THE PEOPLE . GARBUTT. only raise a doubt of guilt which would not otherwise exist, but it may bring conviction of innocence. In every criminal trial it is a fact which the defendant is at liberty to put in evidence; and being in, the jury have a right to give it such weight as they think it entitled to. Chief Justice Shaw has pointed out in the Webster case how important it is in the case of some minor offenses, and he adds that, "even with regard to the higher crimes, testimony of good character, though of less avail, is competent evidence to the jury, and a species of evidence which the accused has a right to offer. But it behooves one charged with an atrocious crime, like high character, and, by strong evidence, to make it counterbalance a strong amount of proof on the part of the prosecution."- Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295. some cases, it may have even this great effect. this of murder, to prove a In The difficulty at this point lies in attempting to surround the jury with arbitrary rules as to the weight they shall allow to evidence which has properly been placed before them. This court has several times found it necessary to declare that no such arbitrary rules are admissible. We refer particularly to the cases of People v. Jenness, 5 Mich. 305; Maher v. People, 10 Id. 212, and Durant v. People, 13 Id. 351. The trial of criminal cases is by a jury of the country, and not by the court. The jurors, and they alone, are to judge of the facts, and weigh the evidence. The law has established this tribunal because it is believed that, from its numbers, the mode of their selection, and the fact that the jurors come from all classes of society, they are better calculated to judge of motives, weigh probabilities, and take what may be called a common sense view of a set of circumstances, involving both act and intent, than any single man, however pure, wise and eminent he may be. This is the theory of the law; and as applied to criminal accusations, it is eminently wise, and favorable alike to liberty and to justice. But to give it full effect, the jury must be JENNY V. PERKINS. left to weigh the evidence, and to examine the alleged motives by their own tests. They can not properly be furnished for this purpose with balances which leave them no discretion, but which, under certain circumstances, will compel them to find a malicious intent when they can not conscientiously say they believe such an intent to exist. Upon a full consideration of this case, we are compelled to say we find some errors in the record, for which the conviction should be set aside and a new trial awarded. CAMPBELL and GRAVES JJ. concurred. Edwin Jenny v. Horace Perkins. Bill in chancery: Multifariousness. The bill set forth that the parties to the suit entered into a partnership, executed a written agreement therefor, and that soon after the business was commenced, defendant deprived complainant of all participation therein; and prays for an account. A plea was interposed to the effect that there had been no subject matter existing between the parties within six years immediately preceding the filing of the bill. The plea was fully sustained by the evidence. Held, that the statute of limitations was well pleaded. It is not designed merely to raise a presumption of payment or adjustment from the lapse of time, but it is a statute of repose, and intended to afford security against stale demands. Heard April 22d. Appeal in chancery from Wayne Circuit. Decided April 28th. This was a bill calling for an account between partners. The defendant filed a plea of the statute of limitations. The case was heard on pleadings and proofs, and the bill was dismissed. D. C. Holbrook, for complainant and appellant. 1. The bill alleges a partnership; that the complainant was excluded therefrom against his will; that there were JENNY U. PERKINS. large profits; and that there was a sale of the partnership property. The plea alleges that there was no property sold, nor business done; that nothing occurred for six years next before filing the bill. The partnership was admitted. The complainant insists that the court below erred in allowing the plea, as the statute of limitations does not apply to the case, and is no answer to the bill; the bill and plea only are to be considered in determining the validity of the plea; and if such a plea is no answer, then the plea is bad and should have been overruled. A plea of the statute of limitations to accounts between partners is not good.-1 Dev. Ch. R. 533; 7 Dana, 241; 1 Edw. 417; 1 Dev. and Bat. 325; 3 Yerger, 201; 8 Porter, 211. 2. The bill alleges a partnership, exclusion, profits, and sale of property proved, within six years. The plea alleges there was no property sold and no business done within six years. The issue is not abandonment, as proved, and thereby a forfeiture of rights as claimed. If the complainant conducted himself in such a manner as to lose his time and profits, nothing short of an answer setting up abandonment would raise that issue. L. Bishop, for defendant and appellee. 1. The plea is good, both in form and substance; and, if sustained by proof, is a bar to the action, from analogy to the statute of limitations in relation to actions at law.Story's Eq. Pl. §§ 503, 751, 756, 757. The proper form for a plea of this kind has been followed in this case. Id. §694. It was intimated, in the argument below, that this defense does not lie against a claim arising from partnership. I find no authority for such a distinction, either in principle or in the books. The claim is simply one in equity, where there is no adequate remedy at law. JENNY V. PERKINS. 2. The professed object of the bill is to wind up an old business connection in 1857, alleged to have been a partnership. The plea is, in substance, that nothing was done in pursuance of the alleged partnership within six years prior to the filing of the bill in June, 1865. 3. It is clearly proved, and there does not seem to have been a serious attempt to deny it, that more than six years prior to filing the bill, the complainant had actually abandoned the business in question; that he had engaged in a rival and even a hostile business; and that the defendant had treated the business and property wholly as his own. This was a complete dissolution of the partnership, if there had been one. This abandonment is the same in effect as if we had produced from the complainant a full discharge, receipt and release of all rights and claims in reference to that business. At any rate, when the abandonment took place, when the complainant left and the defendant assumed to himself, exclusively, the whole business and property of the concern, the cause of action accrued to the complainant, if any he ever had. Then the statute began to run, and this was more than six years before the bill was filed. Even if one partner can be charged as a trustee for the use and benefit of his partner as a cestui que trust, the statute runs. Tyler on Infancy and Coverture, 171; 1 Johns. C. R. 90. GRAVES J. The original bill in this cause was filed on the 14th of June, 1865, and sets forth in substance, that by two certain agreements in writing, respectively bearing date the 5th and 17th of January, 1857, executed by the parties, and which are made part of the bill, a partnership was constituted between the parties to continue until November, 1858, for the purpose of buying, selling and manufacturing staves, JENNY . PERKINS. and making and vending molasses shooks at Ashley, in Macomb county, the acquisition of tools and other needful things; and at the expiration of the term, or as soon thereafter as might be, the disposition at public or private sale of the mill and premises used in said business, together with the right or rights secured by patent in the stave machine; that the business was commenced and promised to be successful, but that the complainant was expelled in a few months after by the defendant, and has been kept out since by him, and that the complainant has been deprived of all rights under said partnership by the defendant, and been denied all participation in the profits and property, although a considerable property was accumulated and large profits have been made by defendant. The bill prays an account as to property and profits, that a balance may be struck, and that the defendant be directed to pay the same to complainant. The bill was unsworn and waived an answer on oath, and set up the first partnership agreement as under seal. The defendant interposed a plea, in which he alleged in substance that the agreement set forth as a sealed one was in truth not sealed; that if a seal or scroll appeared upon it, the same was put there surreptitiously and without authority; that for more than six years next before the filing of the bill, no partnership transactions had taken place; that during all that time there was no property belonging to said partnership, nor any disposition made of any such property, nor any partnership matter remaining unsettled; and that during all that time the defendant in no manner promised complainant to come to any account, or to pay or in any way satisfy complainant, for any money or concerning any of the matters, transactions or dealings charged or alleged in the bill. The plea concluded by insisting upon the statute of limitations as a bar. Upon being set down for argument it was allowed, when the complainant filed a general replication, and the parties proceeded |