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MAJOR FAY.

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colonel of the name whom Sherwood had met on his first visit.

Nevertheless, Sherwood was not quite satisfied with Fay, and he asked himself if his apparent sincerity was over acted. It was a question with him whether Fay was entirely honest, or a perfect jesuit. Sherwood had been also led to believe that when the leading men of Vermont were expressing the desire to join Canada, they were likewise aiding the cause of congress. Fay strenuously denied that such was the case. He desired to prolong the negotiations until November, when he declared they would be ready to act. It seemed to Sherwood as if Vermont had two strings to her bow, and it looked as if they desired to spin out the negotiations, so as to be better able to judge the stronger side. After the expiration of ten days Fay desired to leave, and proposed that Sherwood and Smith should meet him in ten days after he had returned home.

It was well understood by the British commissioners that Vermont would be guided by self-interest. They formed the estimate that one-fifth of the population would accept the policy of Chittenden, and that one-fifth were loyalists desirous of union with the mother country. The remaining three-fifths were extreme supporters of the pretensions of congress, little subjected to their nominal leaders, and accustomed to domineer over and persecute the loyalists. How such feelings would be merged in the desire for the wellbeing of Vermont, was the problem to be faced.,

There was also some advantage obtainable to Canada by the continuance of the negotiations, even when uncertain of the good faith of those engaged in them. Except by a naval force ascending lake Champlain, Vermont offered the one dírection by which an invading army in force could enter Canada at that quarter; it may be said the only one where it was exposed to invasion. While these amicable relations continued, the province obtained an immunity from invasion. I cannot myself doubt, that there was really a disposition of the leading men to sever the fortunes of the new state from

those of congress, more especially as the geographical position of Vermont at that time, before the days of canals and railways, made her dependent on the Saint Lawrence, the outlet by which her produce could be exported, which, in other words, was upon Canada, as furnishing the best means of reaching the ocean. There was a powerful feeling that in the interest of New York and New Hampshire, indeed, of congress itself, the citizens of the new state had been denied that justice and that liberty of action which the thirteen states in congress had arrogated to themselves. A great number had also learned better to weigh the accusation of misgovernment against the mother country, of which so much had been said. Vermont was experiencing in her own territory, in the language of the Boston agitators, the tyranny from which they themselves had made such efforts to be freed: irresponsible imperial control. Vermont equally claimed the right of forming an independent government based on popular aspirations, a right which congress arbitrarily denied. The leaders knew well the danger ever present on the path they were following. They had been witnesses of, and doubtless in the first days of the revolution, many had joined in the cruel, unrelenting persecution of all who held royalist opinions. There was, moreover, the strong sentiment, that if the power were wanting, the disposition existed with congress to visit Vermont with the extreme mark of the displeasure felt at the self-assertion known to be prevalent in the new state.

In August the question of the New Hampshire grants came before congress, the delegates of New York, on the 3rd, having opposed the claims of Vermont. A resolution was passed that no lands ought to be granted until the dispute was settled, and the matter was adjourned until September.

The Vermont assembly met in August, when some members drew attention to the reports which were being circulated that the council was carrying on negotiations with Haldimand, with the request that the papers might be laid before the house. Contrary to the wish of the government, the question was put and carried. Within a short period Ira

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PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS.

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Allen produced a few letters relative to the exchange of prisoners. The explanation was accepted and ordered to be printed, and to be sent to the other states.

The majority desirous of admission into the confederation proposed that commissioners should be sent to congress. The council agreed to the proposal, in the expectation that congress would not recognize Vermont as a state on the conditions asked, and thus the public mind would become prepared for a reunion with Great Britain. At the same time a resolution was passed, declaring that Vermont should not be called upon to pay any of the expenses of the war.

General Allen was in disfavour. In 1780, in a fit of ill humour with the legislature, he had resigned his position in the Vermont force, but in April, 1781, he had been again elected brigadier. In the interval he had written to governor Clinton, of New York, offering his services as a military officer. The fact had become known, and, by the advice of the council, Chittenden refused to sign his commission as a general, and the board of war declined to appoint him to the command.

The commissioners appointed to congress, Fay, Ira Allen, and Woodward, forwarded a duplicate of their commission, signed by Chittenden as governor of Vermont, dated "the 5th year of the independence of this state." Delegates from New York and New Hampshire were present. Massachusetts sent no representative. The commissioners from Vermont claimed jurisdiction on both sides of the Connecticut. Those representing New York set forth that the northern territory west of the river was within the boundaries of that state, that the claim had been recognized by New Hampshire, and the people had been represented in the New York legislature. In 1777 the inhabitants of the district had submitted to the authority of congress, and Vermont had no right to pretend to a separate political existence.

This jurisdiction had been repudiated by Vermont. They had disposed of lands, and had exercised force on all such as had professed allegiance to New York, compelling them to

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submit to the authority they had established. Vermont had likewise passed resolutions setting forth that their jurisdiction extended to the centre of the Hudson. Vermont preferred her claim to be admitted as a state with full rights, from the northern boundary of Massachusetts within the limits she had described.

Congress submitted some queries to test, as it were, the feelings of Vermont towards congress. In reply, it was stated that Vermont would contribute to the war such expenses as were judged equitable. With regard to the grants of land to private individuals, they were prepared to be guided by circumstances, without adhering to strict rules of law. The intention was likewise to grant time in enforcing any conditions of settlement on which the land had been ceded. The estimated population was 30,000, and the area of the state nearly five million acres. The question was directly asked, what attempts, public and private, had been made by the enemies of congress to draw off the affections of Vermont from the cause. The reply was, that the only public documents were the letters of Beverley Robinson, which had been placed in the hands of the president of congress. They were unable to vouch in the matter of private correspondence. The state could furnish 7,000 militia, and sufficient provisions for twelve months were available.

Congress passed resolutions setting forth that, previous to any recognition of Vermont as a state, she must relinquish all claim to territory on the eastern side of the Connecticut, and to the west of lake Champlain, the boundary to commence from the north corner of the boundary of Massachusetts, thence following a line running northerly to the lake.

In accordance with the arrangement made in September, Smith and Sherwood arrived at Ticonderoga, bringing for exchange the prisoners belonging to Vermont. They wrote to Fay and Ira Allen, who had remained at the head of the lake, to meet them at that place to complete the exchange. Fay and Allen replied that they were at a loss to know why

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FEELING IN VERMONT.

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the British commissioners did not join them at Skeenesborough, where they were present with instructions to negotiate the business relative to the change of government. The interview would be of more consequence than could be stated on paper. The British agents accordingly ascended the lake. On meeting Allen and Fay, they learned that the proposals made by Vermont to congress would be rejected ; and that as the new legislature consisted mostly of members personally unknown to each other, some short time must be allowed before any appeal could be directly made to it. Under these circumstances it was recommended that a proclamation should be drawn up by Haldimand, in which the conditions of re-union with Great Britain should be set forth, so that it could be issued when the situation was opportune for its dissemination.

The cause of congress had not prospered in the early months of 1781. The continued success of the British arms in the south, the absence of effort in the north, the failure to obtain possession of the western posts, the difficulty of obtaining recruits for the force in the field, the collapse of all money resources, had given rise to the most gloomy anticipations. Allen had at the first meeting correctly laid down the true basis of the success of the mother country: that she should remain mistress of the seas. The unfortunate dallying of Rodney at Saint Eustatius proved only too clearly the disasters that must follow when this supremacy failed. But de Grasse's fleet at that date had not reached the waters of the Chesapeake, and no such success, as followed his appearance there, was even hoped for.

At the end of September, Sherwood wrote that he believed several of the men prominent in public life in Vermont, with a third of the population, were sincerely desirous of a change of government. The prevalence of this feeling had alarmed congress, and, at much expense, agents had been employed to influence the people against their leaders. The principal person so engaged was one general Bailey. The danger was so evident that the resolution had been formed to call for a