for sight, and therefore, a note payable two months after sight, is a note payable more than two months after date, and requires a stamp of 8s. 6d. Sturdy v. Henderson, 4 B. & A. 592. A bill payable at sight is not a bill payable on demand, so as to come within the exception in the stamp act of 23 Geo. 3. c. 49. s. 4. J'Anson v. Thomas, B. R. T. 24 Geo. 3.

Bayley, 79.

Stamp-Order for payment of money out of a fund which may or may not be available]. It was the object of the legislature in framing this provision (see 55 Geo. 3. c. 184. Sch. part 1. Appendix, No. 6.) to treat as promissory notes and bills of exchange, and to subject to stamp duty such instruments as, being payable on a contingency, or out of a particular fund, could not in strictness fall under that denomination. Per Lord Ellenborough, Firbank v. Bell, 1 B. & A. 36. and see Jones v. Simpson, 2 B. & C. 321. In order to prove the payment of money pursuant to order, the following letter was given in evidence: "Messrs. B. & H. when the mahogany per Regent is sold, you will please pay over to Messrs. P. H. & W. 1500l. in such bills as you receive from the said sale, S. Mann." Messrs. P. H. & W. enclosed this letter in another, addressed by them to B. & H. and B. & H. in reply, wrote promising to pay over the money. The letter from P. H. & W. was stamped with an agreement stamp, but it was objected that the letter from Mann was an order for payment of money out of a fund which may or may not be available, and that it ought to have been stamped accordingly, and of this opinion was the court. Firbank v. Bell, 1 B. & A. 36. F. & Co. wrote to S. & Co. the following letter; "We request you will pay to Messrs. H. & Son or their order, out of the first proceeds that become due of our stock of gunpowder now in your charge, 600l. and charge the same to our account." S. & Co. in answer stated, that they had no objection to pay as directed, provided they were in funds for that purpose, and subject to the payment of their advances; and other letters passed on the subject. The two first letters were stamped with an agreement stamp on payment of a penalty. It was held that this case fell within the authority of Firbank v. Bell, and that the first letter was not admissible, not having been stamped at the time when it was written. Butts v. Swan, 2 B. & B. 78. 4 B. Moore, 484. S. C. But in order to come within this clause, the instrument should be for the payment of a specified sum, and therefore, where A. having consigned goods to B., sent him the following order; " Pay to A. B. the proceeds of a shipment of twelve bales of goods, value about 2000l., consigned by me to you," and B. by writing consented to pay over the full amount of the net proceeds of the goods, it was held that neither of these instruments came within the above clause. Jones v. Simpson, 2 B. & C. 318.

Stamp-bankers' drafts]. The clause exempting drafts or orders for the payment of money on demand, upon any banker or person acting as a banker, within ten miles of the abode of the person drawing the draft, (see 9 Geo. 4. c. 49. s. 15. post,) only extends to persons who are bankers, and therefore an order directed to " Mr. Castleman, Bricklayer," was held to require a stamp. Castleman v. Ray, 2 B. & P. 383. A draft or order on a banker, if post-dated, requires a stamp ; the exemption only extends to drafts bearing date on or before the day on which the same shall be issued. Allen v. Reeves, 1 East, 435. Whitwell v. Burnett, 3 B. & P. 559. Martin v. Morgan, 3 B. Moore, 635. The place at which the draft or order is issued must be specified in it. Therefore, where a person residing at his country seat called Trimsaran, about four miles from Llanelly, drew a draft upon his bankers who resided at Llanelly, and dated it " Llanelly," the draft was held void, and not admissible in evidence. Waters v. Brogden, 1 Y. &. J. 457. Where the defendants knowing a check to be post-dated, and therefore void, and that the drawers were insolvent, presented it for payment to the bankers on whom it was drawn, who, without knowledge of these facts, paid the amount, though they had no funds of the drawer's in their hands at the time, but expected some in the course of the day; it was held that the bankers were entitled to recover the money back in an action for money had and received. Martin v. Morgan, 3 B. Moore, 635. Gow, 123. S. C.

By stat. 9 Geo. 4. c. 49. s. 15., from and after the passing of that act, all drafts or orders for the payment of any sum of money to the bearer on demand, and drawn in any part of Great Britain, upon any banker or bankers, or any person or persons acting as a banker, who shall reside or transact the business of a banker within fifteen miles of the place where such drafts or orders shall be issued, shall be and the same are thereby exempted from any stamp duty imposed by any act or acts in force immediately before the passing of that act, any thing in such act or acts to the contrary notwithstanding, provided the place where such drafts or orders shall be issued shall be specified therein; and provided the same shall bear date on or before the day on which the same shall be issued ; and provided the same do not direct the payment to be made by bills or promissory notes.

Stamp-consequences of want of stamp]. Where a bill or note is not stamped pursuant to the statute, it is void and cannot be given in evidence. See Butts v. Swan, 2 B. & B. 88. Green v. Davies, 4 B. & C. 242. Consequently, whenever an action is brought on a bill or note which is not properly stamped, and the title of the plaintiff depends entirely upon the bill or note, he cannot recover; but where a bill or note

not properly stamped has been given in payment of a prior demand, the plaintiff, on failing to prove his demand on the bill or note by reason of its being improperly stamped, may, if his declaration contain the proper counts, resort to the original consideration. Alves v. Hodgson, 7 T. R. 241. Tyte v. Jones, 1 East, 58. (n). Wilson v. Kennedy, 1 Esp. 244. post, Chap. XI. And it will not prevent the plaintiff from recovering on the original consideration that he has neglected to present the unstamped bill for payment, and that if presented it would have been paid. Wilson v. Vysar, 4 Taunt. 288. Ruff v. Webb, 1 Esp. 129. See also Swears v. Wells, 1 Esp. 317.

Forging a bill or note on unstamped paper, or uttering such bill or note with knowledge of its being forged, and with intent to defraud, is as much an offence as if the bill or note were on paper duly stamped. R. v Hawkeswood, Pasch. 1783. Bayley, 63. And see post, Chap. XVI.

Though a bill or note, if unstamped, cannot be given in evidence, yet it may be inspected for a collateral purpose. Thus where in an action for money lent, the defence was, that the defendant was drunk at the time and had been imposed on by the plaintiff, an unstamped note for the amount was produced by the plaintiff; and per Lord Ellenborough, "The note certainly cannot be received as a security, or to prove the loan of the money; but I think it may be looked at by the jury as a cotemporary writing to prove or disprove the fraud imputed by the plaintiffs." The jury having inspected the note found for the defendant. Gregory v. Frazier, 3 Campb. 454. and see R. v. Pendleton, 15 East, 449. R. v. Bathwick, 4 D. & R. 335. Reed v. Deere, 7 B. & C. 261. Where a promissory was avoided by a material alteration, but on its being presented to the maker, the latter acknowledged his hand, and promised to send the plaintiff (the payee) his money; it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount of the note on the account stated. Bishop v. Chambre, 1 Danson & Lloyd, 83. Sutton v. Toomer, 7 B. & C. 416; post, 34.

Stamp-different denomination.] By the last stamp act (see Appendix, No. 6.) it is enacted that all instruments for or upon which any stamp or stamps shall have been used of an improper denomination or rate of duty, but of equal or of greater value in the whole with or than the stamp or stamps which ought regularly to have been used thereon, shall nevertheless be deemed valid and effectual in the law; except in cases where the stamp or stamps used on such instruments shall have been specially appropriated to any other instrument, by having its name on the face thereof. 55 G. 3. c. 184. s. 10. See Taylor v. Hague, 2 East, 414.

Stamp-reissuing bills.] Where a bill payable to the order of the drawer is taken up by him, and after payment reissued, it is not a new bill, and therefore a new stamp is unnecessary. Callow v. Lawrence, 3 M. & S. 95. and see Beck ». Robley, 1 H. B. 89. (a) post.

Alteration.] An alteration in a bill or note in a material part will render it void, unless such alteration be merely the correction of a mistake. If the alteration was made without the consent of the party who wishes to take advantage of it, the instrument is void as against him, at common law, whether it was made before or after the issuing of the bill or note. If it was made after the bill or note has been negotiated, it is void under the stamp laws, whether the parties consented or not; but if the alteration was made with the consent of the parties and before the bill was negotiated, it will not render the instrument void.

Where the alteration is so material as to vacate the instrument, it will have the effect, though made by a mere stranger. Master v. Miller, 4 T. R. 320. in error 2 H. B. 141. 1 Anstr. 225. S. C.

Where money had been lent and a promissory note properly stamped given for the amount, and the note was afterwards avoided by an alteration, it was held that the lender might recover for money lent, and might give the note in evidence to prove the terms on which the money had been deposited. Sutton v. Toomer, 7 B. & C. 416. See ante, p. 33.

Alteration-after negotiation avoids a bill, though made with consent.] By stat. 1 Ann. stat. 2. c. 22. s. 2 & 3, which is still in force, see 55 G. 3. c. 184. s. 8. ante, p. 27. Battie v. Taylor, 15 East, 416, there shall be no alteration in a stamped instrument after it has been used for one purpose. By the negotiation of a bill it is used, and therefore any subsequent material alteration avoids it. A bill of nine months after date was by consent of all parties, a fortnight after it had been delivered to the payee, altered to ten months after date. Lord Kenyon held a new stamp necessary, and nonsuited the plaintiff. Wilson v. Justice, 1796, Bayley, 89. A promissory note by which the maker promised nine months after date to pay to the plaintiff or order 100l. for value received, was altered the day after it had been delivered to the payee, by inserting, with the consent of both parties, after the words value received, the words for the good will of the lease and trade of Mr. F. K. deceased; this alteration was held to be material, and to avoid the note, for it was evidence of a fact, which, if necessary to be inquired into, must otherwise have been proved by different evidence. Knill v. Williams, 10 East, 431.

In an

After a bill had been drawn and indorsed by the drawers to whose order it was payable, it was left for acceptance at the drawees. It was then dated the 5th of March; without the consent of the drawers, the drawees altered the date to the 15th, and then accepted it. Per Lord Ellenborough, "Before acceptance the bill was a perfect instrument, upon which the drawers might have been sued. Any material alteration of it therefore in that state rendered it void. It is impossible to say that postponing the time of payment is always advantageous to the parties liable on the bill. Without my knowing it, I may thus be out of England at the time when a bill I draw becomes payable and is dishonoured, and thus, having made no provision for it, from the belief that it was duly honoured some time before, this postponement may cause the ruin of my credit. Besides, consent would not justify the alteration with a view to the stamp laws, after the bill had been negotiated." Outhwaite v. Luntley, 4 Campb. 179. action by the payee against the acceptor of a bill, it appeared that the drawer had given the bill to the plaintiff, the payee, for goods sold. When carried by the plaintiff's agent to the defendant to be accepted, the latter begged that the date might be altered, which was done by the plaintiff's agent, and the defendant then accepted it. No communication took place with the drawer. Per Lord Ellenborough, "Upon the stamp laws I think the bill is void. It was an existing valid instrument before the acceptance. It was negotiated when delivered by the drawer to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, as payee, had acquired an absolute interest in it, and might have maintained an action on it against the drawer. As to the drawer, it was before then a perfect instrument. Nor was there any mistake to be rectified. When drawn on the 5th of July, it corresponded with the intentions both of drawer and payee. In the case cited, (Paton v. Winter, 1 Taunt. 420.) the objection on the stamp laws is stated not to have been taken, although that was the only objection that could be taken with any effect. The case therefore decides nothing, and was hardly worth reporting. Here, when the date was altered, a new bill was drawn, and that could not be done without a new stamp." Walton v. Hastings, 4 Campb. 223. 1 Stark. 215. S. C.

Where there was a doubt from the appearance of a note, whether or not the date (May 17) was genuine, Lord Tenterden said that it was a question for the Jury, whether or no the word May was in a different writing from the rest of the note, and whether the note had been altered after it was made and delivered by the defendant, and so had become a perfect instrument; that it certainly lay on the plaintiff to account for the suspicious form and obvious alteration of the note. They were to judge from inspection of the instrument, and if they thought the alteration was made after its completion, the