CHAPTER VIII.

OF THE DURATION AND REPEAL OF LAWS.

§ 39.

A LAW does not of itself lose its binding power, unless the time for which it was to be binding has expired, or the conditions upon and for which it was made have ceased to exist. Laws can only cease to be binding in consequence of some act of the legislative power. By such an act every law may be repealed even though it contain a clause to the effect that it shall last for ever," and though such clause be not expressly mentioned in and repealed by the later law."

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Modes of Repeal.-A law may be altered in many ways and may be repealed in whole or in part. A law may be totally repealed (abrogari) either expressly or impliedly by some later law wholly inconsistent with it. A law may be partially repealed simply (derogari), or by some addition to it (subrogari) or by some alteration in it (obrogari) made by another inconsistent law. P

§ 41.

Effect of new on older Laws.-An old law is repealed by a later

1 Arg. L. 1. § 43. de aqu. quotid. (43. 20.) L. 6. § 14. de excusat. (27. 1.). The mere non-existence of the reasons for which the law was framed does not fall within this rule, post § 52.

E.g. L. 4. C. de SS. eccles. (1. 2.) L. 6. C. de sec. nupt. (5. 9.).

I. N. Hert de lege clausula ne abrogar. possit munita § 8. (op. V. 1. T. 3. n. 1.). Others are of a different opinion on account of L. 14. pr. de legat. 1. (30.) L. 22. de legat. III. (32.) amongst them Bartolus in L. omnes populi D. de iust. et iur. col. 11. vers. quid dicemus.

P Ulpiani Fragm. T. 1. § 3. Dirksen Beiträge 294–297. Schilling Institut. B. 2. § 16.

one. q

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This however is only true when there is a complete and clear inconsistency between the old and the new laws; for a new law of doubtful meaning is always to be construed so that the least possible departure may be made from the law previously existing. A new law is moreover, although general in its terms, to be held to repeal only that which was the rule, and not to apply to the exceptions to that rule, unless such exceptions are referred to in the new law either expressly or impliedly, as where some only of the exceptions to the old are excepted from the operation of the new law. The consequences of a law are of course destroyed by its repeal."

§ 42.

Repeal of Privilegia.-The preceding principles are on the whole applicable to privilegia. (§ 31.) Advantageous privilegia! however, in case of opposition and consequent non-exercise, are lost as a general rule in thirty years by prescription, and if opposed to the acquired rights of others, or consequently to older privilegia, are in cases of doubt to be treated as void. a The sovereign may at his pleasure recall a privilegium which he had granted precario or ad beneplacitum,b or which has been abused by the

L. 4. de const. princ. (1. 4.).

L. 35. pr. C. de inoff. testam. (3. 28.).

L. 26. 27. 28. de LL. (1. 3.) L. 80. de R. I. (50. 17.) L. 41. de poen. (48. 19.) L. 3. C. de silentar. et decur. (12. 16.) cap. 1. de constit. in 6. (1. 2.). F. T. Seydlitz (praes. Stockmann) de vi legum prior. in posterior. Lips. 1803. A partly different view is taken by Gönner jur. Abh. 1. B. Nr. 7. But compare L. 26. § 1. C. de usur. (4. 32.) with L. 2. 3. C. de usur. rei iudic. (7. 54.) L. 4. C. de aedific. privat. (8. 10.) Nov. 158. praef. Thibaut Civil. Abh. 108 ---130. Bornemann im neuen Archiv. Rostock 1818. 178 is of quite a different opinion.

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E. g. L. 23. pr. C. ad SCt. Velleian. (4. 29.) Nov. 134. c. 8.

Thibaut Vers. 1. B. 213--224.

See especially I. G. F. Wasmuth de privilegior, natura. Goett. 1787. cap. 2. Quistory kl. jur. Schrift. 1. Samml. 99. et seq.

▾ Rights to hold fairs are excepted by L. 1. de nundinis (50. 11.). Glück Pand. 2. B. § 110. Hufeland Geist des R. R. 1. B. 262-264, 274-281. Fritz in Linde Zeitschrift 4. B. Nr. 6. Steppes ebenda 14. B. Nr. 5. L. 7. C. de precib. imp. offer. (1. 19.) L. 4. C. de emancip. (8. 49.) cap. 1. de constit. in 6 (1. 2).

b Wasmuth 1. c.

§ 23. 24.

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person to whom it was granted; but a gross abuse and previous admonition are considered to be necessary to warrant a recall.a In other cases a privilegium can not be recalled unless such a measure is for the public benefit, and then only on indemnifying the grantee. A privilegium is not, in a case of doubt, to be considered as having ceased on the death of the grantor; but the grantee is at liberty to renounce it so far as he is interested in it, provided such renunciation be not forbidden as it is by the popish rule which prohibits a person who enters any order from renouncing any of the privileges conferred upon it. This rule, however, is not followed (except as regards ecclesiastics. Froben, $42).

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can. 7. D. 74. cap. 11. 24. X. de privileg. (5. 33.).

d arg. c. 43. X. de rescript. (1. 3.) arg. II. Feud. 27. § 7. Stryk de iure privilegiat. contra privil. § 33. Idem de abusu iur. quaesiti. cap. 4.

e Struben 2. B. 80. Bed. Müller ad Leyser Obs. 43. Hommel Rhaps. Obs. 469. Upon imperial privilegia see Gerstlacher corp. iur. germ. 4. B. 9. Cap. f Wasmuth 1. c. § 29. et seq.

* L. 29. C. de pact. (2. 3.) cap. 6. X. de privil. (5. 33.). Wasmuth 1. c. § 24. ↳ Cap. 12. X. de foro comp. (2. 2.). The rule is even denied by Hufeland Geist des Röm. R. 1. Thl. 286-290.

CHAPTER IX.

OF INTERPRETATION.

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THE purpose of every law is its own application to cases specified in it. In order to be able properly to apply a law, it is not sufficient merely to know its meaning and to be acquainted with the events which give rise to rights and duties, but it is necessary to possess in addition a considerable amount of general knowledge and of tact, which it is the object of sound education to impart. Passing over that which belongs to the latter, there remain to be examined here the principles which govern the interpretation of laws and of legal instruments.

I.-INTERPRETATION OF LAWS.

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By the interpretation of a law is meant an accurate statement of the precept contained in it (the meaning of the law). A system of rules by the observance of which such a statement may be made is Juridical Hermeneutics.

i V. Forster de iuris interpr. (Otto Thes. T. H.). F. Rapolla de iureconsulto, s. de rat. discend. interpr. iur. civ. Neap. 1726. 8. translated into German with notes by Griesinger. Stuttg. 1792. 8. C. H. Eckhard hermen. iur. cum not. C. F. Walch. Lips. 1779. 8. edited also by C. W. Walch. Lips. 1802. 8. I. G. Sammet Hermeneutik des Rechts, edited by F. G. Born. Leipz. 1801. 8. F. Maglianus de iuris interpretandi ratione. Neapoli 1808. M. A. Mailher de Chassat tr. de l'interprétation des lois. Paris 1822. 8. W. F. Clossius Hermeneutik des Rechts. Leipz. 1831. 8. See as to the subject of interpretation in general: Zusätze und Bericht. zu den Inst. des R. R. 171-190. G. S. Teucher de natura et formis interpr. observ. Spec. 1. & 2. Lips. 1804. K. S. Zachariä Vers. einer allgemeinen Hermeneutik des Rechts. Meissen 1805. Zirkler Revision der Lehren des positiven Rechts. Wetzlar 1807. 2. B. S. 34 et

A law may be interpreted either by the law-giving power (interpretatio legalis) or otherwise (int. doctrinalis). Legal interpretation is again either authentic (int. authentica) or customary (usualis), according as it proceeds from the sources of written or unwritten law respectively. The authority of legal interpretation depends, not on its agreement with the rules of hermeneutics, but simply on the extent of the law-giving power of the person declaring it. The rules which follow are only required for doctrinal interpretation.

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It is necessary clearly to distinguish from each other:

1. That which is actually signified by the words as they stand (meaning of the words):

2. That which was meant to be expressed (the intention" of the legislator): and

3. The result arrived at by a logical deduction from the reason of the law."

An interpretation if based upon the meaning of the words of a law is termed grammatical. If based, as it ought to be, upon the spirit of the law (sententia legis), i.e. upon the intention of the legislator and the reason of the law, the interpretation is termed logical.

seq. Hufeland Geist des Röm. R. 1. Thl. 1-211. Savigny System B. 1. § 32—50. Thibaut Hermeneutik u. Kritik edited by Guyet. Berlin 1842. Hänsel Institutionen B. 1. 428-468. Günther in Weiske Rechtslexikon B. 4. 701-711.

» L. 12. 13. 29. 30. de LL. (1. 3.) L. 13. § 2. de excusat. (27. 1.) L. 6. § 1. de V. S. (50. 16.). See contra Schöman Handbuch 1. B. p. 137.

Thibaut Versuche 2. B. 9. Abh. and Theorie der log. Ausl. 2te Aufl. Altona 1806. § 3. Of a somewhat different opinion is Teucher 1. c. Spec. 1. p. 16-24., and a very peculiar view is taken by Guyet Abhandl. Nr. 7. Against the division of interpretation into grammatical and logical see Kritz Sammlung v. Rechtsfällen B. 3. Nr. 8. Savigny System B. 1. § 50.