defeat it might be called, had the effect of a triumph. It gave them confidence in themselves, and consequence in the eyes of their enemies. They had proved to themselves and to others that they could measure weapons with the disciplined soldiers of Europe, and inflict the most harm in the conflict."*

*Irving, Life of Washington, vol. i., p. 482. See also H. Dearborn, Account of the Battle of Bunker Hill; Samuel Swett, Historical and Topographical Sketch of the Battle of Bunker Hill; Alden Bradford, Complete and Authentic History of the Battle of Bunker Hill; Charles Francis Adams, The Battle of Bunker Hill, in American Historical Review, vol. i., pp. 401-413; Francis J. Parker, Battle of Bunker Hill; W. W. Wheildon, Battle of Bunker Hill; Samuel A. Drake, Battle of Bunker Hill; George E. Ellis, Battle of Bunker Hill; John Fortescue, History of the British Army, vol. iii. (1902); John Clarke, An Impartial and Authentic Account of the Battle of Bunker Hill (2d ed. London, 1775); the affidavits in General Heath's Memoirs, pp. 385-401 (Abbatt's ed.); James Wilkinson's Memoirs, chap. xix.; Daniel Webster, The Battle of Bunker Hill-General Putnam, in North American Review (July, 1818); the narrative prepared by order of the Massachusetts Committee of Safety and the various depositions, accounts, extracts from letters and other documents in Frothingham, Siege of Boston, pp. 381-406, and the list of original authorities on pp. 372-381; Charles Coffin, History of the Battle of Breed's Hill, reprinted in Fellows' The Veil Removed, pp. 113-138; Swett, Who Was Commander at Bunker Hill?; Parker, Colonel William Prescott, the Commander at Bunker Hill; Jonathan Trumbull, Vindication of General Israel Putnam, in Year Book of the Connecticut Society Sons of the American Revolution (1895-1896); Alfred P. Putnam, The Commander at Bunker Hill, in Danvers (Mass.) Mirror (1896); ibid, A Sketch of General Israel Putnam (Salem, Mass., 1893); the lives of Putnam by Livingston (chap. xvii and app i., pp. 423-427), O. W. B. Peabody in Sparks, American Biography, vol. vii. (1837); Benson J. Lossing in Harper's Magazine (April, 1856), George C. Hill (1858), John Fiske, in Appleton's Cyclopædia of American Biography,

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Probably the greatest loss which the Americans suffered in the battle was the death of General Joseph Warren. But a few days previously he had been commissioned majorgeneral; and at the time was also president of the Massachusetts Congress, and chairman of the Committee of Safety. Upon learning of the contemplated attack upon Bunker Hill, he left his post as presiding officer of the Congress and hurried to the scene of action. Upon his arrival the chief command was offered to him by Colonel Prescott, but he declined it, saying: "I am come to learn war under an experienced soldier, not to take any command." When the provincials were finally expelled from the redoubt, he was among the last to leave, and almost immediately afterward he received a shot in the head and fell dead on the spot. His loss was deemed a public calamity and produced a deep impression throughout America, for he was highly respected and much beloved.*

vol. v., Jared Cutter (1847), David Humphreys, (1790), I. N. Tarbox (1875); Ashwell Woodward, Memoir of Colonel Thomas Knowlton. On the controversy as to who was commander, see the list of authorities in Winsor, Handbook of the American Revolution, pp. 48-53; and the same author's Narrative and Critical History, vol. vi., pp. 190-191; and the list by Henry B. Dawson, in Historical Magazine (June, 1868).

* See Everett, Life of Joseph Warren, p. 53; also the life by Frothingham. Warren was, as has been truly said, "the martyr of that day's glory. His death was felt as a calamity to the cause and to the nation. He was in the prime of life, being only thirty-five years of age, with a spirit as bold and dauntless as ever was blazoned in legends, or recorded in history. He was a pru

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arbitrarily exercise such power might lead astray even a man like Washington. To the members of Congress the thought of a standing army was a nightmare, and only at Washington's most urgent request was an army of sufficient size formed. Washington informed Congress that the cause would be hopeless unless he could have sufficient troops to prosecute successful campaigns. He said that these troops should not be enlisted for a specific period but to serve throughout the war. From the course which he knew would bring the greatest and best results, Washington could not be moved, though at times his patience and forbearance were sorely tried. The members of Congress had not the military in

*

"This error [of enlisting men for only a year] may have been owing to the character of the government, to the opinions and prejudices prevailing in Congress, and to the delusive idea, which still lingered in the minds of many of the members, that, although the sword had been drawn, the scabbard was not wholly thrown aside, and that they should be able to coerce the British ministry into a redress of grievances, which might be followed by a restoration of the relation between the colonies and the mother country, upon a constitutional basis. No such idea was entertained by Washington from the beginning. He harbored no thought of accommodation, after the measures adopted in consequence of the battle of Bunker's Hill. But at the time of which I am treating, the issue had not been made, as Washington would have made it; and, when we consider the state of things before the Declaration of Independence was adopted, and look attentively at the objects for which the Congress had been assembled, and at the nature of their powers, we may perceive how they came to make the mistake of not organizing a military establishment on a more permanent footing." Curtis, History of the Constitution, vol. i., p. 61 (Constitutional History, vol. i., p. 42).

stinct to understand the necessity of prompt and efficient measures nor the decency to leave Washington unhampered in his operations. They were too much occupied with bickering over trivial matters and with sectional jealousies to comprehend that the fate of a nation swung in the balance. Consequently, upon Washington fell the entire labor of organizing, establishing and sustaining the military system. "To this end he kept up an unremitted correspondence with Congress during the whole war. His letters were read to the House in full session, and almost every important resolution respecting the army was adopted on his suggestion or recommendation, and emanated from his mind. He was thus literally the centre of motion to this immense and complicated machine, not more in directing its operations than in providing for its existence, and preserving its various parts from derangement and ruin. His per

plexities were often increased by the distance at which he was stationed from Congress, the tardy movements of that body, and the long time it took to obtain the results of their deliberations.

By a constant watchfulness and forethought, and by anticipating the future in his communications, he contrived to lessen this inconvenience as far as it could be done."* In addition to his correspondence with Congress, Washington corresponded

*Sparks, Life of Washington, p. 139.

extensively with various public bodies throughout the colonies, to stimulate their zeal, rouse their patriotism, and prevail upon them to render him all the aid possible. Besides this, he was harassed by requests from all parts of the country for detachments of troops for protective purposes, and while he disliked to refuse such requests, he felt it absolutely necessary to do so, if he were to accomplish the great object in view. Nevertheless, the mere fact of his refusal created discontent in many sections of the country - the people seemed not to consider the difficulties under which he labored.

In August, 1775, Washington was informed that the prisoners taken by the British at Bunker Hill were being severely and harshly treated by them; he, therefore, deemed it his duty to write to Gage regarding this.† Both Washington and Gage, it will be remembered, served in Braddock's

campaign, and had fought side by side in that bloody battle. Thenceforth they maintained a friendly correspondence, but now that they had taken opposite sides in the struggle for independence, this correspondence gradually dropped. In reply to Washington's letter, Gage denied that the prisoners were being illtreated, and spoke disparagingly of the rebels," and of those "whose

66

• Ibid, p. 139.

See his letter in Lodge, George Washington, vol. i., pp. 142-143; Irving, Life of Washington, vol. ii., pp. 31-32.

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lives by the law of the land were destined to the cord." Upon receipt of this message, Washington threatened to institute retaliatory measures upon the prisoners in the hands of the provincials, but he quickly relented lented and generously paroled the prisoners in hope that " such conduct would compel their grateful acknowledgments that Americans are as merciful as they are brave."† In a very dignified reply to Gage's letter he said: he said: "You affect, Sir, to despise all rank not derived from the same source as your own. I cannot conceive one more honorable, than that which flows from the uncorrupted choice of a brave and free people, the purest source and original fountain of all power. Far from making it a plea for cruelty, a mind of true magnanimity and enlarged ideas would apprehend and respect it."‡ Shortly after this Gage was recalled to Eng

land, ostensibly" in order to give his majesty exact information of everything that it may be necessary to prepare, as early as possible, for the operations of next year, and to suggest to his majesty such matters in relation thereto as [his] knowledge and experience of the service en

*Sparks, p. 142; Irving, vol. ii., pp. 32-33; Lodge, p. 144.

Bancroft, vol. iv., p. 249. See also Johnson, General Washington, p. 113.

Sparks, Life of Washington, p. 143; Irving, Life of Washington, vol. ii., pp. 34-35; Frothingham, Siege of Boston, pp. 240-241; Lodge, George Washington, vol. i., p. 144.