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823. From the early times of the Church to the time of the Reformation, Bishops alone had a right to ordain Priests. In England, Sweden, Denmark, Ordination is only performed by Bishops. And even some of the protestants, who have rejected episcopal government, give the right of ordination to the Superintendent, and commonly only to the General Superintendent, or higher officers of their Ecclesiastical Polity. Those protestants who are specially called the Reformed (the followers of Calvin), hold that every minister may ordain. But in the larger churches of this kind, in Switzerland, Holland, and Scotland, there is a certain Order of Ordination by the Seniors, Class-leaders, Synodal Superintendents, or the like. Only the Presbyterians, Independents, and other Dissenters in England, reject the imposition of hands, and allow every minister to ordain others.*

824. It is an ancient requirement of the Church that every minister must be ordained to a special local Ministry. The priest was ordained as the Pastor of a particular Place. The appointment to the special place was called a Title :—and the Rule was, Neminem absolute et sine titulo esse ordinandum.

825. The appointment of a minister to any particular place or Parish, was often in the hands of the principal owner of the land. He was the Patron of the Living. His was the Advowson (Advocatio). Of course the Patron could not appoint to the living any one except a person already in Holy Orders. The Right of Patronage became often an appendage of private property; and was bought and sold, like other appendages of property.

826. It was forbidden in the Church to obtain any spiritual office by purchase, gifts, or promises; and this offence was called Simonia, Simony, from its supposed resemblance to the offence of Simon Magus;

* Augusti. Christ. Arch., B. XI., c. 3.

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who (Acts viii., 18) offered the apostles money, saying, Give me also this power, that on whomsoever I lay hands, he may receive the Holy Ghost. In the Apostolical Canons, which, though not what they pretend to be, are Christian precepts of an early date, it is said (Canon Apost. xxviii.), " If any Bishop shall obtain this dignity by means of money, or any Priest or Deacon, let both him and the person who ordained him be utterly excommunicated, as Simon Magus was by me Peter." The condemnation of Simony has been continued to modern times, and adopted in our own Laws; and it is plain that not merely the sacredness of spiritual things, but justice and decency, are violated by the sale of spiritual offices.

827. The Sale of Advowsons, of which we have just spoken, may appear to be at variance with the prohibition of the Sale of Spiritual Offices. But this is not so: for the spiritual office, the Order of Priest or Deacon, is not bought or sold. The Right of Private Patronage implies rather a sacred aspect in Property, than a secular aspect in the Ministry. The principal Lord of the land had originally a religious, as well as a civil Duty, to his tenants. And when the Advowson is separated from the local property, it still implies a religious Duty in those who hold it.

Yet the Laws against Simony, and the Right of Private Patronage, sometimes appear to be in conflict. Thus a clergyman may, as well as any other person, purchase the Advowson of a Living. But he may not purchase it so as to secure himself the next turn only.

828. The manner in which Religious Ministers, and the Property by which they are supported, are protected and regulated by the State, is one of the most important features in the different Polity of dif ferent Nations. It is their Ecclesiastical Polity. Of this subject we shall have to treat in the next Book.

BOOK V.

POLITY.

THE DUTIES OF THE STATE.

CHAPTER I.

THE RIGHTS OF THE STATE.

829. WE have already (465-475) spoken of The State, as a Conception applicable to every Community of Men, among whom Rights and Obligations really exist. The State is the Origin of the Law, and of the powers which execute the Law; and hence, is the Source of the reality of Rights. The State is Supreme, or Sovereign over all persons and authorities within it. The State is single and permanent, while its subjects are many and mutable. We have also seen that the State so conceived is a Moral Agent: it has Duties; and among these Duties, we have been led to notice especially the Duty of Educating the people (474). We have now to consider more fully the Duties of the State in general, and this Duty of Education in particular.

830. In the case of individuals, Duties are extensions of Obligations, and Obligations imply Rights. The same is true of States; and therefore we have

VOL. II.

to consider in the first place the Rights and Obligations of States.

We have already spoken of the rights of Government, and the Obligation of Obedience on the part of the governed (206). These Rights are Rights of the State. It is from the State, that all persons placed in Magistracies and Offices of Command derive their Right to the obedience of subordinate persons. It is as representing or possessing the Authority of the State, that they are Persons in Authority. The Obedience which is rendered to the Magistrate, is rendered to the Law, and to the State, which is the Source of the Law. The State is the origin of Rights in general, as we have said; but it is the origin of other Rights, by having the Rights of Government. Other Rights, as Rights of Property, it assigns to its subjects; the Rights of Government, it asserts to itself.

831. The relation between the Rights of individuals and the Rights of the State, has been variously presented by different Moralists. Some, as we have said (469), have considered the Rights of the State as formed by the addition of the Rights of Individuals. According to this doctrine, individuals constitute a State, by uniting themselves, and contributing to a common stock the rights which they naturally possess; sharing this stock of Rights among themselves by common consent, and establishing Officers and Laws to carry their agreement into effect.

We have already (469) pointed out the untenable character of this Doctrine. Rights cannot exist without the State. Individual Rights cannot be supposed anterior to the State; and thus, State Rights cannot be hypothetically constructed out of Individual Rights. But further: there are some State Rights in particular, which are more evidently, from special considerations, not aggregates of individual

Rights. These peculiar State Rights we shall proceed to describe.

832. The State has a Right to the National Territory. Individuals derive their Rights to their special Property in Land, from the State, according to the Law of the Land; but they could not derive those Special Rights from the State, except the State had a general Right to the whole. An Englishman has a Right to his landed Property in England, because the Law of England gives it him. A Frenchman has a Right to his landed Property in France, because the Law of France gives it him. But this assumes that the English State, which speaks its Will in the English Law, has a Right to the Soil of England; and in like manner, the French State is assumed to have a Right to the Soil of France. Englishman may possess land in France; but this is, still, by the Law of France; and implies the Right of the French State to the French Territory. There can be no property in Land, except what is derived from the State in which the Land belongs.

An

833. We may illustrate this further. Suppose any County of England were conceived as detached from the State; as no longer owing obedience to the English State, or deriving Rights from it. What Right, on this supposition, have the inhabitants of the County to the land on which they live? It may be said, that they have the Right of Possession. But Present Possession can confer no Right, on such a supposition. Present Possession is a fact, which may be succeeded, at any moment, by the opposite fact of Dispossession; and then the Right is gone. Suppose the inhabitants of this County to be dispossessed violently by a body of new settlers from any place, at home or abroad; of what wrong can they complain? When dispossessed, they have no longer the Right of present Possession. If they urge the Right of past Possession, how is this a Right, and by

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