verdict must be for the defendant. The jury immediately found for the defendant. Bishop v. Chambre, 1 M. & M. 116; and see Johnson v. the Duke of Marlborough, 2 Stark. 313.

Alteration-before negotiation with consent of parties does not avoid bill.] Where an alteration is made in a bill or note before it has been issued, such bill or note is good against all who have consented to the alteration, provided it be not made after the time when the operation of the bill is spent. Thus where three persons joined as drawer, acceptor, and indorser of an accommodation bill, which was afterwards issued for value to one Howell, but previously to its being so issued the date was altered with the consent of the acceptor, but without the consent of the drawer and indorser, it was held that the acceptor was not discharged by this alteration, for that until it was issued to Howell, no person could have sued upon it. Per Holroyd, J. " Independently of the Stamp Act, it is clear that the acceptor would be liable; for when he assented to the alteration, it is as if his acceptance had been originally made subsequently to that alteration, for his assent operates as a parol acceptance of the bill. As to the other point, I am of opinion that a fresh stamp was not necessary, because no one could have maintained an action upon the bill until it came into the hands of Howell." Downes v. Richardson, 5 B. & A. 674. And see Johnson v. Gibb, 2 Chitty, 123. Sherrington v. Jermyn, 3 C. & P. 374. These decisions appear to have overruled the case of Calvert v. Roberts, 3 Campb. 343. There the defendant had accepted the bill for the accommodation of the drawer, who, after attempting to negotiate it, but failing, altered the date and indorsed it away; Lord Ellenborough said "that the bill, as originally dated, was a valid and complete instrument, framed according to the intention of the parties. Therefore the date could not afterwards be altered, even with their consent. The alteration was tantamount to the drawing of a new bill." It does not appear whether the alteration was made with the defendant's consent. Where a creditor drew upon his debtor, for the amount of his bill, and sent it to him for acceptance, who wished to have the time altered from three to four months, which with the drawer's assent was done, Lord Ellenborough held that a new stamp was unnecessary. Kennerly v. Nash, 1 Stark. 452. Johnson v. Garnett, 2 Chitty, 122. Though a bill or note may be altered before negotiation by consent, and does not require a new stamp, yet if the alteration be made after the period when the bill, if not altered, would have become due, a new stamp is required. A bill dated 2d September 1723, payable twenty-one days after date, while it continued in the hands of the drawer, was altered with the consent of the acceptor to fifty-one days after date, and with like consent was again restored to twenty-one days

after date, and the date was brought forward from the 2d to the 14th September. This alteration being made on the 30th September, the court were of opinion that as, at the time when the last alteration was made, the operation of the bill as it originally stood was quite spent, it was a new and distinct transaction between the parties, and that therefore there ought to have been a new stamp. Bowman v. Nichol, 5 T. R. 537.

Alteration-what is an issuing of a bill or note]. A bill is issued as soon as there is some person who can make a valid claim on it, but if it remains in the hands of the original drawer, even with names upon it, under such circumstances as that he cannot have any legal claim upon those persons, the bill is not issued. Per Bayley J., Downes v. Richardson, 5 B. & A. 680. ante p.36. In the following case, Lord Ellenborough seems to have been of opinion that a bill drawn for a valuable consideration as between the drawer and payee, was not to be considered as negotiated while in the hands of the payee. Myers agreed to let to Michael Hart a house at Portsea, and M. Hart drew the bill in question in favour of Myers, in consideration of the good will and fixtures. Myers then took the bill to Joseph Hart, the drawee and defendant, at whose desire he altered the date of the bill. It appeared, also, that while the bill was in the hands of Myers, a special acceptance was inserted. Per Lord Ellenborough, "A bill of exchange is certainly capable of alteration before it has passed into a state of negotiation, particularly if the alteration be made for the correction of a mistake as it was here, and made with the acquiescence of the party. With respect to the alteration made as to the place of payment, the objection rests upon the vexata quæstio, whether the place of payment is to be considered as part of the contract, or merely direction where payment may be made (see Mackintosh v. Haydon, post). I am of opinion that the objections are without foundation." Jacobs v. Hart, 2 Stark. 45. But see Walton v. Hastings, 4 Campb. 223. 2 Chitty, 121. S. C. Wilson v. Justice, Bayley, 89. ante, p.34. An exchange of acceptances is a negotiation of the respective bills, and they cannot after such exchange be altered even with consent, without a new stamp. The delivery of the bill by the drawer to the acceptor and the re-delivery of it to the drawer for a valuable consideration, (as the exchange of acceptances) constitutes a negotiation. The several drawers are mutual purchasers of each other's acceptances. Cardwell v. Martin, 9 East, 190. 1 Campb. 79. S. C. Where a creditor draws upon his debtor, who accepts the bill and re-delivers it to the drawer, the bill is then negotiated and cannot be altered without a new stamp. Buthe v. Taylor, 15 East, 412.

Per

Alteration-what alteration is material]. In order to render a bill or note void by alteration, the alteration must be in a material point. Altering the date of a bill payable after date is a material alteration. Walton v. Hastings, 4 Campb. 223. 1 Stark. 215. S. C. Outhwaite v. Luntley, 4 Campb. 179. So the addition of the consideration of the bill. Knill v. Williams, 10 East, 401. ante, p. 34. An alteration in the acceptance, as converting a general acceptance into an acceptance making the bill payable at a particular place, is material. Thus, where the drawer of a bill, without the consent of the acceptor, who had accepted generally, inserted under the acceptance the words " payable at Mr. B.'s, 48 Chiswell Street," the court held that as those words rendered the acceptance special, (Rowe v. Young, 2 B. & B. 165. post, Chap. VIII.) the addition was an alteration in a material part of the instrument, and having been made without the privity of the acceptor, the bill thereby became void. Cowie v. Halsall, 4 B. & A. 197. And even since the passing the stat. 1 & 2 Geo. 4. c. 78. it has been ruled that the insertion of the words " payable at Messrs. R. & Co. bankers, London;" under the acceptance, by the drawer, without the consent of the acceptor, avoids the bill, although the acceptance still continues a general acceptance. Abbott, Č. J. "Here is another view in which the words added materially alter the character of the bill. Suppose the indorsee who was cognizant of such an alteration, were to pass the bill while current to another person, without communicating the fact, and he to a third; the right of the last indorsee to sue his immediate indorser, would, as the bill appears, be complete upon default made at the banker's and notice thereof; whereas in truth, the acceptor not having in reality undertaken to pay there would have committed no default by such non-payment. I am of opinion, therefore, that the alteration is in a material part of the bill, and that the defendant (the acceptor) is in consequence discharged." Mackintosh v. Haydon, R. & M. 362. See Marson v. Petit, 1 Campb. 82. 1 M. & S. 737. So where the drawer of a bill, accepted payable at B. & Co's. erased the name of B. & Co. who had failed, and substituted E. & Co. without the consent of the acceptor, it was held by the court of K. B. (which at that time treated such an acceptance as a general acceptance, see post, Chap. VIII.) that this was a material alteration, and that the acceptor was discharged. Tidmarsh v. Grover, 1 M. & S. 735. And see R. v. Treble, 2 Taunt. 329. But where in an action against the acceptor of a bill, it appeared that after the bill had been given, the words "when due at the Cross-Keys, Blackfriars Road," were written on it, Lord Kenyon said that this was not an alteration either in the time of payment or the sum. That to make a bill of exchange void by reason of the alteration, it

should be in a material point; though it had been formerly holden that even the telling up a sum on a bill, or writing any thing upon it, would invalidate it, that strictness was now exploded, and as the alteration in the present case was not in a material part, but only pointing out where the bill was to be paid, it was not such an alteration as would invalidate the bill. Trapp v. Spearman, 3 Esp. 57. Marson v. Petit, 1 Campb. 82. (n). but see ante, p. 38. Where a bill was originally addressed "Messrs. Southey, Crowther & Co." but had been altered into "Messrs. Southey & Crowther," and the acceptance was signed "Southey & Crowther," and it did not appear when the alteration had been made, in an action against the acceptors, Littledale J. was of opinion that the alteration, even if made after acceptance, was not material. Farquhar v. Southey, M. & M. 14. 2 C. & P. 497. S. C.

Alteration correction of mistake.] Where the alteration is strictly the correction of a mistake, it will not vitiate the bill, though made after negotiation. Thus in an action against the payee and indorser of a bill, it appeared that the bill bearing date the 1st August, was indorsed to K. and by K. to the plaintiffs, and on the 2nd was sent back by the plaintiffs to K. because the words "or order" were wanting, without which the bill was not negotiable; K. applied to the defendant, who referred him to the drawer, by whom the words or order" were inserted, and the bill was returned to the plaintiffs. Per Le Blanc J. "" 'It can hardly be contended that the defendant did not consent to the alteration making this a negotiable bill, as he himself indorsed it and so considered it as negotiable, but this I will leave to the jury. As to the stamp, I think no new stamp was necessary. This was not a new instrument, as in the case of Bowman v. Nichol, 5 T. R. 537. (ante, p. 37,) but merely a correction of a mistake, in furtherance of the original intention of the parties. It would be different if the alteration had been made in the date, or in the time when it was to be paid, that would be a material part; this in my opinion is not so, and does not vitiate the bill." Kershaw v. Cox, 3 Esp. 246. In Knill v. Williams, 10 East, 437, ante, p. 34. Le Blanc J. said, "The opinion which I delivered in Kershaw v. Cox, can only be supported on the ground that the alteration then made in the bill was merely the correction of a mistake made by the drawer of it, in having omitted the words or order,' which it was intended at the time should be inserted, for the alteration there made was a very material one." The principle laid down in Kershaw v. Cox has since been frequently acted on. J. & R. Maddocks being indebted to the plaintiff, agreed to give him a bill of exchange, to be drawn by the one and accepted by the other for the amount. Instead of a bill they

sent a promissory note made by the one and indorsed by the other, which the plaintiff immediately sent back, that it might be altered into a bill according to the agreement, which was done. It was contended that a new stamp was necessary. Per Lord Ellenborough, "I think the stamp impressed upon this paper is sufficient to render the instrument available in its present form. It cannot be considered as having been negotiated as a promissory note. It never was issued to third persons. It remained in the hands and under the dominion of the original parties. Every thing continued in fieri till after the alteration. The plaintiff instantly rejected it as a promissory note. The alteration only fulfilled the terms of the agreement, and may be treated as the correction of a mistake." Webber v. Maddox, 3 Campb. 1. A bill after it was accepted was given to a person of the name of Bennett, the agent of the drawer and acceptor, to deliver to the indorsee. Bennett discovering that the date was January 1822, instead of January 1823, without again seeing the drawer or acceptor, and before he delivered the bill to the indorsee, altered the figure 2 into 3. Abbott, C. J. I shall leave it to the jury to decide whether this bill was not dated by mistake 1822. If they are of opinion that it was originally the intention of the parties to the bill that it should be dated 1823, and that the figure 2 was inserted by mistake, I am of opinion that this alteration will not vacate the bill." Brutt v. Picard, R. & M. 37.

66

Per

When a note beginning I promise," &c. was signed by Jackson, and afterwards Blackstock also signed it as a surety, Bayley J. said that if it were part of the bargain between the payee and Jackson that Blackstock should sign the note as a principal, he might sign it at any time subsequent to Jackson's signature. But if it were no part of the original bargain, and Blackstock came in upon an after-thought as a surety merely, the note would not be binding without an additional stamp. Clark v. Blackstock, Holt, 474. (See Note 8.)

The insertion of his own name by the bona fide holder of a bill drawn payable to — or order, does not require a new stamp. Attwood v. Griffin, R. & M. 425. ante, p. 23.