y

speaking those circumstances only which are uncertain, future, and unessential to the nature of the matter in hand and on the existence of which rights and duties can be made to depend are called conditions. A past or present event on which a right is made to depend (the so-called conditio in præteritum and præsens collata), is no more properly speaking a condition, than is the expression in a conditional form of that which is of itself naturally implied (conditio tacita). Nevertheless, past and present events on which rights are made to depend are, save that they cause no postponement, similar in their effects to conditions proper;b and the so-called implied conditions have at least this effect, that their non-existence suspends the perfect acquisition of a right.

2. Sorts of conditions.
§ 87.

Negative, Affirmative; Precedent, Subsequent.-Every condition, whether it consists of a positive or negative fact (conditio affirmativa, negativa), is suspensive, i.e. delays the perfect acquisition of a right so long as the condition remains unfulfilled. If the acquisition for the first time of a right is thus delayed the condition is called precedent (suspensiva); but if the re-acquisition of a right is so delayed the condition is called subsequent (resolutiva). A condition subsequent has no reference to the transaction by which the right is first transferred, but only to the

§ 11. I. de inutil. stip. (3. 19) L. 39. de reb. cred. (12. 1.) L. 9. § 1. de novat. (46. 2.). See generally F. Balduini comm. de conditt., as an appendix to his comm. de pignor. P. Brusselii tr. de conditt. bound with P. Durani tr. de condit. et modis imposs. Francf. et Lips. 1700. C. Ziegler Diss. de condition. (in his Discept. sel. Lips. 1721.). Weiske Rechtslexicon B. 1. p. 761. Savigny System B. 3. § 116-124. Sintenis Civilrecht B. 1. § 20.

§ 4. I. de verb. obl. (3. 15.) L. 39. de R. C. (12. 1.).

L. 3. de leg. I. (30.) L. 99. L. 107. de cond. et demonstr. (35. 1.). L. 68. de iur. dot. (23. 3.) L. 12. de cond. inst. (28. 7.) L. 25. § 1. quando dies (36. 2.). Brussel 1. c. L. 4. T. 1. Cocceii I. C. L. 2. T. 14. qu. 43..

b They are consequently also called conditions. L. 3. § 13. de bon. lib. (38. 2.) L. 10. § 1. de cond. inst. (28. 7.) L. 16. de iniusto rupto irrito (28. 3.) § 6. I. de Verb. obl. (3. 15.) L. 37. 38. 39. de R. C. (12. 1.) L. 100. 120. de V. O. (45. 1.).

L. 4. § 2. de pact. (2. 14.) L. 1. pr. de cond. et dem. (35. 1.).

agreement by which the return of that right is stipulated, and hence whatever effect a condition precedent has upon the first acquisition of a new right, the same effect is produced by a condition subsequent upon the re-acquisition of a right previously parted with. In those cases in which suspension is not the ordinary effect of a transaction, the presumption is in favour of a condition being subsequent rather than precedent. §

§ 88.

Casualis, potestativa, mixta.-Every condition, the performance of which requires a positive act and not a mere forbearance, is dependent on the effect of physical forces, and consequently (since the will can create nothing physical), every affirmative condition is casual (casualis). This term is, however, in strictness confined to those conditions which depend, solely, on the effect of something independent of the will. But the performance of a condition may depend―

1. On the will either wholly, without any assistance from nature, (as in cases of inaction) or at all events with such assistance only as nature ordinarily gives; or

2. On the will and some extraordinary assistance from nature. In the first of these two cases the condition is termed potestativa, promiscua, and in the second mixta. In the language of Roman law, the expression conditio potestativa is exclusively used

d L. 3. de contr. emt. (18. 1.) L. 1. de leg. comm. (18. 3.) L. 2. pr. de addict. in diem (18. 2.) Hence the former transaction is to be treated in every respect as unconditional. L. 2. § 4. 5. pro emt. (41. 4.) L. 2. pr. § 1. L. 4. § 3. de in diem addict. (18. 2.).

L. 9. § 6. de R. C. (12. 1.) L. 8. C. de condict. ob. causs. dator. (4. 6.). Brussel L. 1. T. 1. n. 5. L. 5. T. 1. no. 1. Thibaut civ. Abh. 359-361. W. H. Jordens de conditione resolutiva. Ludg. B. 1822. W. Sell über bedingte Traditionen. Zürich 1839.

f L. 1. § 2. pro dote (41. 9.) L. 7. in fin. L. 8. de iure dot. (23. 3.).

8 L. 1. de lege comm. (18. 3.) L. 2. §. 4. pro emt. (41. 4.) Thibaut civ. Abh. 378-380. But a new destructive circumstance is of course not a condition subsequent; see Archiv f. civil. Prax. 5. B. Nr. 9.

h Generally speaking the laws only distinguish the potestativa (in the sense above) and the non potestativa L. 4. § 1. de hered. inst. (28. 5.) L. 78. § 1. de cond. et dem. (35. 1.) L. 31. § 2. ad SCt. Treb. (36.). The last can according

to denote a condition which renders the completion of a duty dependent on the will of the creditor. The term conditio potestativa is in modern times also used, but improperly, in those cases where the performance of a duty depends on the will of the debtor.i

§ 89.

Possible, impossible.-Conditions are either possible or impossible. They are impossible, if at the time of their annexation k their existence can, judging from general experience, be pronounced impossible, and they are possible if the contrary is the case. But impossibility is twofold, being the consequence either of physical laws, or of legal and moral precepts; in the former case the impossibility is termed physical (physice impossibilis), and so far as it betrays an intention to prejudice another derisoria; in the latter case the impossibility is termed moral (moraliter impossibilis, turpis). Either may be imagined to be negative or affirmative." Conditions which are in themselves contradictory, are treated as belonging to the impossible class.

3. Effect of conditions.
§ 90.

In general.-I. Every condition so long as it lasts (pendet) delays, if subsequent, the reacquisition, if precedent, the acquisition of a

to L. un. § 7. C. de caduc. (6. 51.) be divided into casual and mixed. The sense of the expression promiscua as used in L. 11. § 1. de cond. et dem. (35. 1.) is given properly by Merill obs. L. 14. c. 2., but improperly by A. E. Endemann de implendae conditionis tempore. Marb. 1821. p. 33-56. A. F. Schott de condit. potestativae figmento (in opusc.) wholly repudiates the conditio potestativa, but see C. G. Einert var. iur. civ. cap. Lips. 1773. cap. 2

It

1 L. un. § 7. C. de caduc. (6. 51.). Gesterding Pfandrecht 19-36. makes a promise void L. 17. L. 46. § 3. L. 108. § 1. de V. O. (45. 1.) L. 7. pr. de contr. emt. (18. 1.).

* L. 35. § 1. L. 137. § 6. de V. O. (45. 1.). Brussel. L. 1. T. 2. n. 12. 15. 1 For example L. 14. de cond. inst. (28. 7.)

n

TM L. 29. § 2. de testam. milit. (29. 1.) L. 20. de condit. et demonstr. (35. 1.).

§ 11. I. de inutil. stipul. (3. 19.) L. 15. de cond. inst. (28. 7.) L. 123. L. 137. § 6. de V. O. (45. 1.). Averan. interpr. L. 2. c. 24.

• L. 16. de condit. instit. (28. 7.) L. 188. pr. de R. I. (50. 17.) L. 88. pr. ad leg. Falc. (35. 2.) L. 39. de manum, test. (49. 4.). Compare W. Sell on impossible conditions. Giessen 1834. p. 261–273. Schilling Institut. B. 2. § 81. Zus. 4.

G

right:P so that he who by virtue of the condition will at some future time acquire a right cannot, even by possession, derive any of the legal advantages which are only consequent upon the existence of the unconditional right.

The person obliged conditionally must, nevertheless, await the performance of the condition and not attempt to hinder it," and the person entitled conditionally transmits his legal expectation to his heir if the latter can succeed to that to which the condition is annexed.s

II. If a condition has happened, which is the case if it be affirmative, as soon as the event has occurred, and if negative, as soon as the time for the event's happening has expired, or the event has become impossible, the right becomes unconditional and effective; and in that case—

1. If the condition was subsequent, the thing must, according to its nature, be returned in the state it then is in. But in cases of contract it is especially declared that the thing is to be returned with all mesne profits, and unencumbered." As a consequence of this the thing may be obtained by means of a vindicatio from a third possessor,*

P L. 66. de R. V. (6. 1.) L. 2. § 4. 5. pro emt. (41. 4.) § 4. I. de verb. obl. (3. 16.) L. 9. pr. de R. C. (12. 1.) L. 213. pr. de V. S. (50. 16).

4 L. 4. pr. de in diem addict. (18. 2.) L. 8. pr. de peric. et comm. r. v. (18. 6.) L. 38. § 1. de A. v. A. P. (41. 2.).

* L. 57. L. 85. § 7. de V. O. (45. 1.) L. 5. C. de O. et A. (4. 10.). Therefore measures may here also be taken for safety. L. 41. de iudic. (5. 1.) L. 6. pr. quib. ex causs. (42. 4.) L. 4. pr. de separat. (42. 6.). G. P. v. Bülow Abh. 1. B. Nr. 17.

t

§ 4. I. de V. O. (3. 15.) § 25. I. de inutil. stipul. (3. 19.).

§ 4. I. de V. O. (3. 15.) L. 115. § 1. eod. (45. 1.). Höpfner Comm. § 740. Not. 6.

u

L. 4. § 3. L. 6. pr. de in diem addict. (18. 2.). Wernher lec. c. L. 18. T. 2. § 8. W. Sell über bedingte Traditionen § 32–40.

× L. 41. pr. de R. V. (6. 1.) L. 4. § 3. de in diem addict. (18. 2.) L. 3. quib. mod. pign. solv. (20. 6). L. ult. de leg. commiss. (18. 3.) L. 29. 30. de m. c. don. (39. 6.) L. 4. C. de pact. int. emt. et vend. (4. 54.). W. Sell loc. cit. § 33. Of an entirely different opinion is Riesser in Linde Zeitschr. 2. B. Nr. 1. & 8., and to some extent also Mühlenbruch Pand. B. 2. §. 267. Note 6. Thibaut retains the opinion expressed by him in his civilist. Abh. 367-378. Compare Thibaut in the Archiv f. civ. Prax. B. 16. Nr. 14. W. Müller civ. Abh. B. 1. Nr. 7. Fritz Erläut. 2. Hft. 254-268. Vangerow Leitfaden B. 1. § 96.

unless indeed the conditions depended solely on the will of the giver back."

2. If the condition was precedent, the acquisition is made and completed, and, in general, as from the moment at which the condition happened. But here again in cases of contract the special principle is met with that, provided the thing is not wholly destroyed, the happening of those conditions which do not depend solely on the will of the debtora is to be considered as relating back to the time of their original annexation. On the performance therefore of either sort of condition all mesne profits must be given up by the possessor.c

III. If the condition is never fulfilled (deficit) the right which was to arise or revest on its happening is postponed for ever and is to be deemed non-existing from the first.d

§ 91.

Especially of such as are impossible.-That which cannot physically exist is to be treated as having no existence, and that which ought not legally to exist can have no legal effect as existing, but only as not existing. Hence, with respect to impossible conditions; e

1. Those which are affirmative, be they physically or morally impossible (§ 89), prevent the acquisition or reacquisition of the right which depends on them."

Brussel L. 2. T. 1. n. 6.

11. pr. §. 2. qui potior. (20. 4.). pr. de V. O. (45. 1.). W. Sell

Stryk U. M. P. L. 18. T. 1. § 28. T. 6. § 5. Thibaut civil. Abh. 362—— 365. W. Sell loc. cit. § 15. See contra Cocceii I. C. L. 18. T. 2. qu. 3. & 12. Schweppe Röm. Priv. R. 1. B. § 119. Valett Pand. 1. B. § 109. But see L. 8. de peric. et c. r. v. (18. 6.) L. 11. qui pot. (20. 4.) L. 105. de condit. et dem. (35. 1.) L. 78. pr. de V. O. (45. 1.) L. 16. de solutt. (46. 3.). and especially with reference to produce, L. 4. § 3. L. 6. pr. de in diem addict. (18. 2.) L. 4. pr. § 1. de lege commiss. (18. 3.).

d L. 19. pr. de const. pec. (13. 5.) L. 20. de donat. int. V. et U. (24. 1.) L. 37. de contr. emt. (18. 1.).

• See Arndts Beiträge Hft. 1. Bonn 1837. Nr. 4.

f L. 7. L. 35. pr. L. 137. § 6. de V. O. (45. 1.) L. 9. § 6. de R. C. (12. 1.) L. 1. § 11. L. 31. de O. et A. (44. 7.) § 11. I. de inutil. stip. (3. 19.). Averan.