plea either by denying the truth of the statement therein made, or by meeting such statement by another, which as in a plea may be either dilatory or peremptory. Such an answer to a plea is called a replicatio. In opposition to the replication there may be again another denial or a further statement called in this case a duplicatio, bearing the same relation to the replication as that does to the exceptio; the duplicatio may be further followed by a triplicatio, and this again by a quadruplicatio and so on.y

IV.-RIGHT OF RENUNCIATION AND ALIENATION.

§ 77.

Inasmuch as a right does not impose upon the person in whom it is vested any necessity of exercising it, but merely gives him the power so to do, every person who is free to dispose of what is his may lawfully abstain from exercising his rights and may either wholly or in part renounce them. No renunciation, however, which has given rise to rights in other persons can be recalled. Renunciation is of course not to be presumed, or extended further than it is clearly warranted by the words or conduct of the person renouncing.d An indefinite renunciation of every kind of defence is consequently to be treated as unmeaning.

* Tit. I. de replic. (4. 14.) L. 2. § 1. 2. L. 22. § 1. de except. (44. 1.). Schilling loc. cit. §. 120.

§ 1. 2. I. de replic. (4. 14.) L. 2. § 3. de except. (44. 1.). Savigny System B. 5. § 229.

L. un. C. ut nemo invitus (3. 7.).

L. 29. C. de pact. (2. 3.). Schilling loc. cit. § 96.

b L. 14. §. 9. de aedil. edict. (21. 1.) L. 4. C. de pact. (2. 3.) L. 11. C. de R. See Fritz Archiv. f. civil. Prax. B. 8.

C. (4. 1.). cap. 3. X. de renunt. 1. 9.
Nr. 15. Savigny System B. 4. § 202.

L. 3. de testam. mil. (29. 1).

L. 8. pr. quemadm. serv. (8. 6.) cap. 20. X. de off. iud. (1. 29.). A. K. H. v. Hartitsch Entscheidungen praktischer Rechtsfragen. Leipz. 1840. No. 443.

e L. 4. §. 4. si quis caut. (2. 11.) L. ult. § 3. de cond. indeb. (12. 6.). Stryk cautel. contr. Sect. 1. cap. 5. § 2. 3. But see K. G. Neundorf Erörterungen. Tübing. 1807. Nr. 2.

$ 78.

Every one who can renounce a right can for that very reason part with it to any person capable of acquiring it,f but in order that a right may be aliened by one person to another, certain means must be taken which vary according to circumstances, and therefore can not with propriety be noticed in an exposition of general principles only.

DIVISION II. OF DUTIES.

$79.

Exclusion of Freedom.-A person obliged, being subject to law, cannot, merely of his own accord, either renounce his duty or transfer it to others, and what he does contrary to any law whether prohibitory or mandatory is in cases of doubt to be held null and void; but in matters of trifling moment this rule ought not to be strictly applied. In case, however, anything is knowingly parted with contrary to law the giver himself cannot recover it back, unless indeed the very object of the law is to prevent him from impoverishing himself;" and even then an actio in rem cannot always be successfully resorted to by him." Cases may

m

Tit. I. quib. alienare lic. (2. 8.).

* See Thib. Syst. §§ 281. 314. 334. 460–466.

h L. 1. C. de novat. (8. 42.).

L. 8. § 2. de procur. (3. 3.) L. 183. de R. I. (50. 17.) L. 7. C. de procur. (2. 13.).

* L. 5. C. de LL. (1. 14.). Cuiac. obs. L. 19. c. 3. Weber nat. Verb. § 64. 74. See contra Vinnius quaest. sel. L. 1. c. 1. Voet L. 1. T. 3. nr. 16. Hommel rhapsod. obs. 213. Pütter theor. general. de nullitatibus (in opusc. § 17. 20.).

The national exchequer has a right to every immoral gift. L. 5. pr. de calumniator. (3. 6.) L. 8. § 14. de inofficios. (5. 2.) L. 2. § 1. de his quae ut indign. (34. 9.) L. 1. pr. L. 9. L. 46. § 2. de iure fisci (49. 14.).

m L. 25. pr. de adopt. (1. 7.) Tit. Dig. de condict. ob turp. causs. (12. 5.). Weber ubi supra § 48. 74–76. 91. Rosshirt Zeitschr. B. 1. 129–142.

This principle is obtained by inference and is everywhere as in cap. 33. X. de iureiur. (2. 24.) recognised as law. See § § 178. 505. Weber loc. cit. does not go quite so far.

• contra Brandis in Linde Zeitschrift B. 7. 180-188. But see § 14. I. de act. 4. 6. compared with tit. Dig. de cond. ob. turp. caus. (12. 5.). Froben § 78.

moreover occur in which only certain persons can dispute the validity of a transaction, or in which a duty exists only towards one of several contracting parties.P

$ 80.

A transaction void at its commencement cannot afterwards and by itself become valid ;9 for this purpose some new circumstance must occur by which the original defect is cured; one such circumstance of great importance and of various effects is subsequent assent (ratihabitio).

If a person obliged has acted partly in non-conformity and partly in conformity with his duty, that part of the transaction which is invalid does not render the remainder so if the latter is separable from the former and is complete in itself. So much moreover of the transaction as is valid may be upheld as a transaction different from that contemplated, and a new juridical transaction may arise, by what is termed a conversio actus juridici.

§ 80 A.

Alternative duties.-In cases of alternative duties, however, i.e. where either this or that has to be done, the person obliged has a discretion, namely, a right of option,a and the same is true of those cases of simple duties, where the person entitled has only a single right whereon to sue, whilst the person obliged can success

P pr. I. de auct. tut. (1. 21.) L. 34. § 3. de contr. emt. (18. 1.). Brandis loc. cit. Nr. 4. 5.

↑ L. 29. de R. I. (50. 17.) L. 83. § 5. de V. O. (45. 1.). Averanii int. L. 4. c. 22.

* See below § 190. G. G. Busse de ratihabitione. Lips. 1834.

L. 5. § 2. L. 31. § 4. de donat. int. V. et U. (24. 1.) L. 29. de usur. (22. 1.) L. un. pr. C. de rei uxor. act. (5. 13.). See especially G. L. Crell de fructu et effectu negotii inutilis, nulli et imperfecti, in his Diss. n. 9. Mühlenbruch Pand. 1. B. § 113. The exceptions will be noticed in their proper place.

L. 1. § 4. de pec. const. (13. 5.) L. 5. pr. de resc. vend. (18. 5.) L. 41. § 3. de vulg. et pup. (28. 6.) L. 8. pr. de acceptil. (46. 4). Hofacker princ. iur. R. G. T. 1. § 221.

L. 34. § 6. de contr. emt. (18. 1.) L. 10. §. 6. de iure dot. (23. 3).

fully defend an action, founded on that right, upon the ground of performance of something other than the immediate object of the action.b

In cases of doubt the option rests with the person obliged, even where a claim is made by him for the recovery back of an excess of payment; d but it is otherwise where a joint duty has been performed by each of the persons in whom it resided; and under special circumstances the option may rest with the person entitled.f

e

The right of choice, in cases of doubt, descends upon the death of the person obliged to his representatives, and similarly when vested in the person entitled, it descends on his death to his representatives, and can be exercised by them even when that right depends on agreement," and notwithstanding the absence of all right of cessioni (System § 460). If, however, one person has to choose for another, no choice can be made by the representatives of the former.k

§ 80 B.

As regards their continuance and extinction, alternative duties are governed by the ordinary general principles. But they

b For example, L. 2. C. de resc. vend. (4. 44.) L. 9. L. 57. pr. de solut. (46. 3.). Cocceii I. C. L. 18. Tit. 5. qu. 9.

L. 34. § 6. de contr. emt. (18. 1.) L. 138. § 1. de V. O. (45. 1.). Hert de electione ex obligat. alternativ. Sect. I. (in opusc. Vol. 1. T. 3.), especially I. A. Kurrer de obligat. alternativa. Tubing. 1686. Archiv für civilist. Prax. 1. B. Nr. 23. M. A. I. de Brassier Diss. de caussis alternativis. Heidelberg. 1821.

d L. 10. C. de cond. indeb. (4. 5.). Thomasius D. de promiss. rei incert. § 53. Voet L. 12. T. 6. nr. 5. Vangerow Leitfaden § 569.

• L. 21. de condict. indeb. (12. 6.) Kurrer 1. c. cap. 7. n. 13. 14. Brassier,

1. c. § 12.

L. 10. § 6. de iure dot. (23. 3.) L. 112. pr. de V. O. (45. 1.)

Kurrer 1. c. cap. 6. n. 82. 83.

h L. 76. pr. L. 141. pr. de V. O. (45. 1.). Kurrer 1. c. n. 105-114. See contra Olea quaest. L. 1. n. 33. Donell comm. L. 15. c. 34. Mühlenbruch Cession § 24. p. 260-275.

i L. 75. § 3. de leg. 1. (30.) L. 19. de optione (33. 5.). Kurrer 1. c. n. 97. Hert 1. c. Sect. 4. § 1. See contra Hilliger in Don. enucl. L. 15. c. 2. lit. d. Hunnius resol. L. 3. Tr. 4. qu. 15.

L. ult. § 1. de V. O. (45. 1.)

98-102.

Thomasius 1. c. § 6.

are also subject to this peculiarity, that the right to elect, which the person obliged has, is extinguished as soon as his choice is definitively made. Moreover, where the object of the right is destroyed distinctions must be taken which have not to be made in ordinary cases. For,

m

I. In case the destruction cannot be imputed to either party, the person obliged is not wholly discharged, unless all the objects of the option are destroyed; and this is so even if the person entitled has acquired one of the things in some other way." If one only of the things is destroyed its value or the remaining thing must be given."

II. In case destruction arose from the delay or some other act on the part of one of the parties, viz.:

A, on the part of the debtor; he must, of course, if all the things are destroyed, make adequate compensation. If one of them remains the creditor has the unconditional right of claiming it or the value of the thing destroyed, provided the option rests with him; but otherwise, at all events upon principle, he can only claim the still existing thing. He is not obliged to receive in satisfaction the value of the thing destroyed, even though equal to that of the other.P

B, on the part of the creditor; he can claim nothing, even though one only of the things is destroyed.

§ 80 c.

Possibility of Performance.-As nothing can be necessary which

1 L. 84. § 9. de legat. I. (30.) L. 106. L. 112. pr. L. 138. § 1. de V. O. (45. 1.). Thomasius 1. c. § 53. 54. Contra Fritz Erläut. Heft. 3. 11.

m

L. 34. § 6. de contr. emt. (18. 1.) L. 2. § 3. de eo quod certo (13. 4.).

L. 16. pr. de V. O. (45. 1.).

Tubing. 1686. n. 16-23.

L. 47. § 3. de legat. 1. (30.). P This is certainly reasonable. tivis. Heidelberg 1821. § 5.

I. A. Kurrer de obligatione alternativa.

Arch. f. c. Prax. B. 1. Nr. 23.

M. A. J. Brassier Diss. de causis alternaNevertheless considerable difficulty arises from L. 95. § 1. de solutt. (46. 3.) See Zeitschr. für Rechtspflege. Leipz. 1839. B. 2. Nr. 16.

L. 105. de V. O. (45. 1.) L. 72. pr. de solutt. (46. 3.). Kurrer 1. c. nr. 39-42. Contra Brassier 1. c. § 10.