CHAP. V.

DUTIES RELATING TO THE DESIRE AND PURSUIT OF REPUTATION,

The next class of moral prohibitions of which we shall treat, relates to those pursuits and dispositions which have for their object Praise, Honour, and Distinction. The love of reputation, or the desire of being in some way praised, admired, or honoured, is a passion of very extensive and powerful influence over the human breast. It is generated, as we have seen,* in earliest infancy, by our necessary dependance on the care and kindness of others. It grows with our growth, and strengthens with our strength. In every period of life its power continues to be more and more confirmed by our frequent experience of the advantages which arise from the good opinion of others, and of the evil resulting from their animosity or censure. It is the strongest motive by which we are governed and directed in youth. It is the principle by which our conduct is perpetu

* Book I. Chap. i. Sec. 13.

ally, though often secretly, influenced, in more advanced life. Who so bold as not to dread the general scorn or hatred of mankind? Who so more or less than human, as not to be gratified by the voice of praise? Various, indeed, are the ways in which this passion displays itself, and the subtle disguises, the manifold and often directly opposite forms which it assumes, are a subject of wide and intricate research to the observer of human nature. Some strive to obtain credit, by one recommendation from one class of men; others by another recommendation from a different class. Some are equally fearful of offending, and desirous of pleasing all; others seek to recommend themselves only to one particular class, and disregard or contemn the opinions of the rest of mankind. Some are satisfied, if they merely escape censure, or court praise only by means of gentleness, courtesy, and pliancy of disposition; others, of bolder stamp or more sanguine temperament, lay claim with confidence to the highest homage, and expect universal submission to their proud demand. Some openly solicit applause by a vain display of their real or fancied merits; others more covertly seek it even by affecting to be indifferent to it, or by disclaiming it

whenever offered. In all these various modes of behaviour, it is the same principle which operates, and the vain, the proud, the courteous, the diffident, the empty boaster, the affected pretender, are all actuated, in their several ways, by a regard to the opinion of their fellow men.

With respect to the limitations to be imposed on this passion, it is evident that they ought not to amount to an entire prohibition. The love of praise is not altogether to be condemned and eradicated as a vicious passion; it requires only to be restrained and directed, and if rightly restrained and directed, it will be found a most useful auxiliary to virtue. In a state like this in which we live, and designed, as we evidently are, for the enjoyment of that happiness which springs from mutual esteem, affection, and harmony, it is by no means to be desired that we should render ourselves completely indifferent to the good opinion of one another. Esteem is the natural and appropriate reward of virtue; and when it proceeds from the wise and good, and is obtained by qualities or actions which are really praiseworthy, it imparts a pleasure as pure, innocent,

and rational, as any we are capable of enjoying. The desire of esteem is, and must ever remain, one of the strongest bonds of human society. It is the chief source of all refinement, and the most powerful stimulus to every useful exertion. It is this which urges to those high attainments in art, science, and literature, by which society is so much benefited. It is this which softens our manners into gentleness, and disposes us to all the tender offices of kindness and compassion. To be destitute, on the other hand, of this desire, is a certain mark of a coarse and depraved state of mind; for a total indifference to the opinion of others, is never found but among the rudest or most abandoned of mankind. Though, however, the love of reputation. is not to be totally eradicated, it evidently requires restraint and direction. For if we regard the applause of men as an object of supreme and exclusive desire; or if we seek it without discriminating between that which is worthless and that which is valuable; we shall be liable to fall into various errors, which I shall now endeavour to point out.

In order to take a complete and regular survey of the various forms under which the regard

displays.

for human opinion diplays itself, we may consider it as being diversified in two ways; first, according to the qualifications on the ground of which honour is sought; next, according to the manner in which the desire is manifested:

I. The regard for human opinion is diversified, in the first place, by the different qualifications which are considered as the subject of praise or distinction. The admiration of mankind for one another is attracted by various qualifications; by bodily, as well as by mental endowments; by accidental, as well as by acquired advantages. Of course it generally happens, that each individual seeks that kind of praise, to which he thinks he has the best pretensions; and according as circumstances determine, one man delights most in the homage which is paid to noble birth, or exalted rank; another in the respect obtained by wealth; a third in the admiration excited by talents or learning. Some endeavour to attract applause by beauty of person and elegance of dress; others by the splendour of their houses, the number of their retinue, and the magnificence of their style of living. The merchant glories in the thousands he has amassed; the clergyman aims to