was a few months after the declaration of the war by France, in the very heat of Genet's intrigues to drive the United States to embark in the contest on the side of France. It was the period when Washington and the really able men about him were exerting themselves in the maintenance of peace, when Jefferson was fomenting opposition to their efforts, and throwing the weight of his influence and of those acting with him to excite public feeling against Great Britain. In the west there was the difficulty experienced in the Indian territory and the dissatisfaction that the posts were retained. On all sides there were painful indications that war was inevitable. Dorchester's duties embraced the defence not only of the whole of Canada but that of the maritime provinces. Prominent in this duty was to safeguard the Saint Lawrence and assure Quebec against danger.

On the other hand, Simcoe's view was confined to Upper Canada, and he had considered it as if he could not only command the resources of the two provinces but would receive strong reinforcements from home for its special defence. He desired to fortify Toronto, to found a new capital on the Thames in the centre of the Niagara peninsula, to occupy a station on lake Erie near Long-point and to make it defensible; to create also a post at Matchedash bay, where subsequently Penetanguishene was established. There can be no question that these suggestions evince forethought and judgment, but in the condition of the weak resources of Canada at that date they could not be carried out. Simcoe himself looked upon war as unavoidable, and he had given great consideration to the defence of the province. He had written on the subject to sir Alured Clarke, for he was commander of the forces, and no project could be carried out without his approval. Thus, when Dorchester arrived in the province, he had not simply to consider what he himself held to be advisable for the defence of the immediate interests entrusted to him, but had also to take into account the manifold propositions of Simcoe. * [Can. Arch., Q. 66, p. 233, 7th of October, 1793.]

1793]

VIEWS OF DORCHESTER.

409

Dorchester's letter contained no remark to cause dissatisfaction on Simcoe's part. He wrote, it is true, as a superior officer addresses an official inferior, and asked information on points connected with the agriculture, and population of the country north of Toronto to lake Simcoe, accessible by the roads lately opened by Simcoe himself. He spoke also of Toronto, of the mode of laying it out, and added, "I cannot approve of any fortifications being erected there at present." After alluding to the answers given by major general Clarke, which he considered "discreet and prudent," he proceeded to say, and I deem it proper to add the ipsissima verba, owing to the resentment they created in Simcoe's mind, in order that the reader may judge with what justice; "I must request you will be pleased to consider the extensive Frontier of Upper Canada, the number of posts there are under very peculiar circumstances, together with the inadequate force for their Defence, and you will, I hope, perceive that any augmenting the number of posts must increase the demand for troops, yet, notwithstanding this want of troops, should Hostilities commence, the War cannot be confined to Upper Canada, and the greatest part of the Forces may eventually be drawn from thence, whatever may be the inconvenience to that province." Simcoe had recommended, that after securing the communications the troops should be kept free to act as occasion required. He was told that without doubt he would pay great attention to the militia, so as to employ their whole strength to the best advantage, "for it may so happen that in their own strength alone they must depend for their defence."

Simcoe replied to Dorchester, justifying his own views,

* The return of the militia of Upper Canada in June, 1794, is as follows [Can. Arch., Q. 280.2, p. 393]:

but in no way admitting the argument urged for Dorchester's opinions, that there were not troops in the province to be applied to the policy Simcoe recommended. He gave some information of interest, that emigration to Upper Canada had been delayed by the sickness at Philadelphia, many hesitating to pass through that city. Settlement had gone on but slowly in the neighbourhood of lake Simcoe, owing to the distance to be travelled. The soil was fit for settlement, the rivers and bays abounded with salmon. What was of importance, he had obtained a route from lake Ontario to lake Huron preferable to passing by Niagara and lake Erie; moreover, it would be possible to send troops from Eastern Canada by the Ottawa to Matchedash bay, and so arrive at Toronto. He objected to the removal of the troops, adding the opinion that it did not appear to him, if that course were taken, Upper Canada "could exist as a member of the British empire." He regarded a fortified post on the Thames as of more importance than garrisoning Detroit; and he considered that, except one company, the regiment quartered there should be removed to Chatham and London. He recommended the reduction of the garrison at Niagara, and that the troops should be sent to Long-point and York (Toronto), and he was sorry that Dorchester did not approve of his proposal to fortify that place.

Simcoe lost no time in addressing himself to Dundas, appealing against the decision of Dorchester, with the remark that the views of the governor-general were entirely opposed to his own, both in a civil and military point of view; entirely setting aside his subordination to the general commandingin-chief. He protested against the possible withdrawal of the troops, as a breach of faith to the loyalists, as conduct immoral in encouraging settlers to a country and then abandoning them. Nothing but the principle of doing his utmost for the king's service would lead him to remain in a position where he considered himself liable to become the instrument

* [Can. Arch., Q. 280.1, p. 39, 2nd of December, 1793.]

1793]

SIMCOE'S ENERGY.

411

of a flagitious breach of national honour and public faith, without any military necessity for the enforcement of the policy. He had not communicated the letter of Dorchester to the militia, for it appeared to him that, with the determination taken for the removal of the troops, it was not possible for Upper Canada to exist as a member of the British empire. In this view Simcoe persevered to the last. There can be no question of his zeal in the performance of his duty or of his activity in carrying out the projects he had formed. Daily, the denizen of Toronto is reminded of the fact by roads opened by him from Toronto to lake Simcoe, to which he gave the name it still bears, Yonge street, after sir George Yonge, then secretary of war; and Dundas street, beginning at Hamilton and carried to the Thames, named after Dundas, secretary to the colonies, with whom he entered into a voluminous correspondence. This road was subsequently extended to Toronto, and still retains the name he gave it. But, with all his zeal for the public service and his energetic and practical ability, his mind tenaciously clung to his preconceived theories. He was unable to recognise his subordinate position. His letters suggest that he looked upon Dorchester's interference with regard to Upper Canada as an excess of the duties of governor-general; as if he considered that his efforts should have been limited to Lower Canada, without control being exercised over the licutenant-governor of the upper province. Simcoe appears never to have recognised that the defence of Canada must be considered as a whole, and that Dorchester was responsible for the measures taken to secure it. In February, 1794, Simcoe addressed a special memoir to Dundas, setting forth his views on the military disposition of the troops required for Upper Canada. This document extends over twenty-three MS. sheets. explained that, as he had written as a matter of duty, he did not desire the paper should be made public, but if its publication were held expedient, he would not object.*

He

In 1793, a military execution took place at Niagara, [Can. Arch., Q. 280.1, pp. 54-73.]

enforced by a laxity of military feeling which had crept into the ranks and led to frequent desertions. The sentence of the court martial, to use the words of the general order, was carried out "from the absolute necessity of a public example." A private of the 5th regiment, Charles Grisler, was tried for desertion, when on sentry over some bateaux, on the 7th of July. He was taken, tried, and condemned to be shot. The sentence was carried out at Niagara on the 29th of October.

It was also in this year that the name of Toronto was officially altered to York. Through the influence of Simcoe the new term had previously, to some extent, come into use. On the 27th of August its confirmation was publicly made. As stated in the general order of the preceding day, “in consequence of the reported victories of the duke of York in Holland," a royal salute was fired, answered by the few shipping in the harbour, and the rising capital of Upper Canada was hereafter to be known as York. Although this change had the weight of official authority and York became the post-office designation of the capital, it was but indifferently accepted. It remained in use only for thirty years. On the incorporation of the city in 1834, the act was obtained for the ancient name, and that now in use, Toronto.

In March, 1794, Dundas, before he had received the views of Dorchester with regard to western Canada, had written to Simcoe agreeing with his representation that London was well selected as the site for the future capital, and York (Toronto) had been judiciously chosen "as the chief place, for the strength of its position and the security it could offer to the naval force of the province." He also approved of the establishment of a post at Long-point on lake Erie. ‡

In May also he wrote to Dorchester that he hoped York and some part of lake Erie would be occupied.

The correspondence with Dorchester was continued by Simcoe throughout 1794. In one of his communications