into Families, in which men unavoidably exist under relations into which they are born, and which they have not selected by their Will; and which yet imply both obligation and duty. And thus the Conception of "the People" as the Source of Government, in order that it may be in any degree distinct and applicable, must be moulded into form by means of the two Principles which we have stated as the grounds of Rights and Obligations; the Relations arising from circumstances of Birth; and Relations which are of the nature of Contract.

921. Having considered the objections commonly urged against the Doctrine of a Social Contract, I shall make a few Remarks on the assertion that the sole foundation of Government is Expediency, or Utility: that it is to be upheld solely on the ground of the Benefits and Advantages which it produces to men. In reference to the latter statement, we may assent to it, with this explanation, that if we are to support Civil Government on account of the Benefits it confers, the nature of our support must correspond with the nature of the Benefits: as the Benefits are moral Benefits, the support must include moral Affections. The Benefits which Civil Government confers upon men (if that expression is to be used) are, that it is the Source of Order, Freedom, Justice; the necessary condition of Rights, and therefore of Duties and Virtues. That anything is the source of these Benefits, is certainly abundant reason for supporting it; and so long as the nature of the Benefits which Civil Government produces is borne in mind, we may be content to say that it depends for its claims upon these. We have endeavoured to show that it produces these Benefits by being of the Nature of a Contract among men; but whether this be assented to or not, it may suffice for our moral reasoning, if Government be regarded as the necessary Condition of all Duty and all Virtues.

922. In this sense, we might also allow that the foundation of Government is its Expediency, or its Utility. But as we have already said (555), when men rest their approval of any general rule or principle on its Expediency, or its Utility, they commonly mean to put out of sight all differences in the value of the objects for which things are expedient or useful. When a man says that it is expedient to speak the truth, we suppose that he considers truth and lying to differ only in being more or less expedient. Now this mode of speech cannot satisfy the purposes of Morality. We cannot be content to say that we support Civil Government for its Expediency, when we mean that we reverence it as the necessary condition of man's moral being. We cannot be satisfied to talk of the Utility which results from the existence of Government, when we must include, in our notion of Utility, Order, Freedom and Justice.

923. The unsatisfactory effect of the language applied to this subject by Paley is, I think, generally felt. For instance, when he discusses the question of the Right of Resistance to Government, he expresses himself in a mode which has startled most of his readers. On this question, his sentence is : "That the established government is to be obeyed so long as it cannot be resisted or changed without public inconvenience, and no longer." And he adds, that, to the question, “Who shall judge?" on this subject, "The answer is, Every man for himself."

924. This decision must be understood to reject, as mistaken feeling, all affection towards the existing Constitution of the Country. All loyalty to the Sovereign, and affection towards the other governing bodies, can only be impediments in the way of forming this judgment, which every one is called upon to form, whether the Government may not be resisted or changed without public inconvenience. The condemnation with which both law

and common opinion regard Faction, Sedition, and Treason, can have no place in the bosom of a consistent Moralist of this school. Such a one would rather be led by his views to deny that there was any harm in Sedition and Treason; since these might be necessary means of attempting improvements. There may be always ground to hope advantage from change; and those forms of attempting it, which the law calls Sedition and Treason, may be natural results of a wish to promote the public convenience; and therefore, even if errors, are no proper objects of indignation.

925. It is true, that Paley and his followers do not really draw, from their doctrines, such conclusions as these. They assert Expediency as the sole basis of the Rights of the State, and of the Obligations of the Citizen; but then, they assume Expediency to be a sufficient ground of strong love for existing expedient things: and of strong condemnation of those who attempt to change them for things less expedient. Though professedly so open to proposals of change, they really cling with affection to the claims of usage. And though deriding the value set upon the Constitution by others, Paley is often led to refer to it himself as an important subject of consideration.

926. Thus, he says, in speaking of his doctrine of Resistance to Government, "Not every invasion of the Subject's rights or liberty, or of the constitution; not every breach of promise or of oath; not every stretch of prerogative, abuse of power, or neglect of duty by the chief magistrate, or by the whole, or any branch of the legislative body, justifies resistance, unless these crimes draw after them public consequences of sufficient magnitude to outweigh the evils of civil disturbance." And again, as a reason for especially resenting and punishing viola

tions of the Constitution, he urges that "a wellknown and settled usage of governing affords the only security against the enormities of uncontrolled dominion." Here, the Constitution is become a valuable reality. In the same manner Paley, after he has said that "an act of parliament can never be unconstitutional, in the strict and proper acceptation of the term," as if startled by the hardihood of his own assertion, adds, "that in a lower sense it may; viz., when it militates with the spirit, contradicts the analogy, or defeats the provisions of the laws made to regulate this form of government. This spirit and this analogy form a large part of what has always been understood by the Constitution.

927. The same thing may be noticed in other passages. Thus Paley asks, "Why is a Frenchman bound, both in law and in conscience, to submit to many things to which an Englishman is not obliged to submit?" He replies, "Because the same act is not the same grievance, where it is agreeable to the "And this,' constitution, and where it infringes it.

he adds, "is sufficiently intelligible without a Social Compact. But when he thus explains the case by reference to the Constitution, and to the wrong inflicted by its violation, he approaches very near to the meaning and the language of those who hold the Doctrine of a Social Compact expressed in the Constitution of the Country.

928. Indeed, we may remark in general, that in Paley's mode of treating moral questions, although Expediency is proclaimed as the basis of all Duties, Obligations, and Rights, yet that when these asserted results of Expediency have assumed the forms of Duty, Obligation, and Right, they are forthwith represented as the occasion of affections and sentiments which it would, by most persons, be reckoned absurd to found upon Expediency alone. The ear

nest love of what is right, and indignation at what is wrong, are professed by the disciples of Paley, as feelings in which they, no less than any other men, have a share. Yet how strange does the description of these feelings sound, when translated into the proper phraseology of the school;-when they are called the "earnest love of what is expedient," and the "indignation at what is inexpedient." The insuf ficiency of the notion of Expediency, as a basis for moral affections and moral sentiments, proves that it is not the true basis of Morality. And this further appears, by the mode in which it is employed by its assertors. While we read Paley's pages, we find, that when he comes to particulars, the things which he treats as Realities, and by reference to which he discusses special cases, are the things which he has rejected in his general discussions ;-Constitution, Supposed Ancient Covenants, Established Usage, National Rights; while the Expediency, which is asserted in general as containing the essence of moral and political philosophy, is put out of sight as an element of discussion, and becomes merely an occasional form of expression.

CHAPTER VII.

NATURAL PROGRESS OF GOVERNMENT.

929. CIVIL Government exists as the necessary condition of man's moral being. It combines the conditions of Order and Freedom; and corresponds to its Idea the more completely, in proportion as it more completely realizes those conditions. In the history