the court reasserted its views strongly in the same direction. "From the moment of marriage the husband and wife assume towards each other, duties in the performance of which society is vitally interested, and which it will not permit to be hampered or obstructed by the assertion of conflicting rights by others."

This majority rule is laid down in the following cases also— Vanatta v. Carr, 229 Ill., 47 (1907); Town of Sherburne v. Town of Hartland, 37 Vt., 529. The latter case was approved of and followed in Town of Northfield v. Town of Brookfield, 50 Vt., 62, and even more clearly in Town of Craftsbury v. Town of Greensboro, 66 Vt., 585. New Hampshire laid down the majority rule in one settlement case; Fremont v. Sandown, 56 N. H., 300; and in Aldrich v. Bennett, 63 N. H., 415, where they said the same result followed whether parent consented or not. Roach & McLean v. Quick, 9 Wend., (N. Y.), 238, lays down the same rule in holding a minor husband liable for the debts contracted by his wife before the marriage, as does also the case of State ex rel. Scott v. Lowell, 78 Minn., 166.

It thus seems as though the Supreme Court of Michigan in the principal case followed out the rule of stare decisis too rigidly, following a case which it could seemingly have explained differently. It is clearly contrary to the weight of authority, reason and logic, against public policy, and decidedly against the better judgment of the court.

RECENT CASES

ADVERSE POSSESSION-RAILROADS-PUBLIC LANDS-EFFECT OF ABANDONMENT.-MILLS V. DENVER & R. G. R. Co., 198 FED., 137.-Held, where a railroad company, which by the construction of its road has acquired a right of way over public land, has abandoned the same by relocation of its line and the removal of its track, the old right of way becomes subject to the rules governing property privately owned, and title thereto may be acquired by adverse possession under color of title.

As to whether a railroad right of way is the subject of adverse possession there is a conflict among the authorities. Many cases have held that title may be so acquired. Matthews v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 110 Mich., 170; Pittsburg R. R. Co. v. Stickney, 155 Ind., 312; Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Houghton, 126 Ill., 233. In other jurisdictions it is held that a railroad right of way cannot be acquired by adverse possession on the ground of the public nature of such a right cf way. Southern P. R. R. Co. v. Hyatt, 132 Cal., 240; McLucas v. St. Joseph R. R. Co., 67 Neb., 603. In other jurisdictions a railroad right of way is put under the protection of a statute. Littlefield v. Boston R. R. Co., 146 Mass., 268; Costello v. Grand Trunk R. R. Co., 70 N. H., 403; St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Smith, 170 Mo., 327. The principal case does not deny the contention of the defendant that a title acquired under an act of Congress cannot be taken from it, but it draws a distinction, in that in the case under consideration the right of way having been abandoned by the railroad company the reason for the rule no longer exists. The company having taken up another route, the old route loses its public nature and becomes subject to the rules governing private property.

BILLS AND NOTES-EVIDENCE-PARTIES-PRESUMPTIONS-NATURE OF LIABILITY.-WOODSVILLE GUARANTY SAVINGS BANK V. ROGERS ET AL., 83 ATL., 537 (VT.)—Held, that strangers to a note, who sign their names on the back thereof, become prima facie makers, but may show that they are indorsers and liable only as such.

Before the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law there was considerable diversity of opinion as to the liability of a stranger who signed his name on commercial paper. In some of the States such an indorser was prima facie regarded as guarantor. Parkhurst v. Vail, 73 Ill., 343; Lyon & Co. v. Bank, 85 Fed., 120. In other jurisdictions he was regarded as joint maker. Good v. Martin, 95 U. S., 90; Currier v. Fellows, 27 N. H., 366. The Massachusetts Courts adopted a stringent rule, holding such a party liable as maker, and did not admit parol evidence to show that such was not his real contract. Way v. Butterworth, 108 Mass, 509. Still other jurisdictions regarded him as indorser. Moore v. Cross, 19 N. Y., 227; Riggs v. Waldo, 2 Cal., 485. But these Courts again dif

fered as to whether he was first or second indorser; some holding him prima facie second indorser. Coggswell v. Hayden, 5 Ore., 22; Phelps v. Vischer, 50 N. Y., 69. Others treated him as first indorser. Davis v. Barron, 13 Wis., 227. In England such an indorser was not liable at all. Steele v. McKinley, 5 App. Cas., 754; Gwinnell v. Herbert, 5 Adol. & E., 436. The Negotiable Instruments Law has made important changes in the States where it has been adopted. Section 17, subdivision 6, provides that where a signature is so placed upon the instrument that it is not clear in what capacity the person making the same intended to sign, he is deemed an indorser. Section 64 provides that where a person, not otherwise a party to the instrument places thereon his signature in blank before delivery, he is held as indorser in accordance with the following rules: (1) If the instrument is payable to the order of a third person, he is liable to the payee and all subsequent parties. (2) If the instrument is payable to the order of the maker or drawer, or is payable to bearer, he is liable to all parties subsequent to the maker or drawer. (3) If he signs for the accommodation of the payee he is liable to all parties subsequent to the payee. Section 68 provides that as respects one another, indorsers are liable prima facie in the order in which they indorse, but evidence is admissible to show that as among themselves they have agreed otherwise. Since the passage of the act there has been some conflict as to whether parol evidence may be received to give the contract a different effect; some Courts helding that parol evidence is admissible; Haddock v. Haddock, 192 N. Y., 499; Bank v. Busby, 113 S. W. (Tenn.), 390; others hold'ng it not. Bank v. Bichel, 143 Ky., 754; Nimmecll v. Weil, 95 III Ap», 15; Baumeister v. Kuntz, 35 Fla., 340. It is the evident purpose of the statute to exclude parol evidence, and make the written contract control the rights of the parties; therefore to allow parol evidence is reading into the act a meaning not expressed by the words themselves. not been adopted in Vermont.

The act has

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION-RAILROAD RATES. -STATE EX REL. SIMPSON V. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. Co., 137 N. W., 2 (MINN.).-Held, that an act establishing a lower rate than the maximum passenger rate for the carriage of the members of the State's military force upon railroad lines within the State, when such members are required to so travel under orders in discharge of their military duties, is not an unlawful discrimination of which the defendant may complain; the defense having been waived that such rate is not compensatory.

There is but one other case that discusses this question and that case reaches a conclusion contrary to the one established in the principal case, holding the act unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Re Gardner, 84 Kan., 264. But similar statutes requiring a street car company to carry school children at half the regular fare have been held valid. Com. v. Interstate Street R. R. Co., 207 U. S., 79; Fitzmaurice v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 192 Mass., 159; San Antonio Traction Co. v. Altgelt, 200 U. S., 304. A law requiring a

railroad company carrying live stock for an individual, to carry him free of charge was held to be unconstitutional. A., T. & S. F. R. R. Co. v. Campbell, 61 Kan., 439. Also laws requiring a railroad company to issue milcage bocks at a lower rate than that regularly charged passengers have been held void. Smith v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. R. Co., 173 U. S., 684; Atty. Gen. v. Boston & A. R. R. Co., 160 Mass., 62. A State law establishing rates for transportation which will not admit of the carrier earning such compensation as under all circumstances is just to it and the public is unconstituional. Wallace v. Arkansas Cent. R. R. Co., 55 C. C. A., 192. The principal case disapproves of re Gardner, and distinguishes itself from Lake Shore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Smith in that that case held the act unconstitutional because of the uncertainty of the earnings of the company, this defense having been waived in the principal case The opinion points out that requiring a lower rate for the transportation of the State's troops is not discrimination against the company, because it receives all that it may legaly demand; nor is it class discrimination, for the State pays the transportation. The case is well argued and reaches a sane conclusion.

EASEMENTS DISTINCTION IN CLASSES.-ADAMS V. HODGKINS, 84 ATL., 530 (ME.).-Held, that on an issue of abandonment of an easement for a right of way across land, there is a distinction between an easement created by deed and one acquired by prescription.

An easement acquired by actual deed or reservation is not lost by non-user, but can only be lost by hostile and adverse possession for the prescriptive period. Edgerton v. McMullen, 55 Kan., 90; Kammerling v. Grover, 9 Ind. App., 628. By statute in California, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota and Oklahoma, it is provided that an easement acquired by prescription is extinguished by the disuser of the owner for the period prescribed for acquiring the title. The cases of Browne v. Baltimore M. E. Church, 37 Md., 108, and Shields v. Arndt, 4 N. J. Eq., 234 (dictum), arrive at the same conclusion under the theory that long nonuser affords a presumption of a release of the right. The distinction then between the two kinds of easements lies in the methods of their abandonment. This distinction is recognized to a limited extent in New York, Maine and Massachusetts. The distinction, however, seems to be an impractical one as both easements arise out of a grant. Veghte v. Raritan Water Power Co., 19 N. J. Eq., 142. The present trend of the Courts is, in the absence of statutes, to entirely disregard the difference and to require actual adverse possession for the prescriptive period in order to extinguish any easement.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-SALE OF REAL ESTATE-WARRANTIES -IVEY V. VAUGHN ET AL., SINCLAIR V. SAME, SMITH V. SAME, 76 S. E., 464 (S. C.).—Held, that where a testator's will, though authorizing his executors to sell his realty, did not authorize them to give a warranty, and

the executors after advertising the sale as under the provisions of the will, executed deeds containing a warranty as executors, they were not personally liable; the warranty being without consideration, made in a representative capacity, and not having injured the purchaser. Woods, J., dissenting.

A power of sale given by a will does not authorize an executor to bind the estate by covenants of warranty. Ramsey v. Wandell, 32 Hun. (N. Y.), 482; Godley v. Taylor, 14 N. C., 178. If he makes such covenants they operate as personal obligations. Jones v. Noe, 71 Ind., 368; Ross v. Barr, 21 Ky. L. Rep., 974; Lynch v. Baxter, 4 Tex., 431. Nor is the liability of the executor on his covenants of warranty affected by the fact that the purchaser had notice of the will under which the executor sold. Wurdeman v. Robertson, Riley Eq. (S. C.), 115. This is true even though he describes himself as covenanting as executor. Mitchell v. Hazen, 4 Conn., 495. But should he covenant as executor, "but not otherwise", he does not bind himself personally, even though it may not be binding on the estate of the testator. Thayer v. Wendell, 23 Fed. Cas. No. 13, 873. The principal case is contrary to the authorities. However, in view of the fact that the warranty was made in a represenetative capacity, "as executor", and the purchaser has not been injured, it is certainly good sense, if not good law, to excuse the executor from personal liability.

JURY-EXAMINATION OF JURORS-VOIR DIRE.-STATE V. HUFFMANN, 99 N. E., 295 (OHIO).-Held, that upon a trial under an indictment for bribery, it is not competent to inquire of a prospective juror upon his voir dire whether he will stand upon his opinion of not guilty, formed upon due deliberation in the jury room, or will yield his opinion merely for the purpose of reaching a verdict in the case.

The purpose of the examination of a juror on voir dire is to determine whether or not he is qualified to sit in the trial, and a thorough examination is allowed. Pinder v. State, 27 Fla., 370; Com. v. Surles, 165 Mass., 59; Stools v. State, 108 Ind., 415. The questions asked should aim to disclose the juror's relation to the parties and the actual disposition of his mind as to the subject matter of the action. People v. Plyler, 126 Cal., 379; Clark v. Com., 123 Pa. St., 555. Irrelevant or misleading questions should be excluded by the Court. State v. Cleary, 97 Iowa, 413; State v. Mills, 91 N. C., 581. The character of the questions and the nature and extent of the inquiry is left to the judgment and judicial discretion of the presiding judge. State v. Cross, 72 Conn., 722; Sullivan v. Padrosa, 122 Ga., 338; Donovan v. People, 139 Ill., 412. The exercise of the Court's discretion wil not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly abused. Connors v. United States, 158 U. S., 408; State v. Brooks, 92 Mo., 542; l'an Stike v. Porter, 53 Neb., 28. In view of the fact that the questions asked of a juror upon his voir dire are largely at the discretion of the presiding judge, and review on appeal may be had only in rare cases, the principal case must be considered contrary to the general trend of authority