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form the negotiations had taken. They described Oswald as an additional United States negotiator. They desired his recall; the proposition was opposed by Shelburne and Townshend. Strachey, however, was instructed to proceed to Paris to continue the negotiation as to the fisheries, and to insist on indemnity to the royalists, especially enforcing the proprietary rights of the Penns and the heirs of lord Baltimore, a point upon which the king shewed much interest. On the arrival of Strachey at Paris, he found that the ill feeling which had arisen between the United States negotiators and the French minister had been in no way lessened. De Vergennes had adhered to the views he had made known as to the boundaries to be granted, and what was a more important matter, he had expressed himself to the effect that some consideration should be shewn to the loyalists. He had moreover declared that France would not continue the war for the attainment of the views of the United States. On their side, the commissioners were equally indisposed to carry on the contest for the aggrandizement of France and Spain; and Adams did not conceal his fears, that there was a tendency on the part of the European powers to use the United States as instruments for their own purposes.

The refusal to entertain the claims of the loyalists, based on Franklin's objection that it was not a subject with which congress could deal, and that it appertained to each particular state to make the restitution asked, suggested to the British negotiators that a clause might be introduced into the treaty by which congress should bind itself to recommend to the several states this principle of restitution, or indemnification, as an accepted condition of the peace. The proposition was refused. The rejection in the first instance by the commissioner is of importance, for it shews the insertion of the clause was not the mere matter of form which several of the United States politicians at the time declared it to be, and which many modern writers still strive to establish. On Strachey's return to Paris at the end of November, he found that Laurens, who had been exchanged for lord Cornwallis,

had joined his colleagues.* At the first meeting held by the negotiators, Strachey stated in plain words that the question of restitution of the confiscated property of the loyalists was the point on which the final settlement depended, that if no settlement was possible the negotiations must cease and be submitted to parliament in the stage they had reached.

The United States commissioners were placed in a dangerous dilemma. The point in dispute was not one in which they could count upon the support of France. They knew the desperate condition of affairs in their own country. Their credit was exhausted, there was dissatisfaction in the army, enlistments could not be made, and the separate states would not pay the contributions to sustain the war as they had been assessed. In England, Cornwallis's surrender had been so unlooked for that its effect was to give rise to the belief that there could be no fortunate termination to the war: a view which Burgoyne had encouraged as an apology for his own bad generalship. In all directions this opinion became prevalent, and it was a general belief that the time for peace had arrived. There was no such sentiment in the United States. Had an able and experienced diplomatist then represented Great Britain, he would have discovered the true character of the negotiations, and would have penetrated beneath the insincerity of the extreme pretensions which we still read in Franklin's letters. As we failed in the field through the incompetence of our generals and the mischievous interference of Germain, so it was the fate of Great Britain at the peace of Versailles, to be sacrificed by the incapacity of those to whom the negotiations were entrusted. Even after the success at Yorktown the army of congress became weaker, so that Washington recommended compulsory enrolment, and that the prisoners should be forced to serve. It was held

* Laurens had been unconditionally released from his parole by lord Shelburne. Feeling delicacy in accepting this act of consideration, especially as he was a commissioner to determine the terms of peace, likewise being desirous of obliging lord Cornwallis, he caused the exchange to be effected. [Franklin, IX., pp. 289-292.]

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impossible to keep up the army for another year. The finances of congress were completely embarrassed, the states would give nothing, and the common dependence was upon the aid to be supplied by France, so that the war could be continued. *

The point in dispute was one which particularly appealed to the honour and dignity of Great Britain, and, if brought before the country, would have awakened the most powerful feeling of a sense of duty, and the non-abandonment of the demand. The United States commissioners accordingly felt that they could not maintain their ground. The concession was made only after several discussions. It was finally agreed that all pending persecutions should be discontinued, that there should be no further prosecution of the loyalists, that confiscation of property should cease, and that congress should recommend to the legislatures of the states the restitution of the property already confiscated. The claim preferred by Great Britain for the payment of debts due previous to the commencement of the revolution took the form that creditors on either side should meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.

The United States commissioners having agreed to these preliminaries desired that the articles should be signed without reference to those of France. The British commissioners were desirous of referring the matter to London. Franklin declared that if the articles were not immediately completed, the question of the royalists must be re-opened. The treaty was accordingly signed on the 30th of November, 1782, without reference to the French minister.

To meet the dissatisfaction which it was certain would be

* The British government, however, had been informed of the true condition of the United States, according to the last edition of Adolphus III., p. 194. He states on the authority of "private information": "After the surrender of lord Cornwallis, Sir Henry Clinton forwarded an assurance to the administration, that with a reinforcement of ten thousand only, he would be responsible for the conquest of America. Other officers were no less sanguine."

One additional requirement was indispensable, the removal of Germain from the position in which he had proved so mischievous.

felt in Paris, it was set forth in the preamble that the articles were those which were "to be inserted in and to constitute the Treaty of Peace" with the United States, but that the treaty was "not to be concluded until the terms of a peace shall be agreed to between Great Britain and France."

It is a point ever to remain in dispute, whether, in the record of history, the United States commissioners can be justified in having signed the treaty without the concurrence or knowledge of France. Franklin's trumpery explanation that it was, as he put it, a mere want of “bienséance," may be dismissed with contempt. If the proceeding has to be justified, it has to be met squarely in the face on broad grounds. The United States commissioners were instructed "to undertake nothing in the negotiations for peace or truce without their (the French ministers') knowledge and concurrence, and ultimately to govern themselves by their advice and opinion." These instructions, communicated to the French court, were a warrant for the fullest loyalty of conduct on their part. In a communication to their government, the commissioners stated clearly the fact that they had signed the preliminaries without communicating with the French minister, from the conviction that the conditions agreed to regarding the boundaries and the fisheries with those affecting the loyalists did not correspond with the views of France. The articles were made known to the French government immediately after the signature of them; but the determination of the northern boundary of west Florida, should that province be ceded to Spain, was withheld.

The fact cannot be denied that the act was one of bad faith. As de Vergennes pointed out, the conclusions of the separate treaty threw increased difficulties in the way of France, for in addition to her own interests she had to regard those of Spain, and it had been in the power of the French minister to have signed independent articles with Great Britain, and abandoned the cause of the United States. The justification for the proceeding, if it can in any way be given, is that the United States commissioners felt that they would

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obtain no support from France in the fundamental points in which the interests they represented were chiefly involved. In the concessions of the right of fisheries, concerning which New England was so urgent, France was in opposition to them, being desirous of obtaining privileges limited to her own fishermen. France was likewise desirous of sustaining the views of Spain, which looked forward to possess the territory on the east of the Mississippi, as that power held the western bank of the river. The country north of the Ohio, France would have ceded to Canada, as the desire to re-possess that province had not entirely passed away; so that if ever she regained possession of it, it should be to its ancient extent. The commissioners, moreover, strongly entertained the view that there was the desire on the part of de Vergennes to limit the territorial strength of the United States, so that the influence of France could still prevail, and the memory of her aid in the revolutionary war would act as a powerful influence in the diplomacy of the new nationality.

If these considerations be admitted in explanation of the course followed by the United States commissioners, arguments are not wanting for the justification of their conduct. It cannot be forgotten that the signature of the treaty was an abandonment of the engagement entered into with France. The condition of the United States, however, was most critical. The commissioners themselves were placed in the trying situation, that in their view compliance with ordinary diplomatic forms would lead to the sacrifice of great national advantages, which were attainable by the independent exercise of the power they held. They adopted the alternative of securing this result without the knowledge of the French minister, although bound by the most formal declaration to carry on the negotiation conjointly with him.

Whether the United States commissioners were justified or not in so acting must ever remain one of the unsolved problems of history.

I am impelled to allude to an event which took place