1782]

HALDIMAND'S EMBARRASSMENT.

105

by the geographical position of Vermont, which had at that date no outlet to the ocean but by lake Champlain, in no way abandoned the opinion they had expressed, that the relationship was desirable, and hoped that means would be found to effect it. The correspondence which followed convinced Haldimand that the desire for reconciliation with the mother country was still entertained, however the probability of its being brought to pass had been weakened by late events; and as he had received instructions to spare no expense, he still retained a strong detachment at Crown point.

Early in the summer of 1782, Haldimand received orders from Carleton at New York to act only on the defensive: instructions attributable to the beginning of the peace negotiations. They were necessarily imperative upon Haldimand in the policy he should follow. He, however, did not aban

don his theories of the advantages to be gained from the secession of Vermont from the cause of congress, for he foresaw that the example would be followed in other instances. While in a qualified degree he gave his confidence to those with whom he had been brought into relationship, he had no illusions regarding the cardinal consideration, that the majority would be guided as their interest suggested, and by the events of the contest.

In July Haldimand described his embarrassment to Clinton. The change in the home administration suggested that he could not continue to act towards Vermont as he had done, until he received instructions as to the course he should pursue. He would, however, endeavour to keep the people of Vermont in a favourable spirit, for in the event of an attack upon Canada, their alliance would be of importance. He had received the strongest assurances from the leading men of their desire to reunite with the mother country, in which wish they were sustained by half the population, and they were making every effort to influence the remainder of the council, and all but two were favourable to the movement.* *[Can. Arch., July 20th, B. 148, p. 53.]

*

Previous to the receipt of this letter, on the 3rd of August, Carleton had informed Haldimand that the peace negotiations had been commenced. Haldimand replied that if there was a determination to carry on the war, rather than come to terms with Great Britain, Vermont, he believed, would join with Canada, if not exposed to the rage of the other colonies. A change had taken place in the policy of congress since Washington had arrived in Albany; the people had been called upon to take the oath of allegiance, or to abandon their settlements. The consequence was that they were entirely over-awed. It was reported that Washington had ordered that all persons who had refused to bear arms in the cause of congress should be put to death.*

In December, 1782, when the peace negotiations had reached a favourable stage and there was assurance of a satisfactory conclusion to them, congress felt that it possessed the strength to treat Vermont with a high hand. A resolution was passed to compel the people of the New Hampshire grants (the state of Vermont) who had expelled certain inhabitants of New York, to make restitution to them, that measures should be taken to enforce this resolution, and that no independent authority be allowed in the district mentioned. The resolution was sent, addressed to "Thomas Chittenden, Esq., of Bennington, in the district aforesaid, to be communicated to the people thereof."

In February, 1783, news reached Canada that great preparations were being made in Albany, with the design of taking possession of the advanced posts on lake Champlain. The general belief, however, was that the organization was directed against Vermont, with the determination to coerce the population and apportion the territory between New Hampshire and New York. Great apprehension was felt in Vermont as to the possibility of such an attempt. The feeling both of New York and of congress was known to be inimical, and Washington had testified great jealousy on the subject of

[Can. Arch., July 20th, B. 148, p. 63.]

1782]

CLAIMS OF VERMONT.

107

their pretensions. The inhabitants, however, shewed that they were by no means inclined to suffer martyrdom patiently. It was intimated to Haldimand that in the event of this threatened operation being carried out, his protection might be asked. It was even insinuated to him that an application might be made for ammunition, as there was a scarcity of it. Haldimand felt greatly embarrassed, as he had entered into these negotiations before the negotiation for peace had been commenced. He was not only without authority to give them countenance, but his instructions were positive to act only on the defensive. All he could do was to express the hope that no such demand would be made.*

On the conclusion of the peace Vermont claimed to be admitted as the fourteenth state, exempted from payment of any part of the debt; at the same time protesting against the limitations imposed by congress. Agents were sent to Haldimand who expressed the desire to be annexed to Canada, and declared in somewhat magniloquent language, or "otherwise Vermont must become mistress of it." They preferred the former. Haldimand's reply was that he could in no way interfere, as his orders were to conciliate the citizens of the United States. Vermont, however, continued to set New York at defiance, and granted patents for settlements to the borders of Canada. New York, on the other hand, was encouraging settlement on the west of lake Champlain. Hazen, and the few Canadians remaining of his corps, had been established there, each man receiving money according to rank. Haldimand expressed his fears that the measure would increase discontent in Canada, and suggest to many the expediency of proceeding to the new settlement, where

*

Sydney, to whom the matter was referred, wrote after the peace, "much will depend upon the reception their proposition shall meet with from congress. The language they have held to you has, to be sure, been somewhat extraordinary. I do not see how it is possible for us consistently with the Treaty of Peace, openly to interfere in their dispute, and, on the other hand, I think it difficult to refuse to take them under our protection, should they be determined to become subjects of Great Britain." [Sydney to Haldimand, 8th April, 1784. Can. Arch., B. 50, p. 155.]

they might prove troublesome. There is no evidence that any such evil consequences followed.

Vermont was finally admitted a state of the union on the 4th of March, 1791, her limits being determined, as previously assigned by congress, from the Connecticut to lake Champlain, a line being traced from the north-western point of Massachusetts to East-bay.

I have felt it incumbent upon me to give the narrative of these negotiations at some length. Of late years they have been frequently mentioned, but neither fully nor accurately. The important principle is involved, that the desire for a re-union with Great Britain is antagonistic to the assertion that the government of the colonies by the mother country was harsh and oppressive. On the contrary, it can be adduced as a proof of perfect trust in the faith, justice, and beneficence of her rule. It cannot for a moment be pretended that the desire to unite with Canada had its origin in sympathy with her institutions, or from any re-awakening of a feeling of loyalty. With the full admission that it arose from distrust of congress, and the failure to obtain recognition of the self-government claimed, the truth remains, that a large proportion of the inhabitants of Vermont were prepared to return once more under the folds of the British flag, with their rights guaranteed, and their claims as a distinct political body recognized. The fact itself is a powerful reply to the tirade of vilification which to this hour is declaimed against the old colonial connection. There was much in these relations which required adaptation to circumstance, and great modification; but these admitted defects are not traceable to a spirit of tyranny, or to the desire of ruling arbitrarily. The errors of government were incident to the time, for the principles of colonial rule had to be evolved by experience, and the traditions of the colonial office were more frequently technical than wise. Even now the complaint is not entirely removed, that occasionally we find, as in the days of ancient. Rome, the dominant sentiment of the imperialist to lord it over the provincial. But the outer provinces of the empire

1782]

CANADIAN FEELING.

109 are too powerful in population and resources, their public men too well trained in political life, the self-assertion of the individual too uncontrolled, and in many quarters education is striving to attain as high a standard as that observed in an English university, for the provinces to submit to merely arrogant interference on the part of any home official. It is now clearly understood that much of the trouble experienced to within half a century of this time may be attributed to the prevalence of this influence. Except when based on wisdom and justice in the future, no ear will be given to it. With all our pride in the connection with the mother country, with our loyalty of sentiment, and devotion to the common cause of the empire, the precedents and practice of the colonial office will no longer have weight. For they are regarded in many cases as an impracticable assertion of authority not unfrequently unwisely exercised.