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We may in Canada ask ourselves, bearing in view the facts I have narrated, what would have been the policy of Jefferson if chosen president in 1797 ? Surrounded by men who partook of his opinions and passions, would he have recognised the services of Adet, and from his leaning to France have satisfied the directory by the acceptance of their policy? His previous conduct, when secretary of state, suggests, and his known enmity to Great Britain gives warrant for the belief of the possibility. Would he have thrown the influence of the United States on that side, and by prepared events have caused them to become participators in the war? Or would he, in the hour of action and responsibility, have cowed before the opposition he would have experienced, and admitted his impotence to act as he desired? No argument can be drawn from the course followed by him after his election in 1801. In 1800 Napoleon was first consul, and he regarded interference in American affairs as in no way advantageous to France. Moreover, the peace of Amiens was signed in March, 1802. Napoleon's system of rule embraced Europe only; and the conditions affecting the government of Jefferson were no longer the same as those under which he would have assumed power in 1797. The transfer of Louisiana to the United States in 1803 establishes the fact. Had it fallen to the duty of Jefferson, as president, to consider the difficult questions which presented themselves to Adams, there might have been a different chapter of events. A sense of relief is felt, that as a point of history it is confined to speculation.

Although Adet had been recalled, there was no discontinuance in the efforts of his agents in Canada. Not unfrequently in these conspiracies the subordinate agents are chosen from their vanity, folly and recklessness; in many cases, also, from the desperation of their circumstances. McLane is an instance in point; he persevered in his attempts, with no prospect of success and with a fatuity which bewilders the readers. We may best learn his want of prudence by following the depositions which led to his conviction.

1797]

DAVID MCLANE.

449

Black, a ship carpenter, testified that he had been called upon by a man named Frichet (Frechette), on pretence of selling some timber. When alone with him, Frichet had said that it was known to the French minister that Black was discontented with the British government, and had sent a French general to confer with him and other friends of the French cause, the design being to take possession of Canada. The general was now in the woods, three-quarters of a league distant. Black felt it a duty to accompany Frichet, who, on the road, told him that the man they were to meet had plenty of money and had assumed the character of a dealer in horses. That he was an Englishman or American whom Frichet had accompanied to Quebec in preference to a Frenchman.

On this person being met in the woods, he said that his name was David McLane and gave a letter of introduction from a Mr. Hundson, on lake Champlain. His object, he said, in being present was to drive the British from America. It was not difficult to surprise the garrison of Quebec when troops were being changed. He knew how to make all the guard drunk and set them asleep with laudanum. There were 15,000 men without the lines; but, owing to the principles upon which the wrongful government of America acted, they could not be brought into the province until summoned by the party he intended to engage. He wanted about ten confidential persons who had influence among the people, so they might be spoken to, one by one, to be brought into his plan.

known him as Jacob Felt Frichet was a man entirely

Frichet, McLane's guide, had and had been sworn to secrecy. without education or influence; nevertheless, McLane had communicated to him his plans, and had engaged him to procure a written engagement, signed by six persons of Canada, to shew that the Canadians were dissatisfied with the British and desired the re-establishment of French authority. Such a demand was in itself a proof that McLane was wanting in every qualification to carry out the dangerous

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duties he had undertaken. He was by no means backward in describing his mission. He declared himself to have been sent by the French government to excite an insurrection in Canada, and deliver the people from slavery; and that he was second in command. Frichet was also told how easy it was to surprise the garrison of Quebec. Five hundred men only were required, "resolute and secret," and McLane would be the commander and head them. *

McLane was arrested on the 10th of May, tried on the 7th of July, and executed on the 21st, on the glacis, near Saint John's gate, with the barbarous practices observed towards a prisoner who suffered for treason. Frichet, the subordinate agent, was tried for misprision of treason and sentenced to imprisonment for life. From consideration of his ignorance, the penalty was shortly afterwards remitted and he was set at liberty. Although McLane's career throughout was one of extreme folly, and it can now be seen that personally he was impotent for mischief, he was one of a class who was causing much trouble by unscrupulous agitation. We are not called upon in modern times to judge him by his mental calibre, but according to the active and self-asserting part he played. His intrigues were known to the authorities of Quebec for some weeks before his arrest. They were constantly receiving intelligence of the steps being taken in Vermont to help forward the project. If the evidence offered on this point be accepted, several persons in that state had embarked in the proposed design to obtain possession of Canada. The purchase of arms by Ira Allen is certainly no fable, for the vessel containing them was taken at sea; and to pretend that they were required for the state of Vermont is a tax on human credulity that no writer of character would attempt to foist upon us.

The position of the parties in Vermont who were implicated is perfectly explicable. They were desirous of obtaining the water communication by the Saint Lawrence to the ocean, Deposition of Charles Frichet, the 12th May, 1797. [Can. Arch., Q. 79. 1,

p. 70.]

1798]

LE FER'S REPORT.

451

indispensable before the days of canals and railways; and, having despaired of accomplishing their purpose by means of negotiation with the British government, they looked forward to attain their ends by this successful enterprise.

With the knowledge of the existence of this purpose, fomented by the intrigues of the French minister and encouraged by the directory to the extent of sending arms to carry out the attempt; with agents constantly mixing with the people, corrupting their minds by falsehood and every bad influence, the Canadian executive could not remain longer passive. The contempt now felt for the folly of McLane's attempt was at this date non-existent. There were no palliating circumstances to set his criminal attempts out of view. He suffered the penalty of the law, from the necessity of an example to those inclined to follow in his steps. I cannot agree that cruelty and injustice were shewn in his execution. His plan of proceeding to-day may be regarded as the extreme of folly, but it is plain that abler and more dangerous leaders would have appeared, less garrulous and more discreet. McLane was one of the forerunners in the province, to prepare the population to receive with favour the French sympathisers when they appeared in force. The low intellectual standard at which he is to be rated cannot be urged as an apology for his attempt. Neither can it be assumed that the design was impracticable or futile; nor can that view be adduced as an argument in his favour. The one claim that can be advanced, that mercy might have been shewn the unhappy man, is that he was of weak intellect. The universal opinion of that time appears to have been that such mercy would have been in every sense impolitic, and that the salus reipublicae demanded an example to deter others from similar attempts.

In 1798 a French loyalist, M. Jules Le Fer, was engaged by Liston, the British minister, to learn what plans were in contemplation to carry out Adet's designs. We may discern, in the instruments Adet selected to join his undertaking, that interest was the primary influence to which

he appealed. We accordingly meet with much gasconading, which had little basis on truth. The French agents expressed themselves convinced of the perfect readiness of the French Canadians to risk life and fortune in the cause; but there is not the slightest evidence that there was any organization or that any one person possessing influence was compromised in the agitation. The appeal to French sentiment may have made many discontented, to the extent of shewing unfriendly feeling to the government, and, no doubt, may have conveyed the impression that little reliance could be placed on them, in the event of an invasion by French troops, attended by the constantly promised fleet. The gratuitous assertion that they were prepared to take the field may be summarily dismissed. Le Fer described that the feeling he had found to prevail was the desire that Canada should be regained by France. Few, however, were willing to take up arms to join the movement. They would remain lookers-on. If success attended the invasion, to judge by what was said, they would have rallied around the invaders in great numbers.

What powers were given to Adet to make an attempt in Canada and what he was commissioned to endeavour to effect must remain a matter of doubt. The directory, it is probable, was equally without matured plans and would have been governed as chance suggested. Genet, after him Fauchet, and now Adet, represented the same principle, the desirability of repossessing Canada; and each had represented to his government the undertaking to regain the province as feasible. The French government had incessantly given encouragement to its ministers in Philadelphia, in the prosecution of their intrigues. Such action was at least hostility to a British possession. As we read events to-day, we know France had not the power to furnish the ships or the troops to carry out the promises made in the parishes by the French agents. Le Fer described the plan laid down as he became acquainted with it. The fleet would ascend the Saint Lawrence with a force of 6,000 men and 30,000 stand of arms

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