3. Of Criticism. $ 54. It is of very considerable importance, in the actual state of the Roman law, to determine how far a jurist is at liberty, by his own criticism, to form a text having the force of law. There are two principles to be kept in mind here: A. A judge ought not, without an authentic interpretation, to proceed farther, if the rules of interpretation are insufficient for his purpose; B. The Roman law has not been adopted from the text of any one manuscript, but from that of several manuscripts. Hence it follows that we are at perfect liberty to choose the text of that manuscript which appears to us the best, and to correct errors in the printed copies by collation with it, but if the text of the manuscript is certain an alteration is only to be allowed in case all the conditions for a logical interpretation are present. II.-INTERPRETATION OF OTHER INSTRUMENTS.* § 55. The Roman law contains an almost innumerable number of rules for the interpretation of legal instruments." The laws applicable to particular agreements, servitutes and legacies, for the most part depend on nothing else. The following main principles are all that can here be noticed. y See above § 46. * With this qualification I still adhere to the opinion formerly expressed by me in my Vers. 1. B. Nr. 16. For the views of others see I. L. Conradi vitiorum criticorum climax, adversus Ranchinum. Lips. 1762. Feuerbach Civ. Vers. 1. B. 3. Abh. But see contra: Thibaut Theorie § 44. Compare also Hufeland Geist des Röm. R. 1. Thl. 70-81. Spangenberg Einleitung. 243-253. * The translator has preferred to use the word instruments throughout this and the following section, although the principles stated in the text apply as well to verbal as to written agreements &c. The German word is Geschäft. Mantica de tacit. et ambig. convent. Averan interpr. L. II. c. 2. 30. L. III. c. 16-30. L. IV. c. 1. 2. 3. 9-17. L. V. c. 1. 2. 5-12. C. F. Alef de eo quod aequ. est in dubiis convent. (in his dies acad. n. 8.). Unterholzner Lehre v. d. Schuldverhältnissen B. 1. § 41. E - Words. In the first place, according to what has already been said upon grammatical interpretation, attention must be paid to the meaning of the words used; and these are to be taken in the sense usual in the place where the transaction occurred. Unrestrained general words are to be taken in a corresponding sense, and no word is to be treated as superfluous,d even though the whole instrument should, when correctly interpreted, prove good for nothing.e If, however, the sense of the words be obscure or ambiguous, then that meaning is to be adopted a. By which some effect may be given to the instrument; or, b. By which the result most agreeable to the nature of its subject matter may be attained; and lastly, c. By which the losing party is least prejudiced; but still in cases of doubt the words are to be taken most strongly against him by whom the first proposals touching the matter in question were made (as in general the seller or lender). Marriage gifts are especially favoured. $56. Intention. Words are merely a means to an end; and if an intention contrary to the meaning expressed by them can be proved,' L. 7. § 2. du supel. leg. (33. 10.). L. 69. de leg. III. (32.). L. 50. § 3. de leg. I. (30.) L. 65. § 7. de leg. III. (32.) L. 18. § 3. de instructo. (33. 7.) Wächter im Archiv f. civ. Prax. B. 19. Nr. 5. d L. 31. de evict. (23. 4.). (21. 2.) L. 23. de S. P. U. (8. 2.) L. 26. § 2. de pact. dotal. L. 9. § 6. de R. C. (12. 1.). ↑ L. 22. pr. de usu (7. 8.) L. 41. L. 80. 134. § 1. de V. O. (45. 1.). L. 9. de servit. (8. 1.) L. 43. pr. de damn. inf. (39. 2.) L. 67. de R. J. (50. 17.). h L. 34. de R. I. (50. 17.) L. 99. de V. O. (45. 1.). i L. 17. § 3. 4. de S. P. U. (8. 2.) L. 21. 33. 34. pr. de contr. emt. (18. 1.) L. 39. de pact. (2. 14.) comp. with L. 40. 68. pr. de contr. emt. (18. 1.) L. 6. § 6. L. 11. § 17. L. 26. 27. de act. e. v. (19. 1.). For other views see I. H. Boehmer de interpr. fac. advers. eum qui clarius loqui debuisset (Exerc. T. II.). Cuiac. Obs. L. 1. c. 10. Averan interpret. L. 2. c. 2. Pufendorf T. 1. Obs. 132. § 8. * L. 85. pr. de R. I. (50. 17.). 'An extensive interpretation ob rationem cannot be allowed in the case of private instruments. Schweppe Röm. Privatr. 1. B. § 124. m effect must be given to this intention rather than to the words used. A distinction, however, is made between Bilateral and Unilateral instruments. a. In bilateral instruments the words, if clear, must be followed even against the intention of one of the parties :" but, where the intention of both parties is the same, effect must be given to it against the clearest words. The preamble of an instrument generally affords the best means of discovering the intention of the parties thereto.P b. In unilateral instruments the intention of the speaker has to be ascertained and followed, and if the meaning of his words be doubtful, recourse must be had to his previous explanations and statements. If the instrument, as for instance a testament," be such that it cannot be upheld without a will expressed, a proved intention, inconsistent with the words themselves, operates merely to destroy their effect, but cannot go further and render operative a disposition not warranted by the words used. If no satisfactory result can be arrived at in any one of these ways the instrument must be held void.t L. 69. pr. de leg. III. (32.) L. 6. de pignor. (20. 1.) L. 5. de transact. (2. 15.). " L. 99. pr. de V. O. (45. 1.). L. 219. de V. S. (50. 16.). P L. 134. § 1. de V. O. (45. 1.). Mantica 1. c. cap. 4. Tit. 9. S. Stryk de iure praefationum cap. 2. § 4. I. H. Boehmer consult. et. dec. T. 2. P. 1. Resp. 68. n. 24. R. 318. n. 8. R. 560. n. 11. R. 564. n. 6. R. 642. n. 5. T. 2. P. 2. R. 914. n. 11. T. 3. P. 1. R. 177. n. 15. 9 L. 66. de iudic. (5. 1.) L. 52. pr. L. 83. § 1. de V. O. (45. 1.) L. 96. de R. I. (50. 17.). See further as to the interpretation of wills the last § of Thibaut's System. PART II. OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF LAWS. CHAPTER I. OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES CONSIDERED BY THEMSELVES. DIVISION I. OF RIGHTS. $ 57. RIGHTS and duties are the results of laws. In considering rights and duties we must carefully distinguish: (1) rights and duties themselves, or power and necessity; (2) their subject or the person for whom something is possible or necessary; (3) their object or that which is possible or necessary, and (4) their foundation or that which calls them into existence and sustains them afterwards. I.-FREEDOM OF ACTION. As a right is neither more nor less than a legal power to compel, everything done in exercise of a right is juridically speaking lawful, even if another be hurt thereby." If however an act in itself lawful be performed craftily to evade a law or merely with the cunning intent to hurt another," such act must be treated as if it were forbidden by law. The old doctrine was well founded on the moral tendency of the Roman law (§ 9) and on L. 1. § 12. L. 2. § 9. de aqua et aquae pluv. (39. 3.), Nov. 63., but not so well on L. 38. de R. V. (6. 1.) L. 3. Carpzov Decis. n. 104. Gail L. 2. Obs. 69. S. Stryk de iure aemulationis. c. 1. n. 13. pr. de oper. publ. (50. 10.). Pufendorf T. 4. Obs. 263. Hert de servitute naturaliter II-POWER OF COMPULSION. $ 59. Every right is as such accompanied by a power of compelling the performance of or forbearance from some positive act. In the absence of such a power no right properly speaking is conceivable; but a right may well exist without there being any absolute necessity to exercise that power.z This power of compulsion can as a rule only be exercised with the aid of a judge. With such aid the power may be exercised either actively (by an action), by seeking the assistance of the judge to compel another to perform his duty,a or passively (by way of defence), by bringing forward one's own right in answer to an action instituted by another. Generally speaking the latter course is most advantageous in consequence of the more favourable position of a defendant as compared with that of a plaintiff." III.-MODES OF COMPULSION. Offensive.-A person seeking himself to enforce a right can do so by acting offensively or defensively. The former course, whenever judicial assistance can be procured, is as a general rule forbidden, unless expressly allowedd by the supreme power or by constituta. Sect. 2. § 11. See contra C. Thomasius non-ens actionis forensis contra aedificantem ex aemulatione (Diss. T. 2. n. 61.). Hufeland Geist des Röm. R. 1. Thl. 92. Gesterding Nachforsch. 3. B. 191–197. Schweppe Röm. Priv. R. 1. Bd. § 146. Sintenis Civilrecht B. 1. § 27. This is inserted because Müller ad Leyser Obs. 44., attributes no power of compulsion to negative privilegia. a G. Hasse im Rhein. Museum B. 6. Nr. 1. & 6. Savigny System Bd. 5. § 205. b Weber's Beitr. to his Kl. u. Einr. 1. N. 1. L. 10. § 16. quae in fraud. cred. (42. 8.). L. 3. C. de pignor. (8. 14.). Pufendorf T. 2. Obs. 62. Struben 2. B. 32. Bed. 3. B. 57. Bed. e Claproth ord. Proc. § 2. 3. 4. 5. For the history of these doctrines see in C. F. Walch disquis. hist. iur. civ. de vindict. privat. Ien. 1768. (op. T. 1.). Linde Zeitschrift 1. B. Nr. 21. Fritz Erläuterungen 1. Hft. 125-131. S. Benfey im. Rhein. Mus. B. 7. Nr. 1. Vangerow Leitfaden § 133. |