individual takes his share of the Duties of the State, as we have seen, knowing historically what the State has done; and trying to make the State, for the present, act morally, so far as the coherency of its being will allow. And all the individuals who share in the acts of the State, have to act thus, with historical knowledge and moral intention. But there is nothing in this process which can with propriety be called the Conscience of the State. Statesmen are not conscious of the past history of their country, however they may be cognisant of it. The Statesmen of to-day are not conscious of the purposes and convictions of the State at the time of the Revolution. Men, contemporaries and successors of each other, may add together their knowledge, and may correct it by their discussions; they may combine their intentions, and may thus carry out a common plan: but they cannot properly be said to add together their Consciences, and thus make a Common Conscience. We have indeed (368) spoken of the Common Conscience of mankind; namely, the Supreme Law of Man's Being, which each man contemplates in his own Conscience: but we have also said (370), that we may more properly render the moral reasons for actions by referring them to the moral Ideas of Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order, than by speaking of Conscience. The Conscience of a Nation, if it be spoken of at all, must be conceived to be, like the Conscience of an Individual, the stage at which it has arrived in its advance towards a full possession of the Fundamental Moral Ideas. But the stages at which different individuals have arrived, in such an advance, must be very various; and it does not appear that we gain anything by calling the result the National Con

science.

But in whatever way we express it, the State undoubtedly possesses a Moral Character; and has

Duties, as we have intimated, of the same description as those of individuals:-Duties of Humanity, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order; the Duties of Moral and Intellectual Progress. These latter Duties, in the case of individuals, include, as we have seen (720), the Duty of Religious Belief. We shall have to consider, hereafter, whether the same be true with regard to the State. But we must first consider some

of the other Duties of the State.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT.

868. We have spoken of the manner in which the Nature of the State imposes Duties upon the Governors; we must now speak of the manner in which it imposes Duties upon the Governed. Of some of the Duties of the Governed, we also formerly spoke (333); namely, willing obedience to the Laws, an affection for the country, a love of its institutions and of its constitution; a loyalty to its Sovereign. That men shall possess such feelings as these towards the Government of their country, is a general Moral Rule, of great extent and great importance. But we have already stated (462), that in the course of the intellectual progress of mankind, Moral Rules require to be improved by a fuller development and elucidation of the import of the terms which they contain. We have already endeavoured (465, 486, 513) to unfold, for this reason, the conceptions of the State, Justice and Humanity: we must now do the same for the conception of Government; and for this purpose, must explain some of the views which have been successively taken by writers, of the Moral

Nature of Government, and the grounds of men's Duties towards it.

The view which we have already given of the foundation on which Government rests is this (94) that Government is a necessary condition of man's Moral Nature; for Government is necessary to the existence of Rights; and Rights are requisite to the existence of Duties and Virtues. Or as we have otherwise expressed it, that our Idea of Moral Perfection involves an Idea of Order (269): and that this Idea of Order cannot be realized, without fixed permanent external Laws, or Rules for human Actions. The Rules which the Idea of Order thus implies, are Facts external to the human Agent; but they are Facts requisite in order to mould his acts into a definite moral form.

869. But though the external Facts which embody the Idea of Order are thus requisite, in order that man's actions may have a moral form; there is something also requisite, in order that they may be Moral Actions: namely, an internal Principle of activity, Freedom to act (534). Without the Combination of these two elements, Order and Freedom, Moral Action cannot take place. And Government, which has it for its office to supply the element, Order, in this combination, must do so in such a manner as not to expel or destroy the element, Freedom. The external fact must not annihilate the internal act. The internal act must modify the external fact. Public Order and Individual Freedom

must subsist together.

Thus Government, in order to be what it essentially is, a necessary Condition of man's moral agency, must include a Principle of Order, and also a Principle of Freedom. These two Principles are in some respects opposed to each other, and have been so considered, in the course of man's intellectual progress. We shall first observe some of the conse

quences of this opposition, before we attempt to trace especially the development of the Ideas themselves.

These abstract Ideas, Order and Freedom, have been the Objects of sentiments in men which are described as the Love of Order and the Love of Freedom. Under the influence of these Sentiments, the affairs of various nations have been variously conducted; and the Conception of Government itself has been presented under various points of view. We must consider how these are related to each other.

870. Since Government, as we have seen, includes an external Fact independent of man's Will, and an internal Will modifying the external Fact, it may be regarded mainly in the one or the other of these two lights: and thus have arisen two different, and in some respect opposite views, of the nature of Government, and of the Duties which relate to it.

One view represents civil Government as an External Fact, which men must take as they find it, and conform their actions to it, without having anything else to do with it. We are under a Government; we are to obey it; this is our Duty, and this is the whole of our business as subjects. The claims of Government upon our Obedience are universal and irresistible.

871. This view borrows one of its main illustrations from a kind of Government which is undoubtedly an External Fact independent of our Will: which all men find, and must take as they find it; which is a universal condition of human nature, and claims obedience with irresistible power; namely, the Paternal Government. The child is placed by nature in the power of the parent. He obeys him, and must obey him, at least for some portion of life; and no one questions that he ought to obey him. The obedience, thus begun, is naturally continued through life, and extended to successive generations, as we know was the case in the early periods of society;

and thus was produced a Patriarchal Government. This, the natural and original form of Government, presents to us the true nature of Government and other kinds of Government are to be explained and justified by their derivation from the Patriarchal System.

872. This view, or one nearly resembling it, is sometimes expressed in a different manner. Government, being an External Fact which we find universally annexed to our condition, by no agency of our own, is to be accepted as a part of the scheme of Providence, which we must not think of altering. It is a portion of the Divine Order of things, to which men must conform. Men's Duty of Obedience to their Civil Governors is their Duty of Obedience to the Will of God; and hence, Governors have a Divine Right.

873. The opposite view to this looks not to the External Fact, but to the Internal Fact, the Will; as that which must determine man's condition. His moral position must depend upon himself. He makes Government what it is; and obeys it because he Wills to do so.

874. This view, again, borrows one of its main illustrations from a class of transactions in which a man does determine the circumstances of his condition by the acts of his Will; and in which the External Facts which regulate his actions, do so because he chooses, and as far as he chooses, that they should do so; namely, Contracts. A man may, by a Contract with other men, unite with them and bind himself to obey certain Rules mutually agreed upon; and so long as the Contract stands, the Rules are binding. It is held, that Government may be likened to such a Contract, and that the Laws which the Government upholds, are binding in virtue of this likeness. Government is a special kind of Contract, the Social Contract; and it is a Duty of