the present necessarily abandoned to the Khyberees, and that the difficulties of the garrison of Jellalabad have been much increased by the retirement of the friendly Mamund Chief Turabaz Khan, from Lalpoora, the other line of communication between Jellalabad and Peshawur, in consequence of apprehensions arising from the approach of Mohamed Akhbar Khan.

20. There are circumstances represented in a letter from Captain Mackeson, of the 27th January, regarding the absence of proper precautions for taking on with the two regiments, which penetrated to Ali Musjid, the supplies of grain prepared for their support there, which will be made a subject of separate and full inquiry in the military department. Most injurious consequences may arise from the retreat, which was unavoidable, when from their supplies not having arrived with the detachment, and from the subsequent failure of the two remain

ing corps to force their way to Ali Musjid with a convoy, the means of subsistence at that post no longer remained.

21. Our instructions for the guidance of Major-General Pollock and Sir Robert Sale have been adapted by us from time to time to the exigencies of circumstances, as these have gradually been disclosed. We entirely approve the answer of Sir Robert Sale and Captain Macgregor to the injunction sent to them from Cabul, for a retirement from Jellalabad, which answer was to the effect, that they must first learn what security could be given to them for the safety of that movement, for we felt that the chiefs with whom the engagements were formed at Cabul were in no condition to stipulate for a state of things, or for the protection of our troops in other parts of the country. We have regarded the proceedings generally of Major-General Elphinstone, as far as we are aware of them, with the keenest disappointment and displeasure, and we have requested the Commander-in-Chief to institute, when circumstances may admit of it, a full military inquiry into the Major-General's conduct, and desired that the authority of the MajorGeneral over the troops serving in or near Affghanistan should wholly cease.

22. The successive instructions which we have issued for the guidance of Major-General Pollock will be found in our letters of December 15, January 31, and February 10th and 16th.

23. The original direction to Major-General Pollock was, that the safety of the force under Sir Robert Sale should be the prominent object of his care, and that,

otherwise, the situation of the force under his command was mainly that of a strong demonstration on the Peshawur frontier; it resting in his military discretion to determine whether he could with safety hold the advanced post of Jellalabad, in dependence on a secure command of the Khyber, and other passes, between Jellalabad and Peshawur. We should have been glad, had it appeared likely to be in Major-General Pollock's power to maintain the post of Jellalabad for some period, as giving advantages in any communication with the adverse chiefs in Affghanistan, or in any ulterior movement, or course of policy that might be thought proper by the Government here or in England. But on the 31st January, we expressly informed Major-General Pollock, that Jellalabad was not a place which we desired to retain at all hazards, and that after securing Sir Robert Sale's brigade there, and giving every practicable relief to parties from Cabul, we would wish him, rather than run extreme risks at Jellalabad, to arrange for withdrawal from it, and the assemblage of all his force at or near Peshawur.

24. Since we have heard of the misfortunes in the Khyber Pass, and have become convinced that with the difficulties at present opposed to us, and in the actual state of our preparations, we could not expect, at least in this year, to maintain a position in the Jellalabad districts for any effective purpose, we have made our directions in regard to withdrawal from Jellalabad clear and positive, and we shall rejoice to learn that MajorGen. Pollock will have anticipated these more express orders by confining his efforts to the same object.

25. We have attentively considered the question of remaining in force at or near Peshawur during the present year, and upon strengthening the division under Major-General Pollock, by the other complete brigade, which your honourable Committee has before learned had been warned to march from Ferozepore, and we have given the full instructions, which will be found in our letters to the Commander-in-Chief and Mr. Clerk, of the 10th instant, upon these subjects.

26. While there may be a hope of contributing to the safety of the Jellalabad garrison, the advance of the fresh brigade will, of course, be most desirable and necessary, for the purpose also of supporting the division under Major-General Pollock, whether it remain for the year at Peshawur, or other place, in the Lahore territory, or be drawn back gradually to the British frontier. The advance of the brigade is likely to be of much advantage; but there are questions of much delicacy and difficulty connected with the position of the Sikh government, and with the temper and feeling of the most powerful of the Sikh chiefs, and of the body of the Sikh soldiery, which may make the retention of a British force for a long period at any advanced point of the Sikh dominions, far from politic and safe. We have in our instructions to Mr. Clerk dwelt upon these considerations, and given to him a large discretion in respect to the position and movement of our forces in the Punjab. We trust that your honourable Committee will be satisfied, that upon a matter of this nature, the proper determination of which depends so entirely upon local circumstances, we have