By William T. Brantly. 263 Law of Contrast. This appears to be a very creditable and useful work, with the merits of brevity and clearness. On the other hand, it is of little assistance in the solution of problems heretofore unsolved. The topical outline largely follows Anson, having great merit therefore; but it also possesses most of Anson's faults and has added a few others. "Particular Contracts" is not a good heading under which to find conditions. Anson's "Operation of Contract" here becomes "Effects of the Contract", certainly no improvement. Under the heading "Extinguishment of Contract" many things are treated that do not extinguish. The author's treatment of "consideration" is good, particularly the sections on performance of an existing obligation as consideration; but he seems not to be acquainted with Ames's History of Assumpsit. The discussion of impossibility of performance is good, and as much may be said of "novation". In the treatment of "accord and satisfaction" there is lacking an application of the rules governing unilateral contracts; and in dealing with performance of contract there is no distinction made between contract and quasi-contract. The author has courageously grappled with the subject of "conditions", and he is often suggestive and illuminating; but his analysis of the subject is far from thorough and complete. This is true, for example, of his treatment of "promissory conditions", a term to which he makes objection. He says a promissory condition is not a true condition, but is merely a term of the contract. But is not a "true" condition also a term of the contract if it is expressed therein? And cannot one make his own liability truly conditional upon the performance of a promise as well as upon the happening of an event not promised? The important distinction is between conditions intended as such by the parties, and conditions not so intended, but which are constructed by the law for the sake of justice. The author discusses "subsidiary conditions", a term that is self-contradictory. His definition of condition precedent is: "When the happening or not happening of the event upon which the agreement is conditioned must precede the existence or enforcibility of the obligation on the part of the promisor to perform, the condition is called precedent." This fails to distinguish between the formation of an obligation and liability for breach thereof. These are serious defects, but nevertheless the author's work is of much value, and his analysis and classification of individual cases is accurate. A. L. C. SCHOOL AND ALUMNI NOTES The Moot Court this year will be under the alternate charge of different members of the Faculty, and meetings will commence shortly. Owing to the prevalence of cutting among the members of the two lower classes, the Faculty have been compelled to return to a strict method of taking attendance. It is to be hoped that the students in the School will some day outgrow the need of preparatory school discipline as regards their daily work. '78-Burton Mansfield and Osborne A. Day, '02, have formed a partnership for the practice of law, under the firm name of Mansfield & Day, with offices at rooms 600-603, First National Bank Building, New Haven, Conn. '85-Everett Smith was elected one of the judges of the Superior Court in Seattle, Wash., at the last general election. '93-George H. Stanton was elected President at the first official meeting of the stockholders of the New Commercial Trust Company and Savings Bank, of Great Falls, Mont. '97-Chester L. Dane has changed his address from Marblehead, Mass., to 12 Charles River Square, Boston, Mass. '02-The firm of Borland, Pew & Proctor having been dissolved, John B. Pew, '02, and David M. Proctor, have formed a partnership to carry on the practice of the law, under the firm name of Pew & Proctor, with offices at 431 Scarrit Building, Kansas City, Mo. Ex-'04 Charles Shinkle Sproule died after a month's illness from pneumonia at the West Penn. Hospital, Pittsburg, Pa., on Nov. 11. '05-Thomas Whipple Connally, Secretary and Treasurer of the University Club of Atlanta, Ga., has recently returned from a two months' trip to Europe. Since leaving Atlanta he has visited the University Clubs of Chicago, Milwaukee, Detroit, Toronto, Montreal, New York, and Boston, gathering ideas for a proposed new University Club building in Atlanta. He was asked by the authorities of the University of Georgia to undertake for that body the organization of an up-to-date alumni bureau, and has been to Harvard and Yale to consult their alumni departments in this connection. '06-John M. Cates has resigned from the Colorado and Southern Railroad Co. and is now associated with the Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, in Baltimore. '06 Harry F. Hamlin and Lorin Thompson announce that they have formed a partnership for the general practice of the law under the firm name of Hanlin & Thompson, with offices in suite 1003-4, Rector Building, Chicago, Ill. '08-A daughter was born to Mr. and Mrs. Charles N. Harmon on Nov. 19th. She has been named Ann Louise Harmon. '09-A son was born on Oct. 25 to Mr. and Mrs. Alexander W. Smith. Mr. Smith's address is 632 Peachtree Street, Atlanta, Ga. '09-Edward J. Quinlan, formerly associated with the law firm of Walsh & Wright in Greenwich, Conn., but more recently with the firm of Walsh & Hubbell in South Norwalk, Conn., has become a member of the latter firm. He was recently married to Miss Alice Jane Fahy of New Haven. '10 Charles V. Porter, Jr., has entered a law firm which is to be known as Taylor, Smitherman, and Porter, with offices at the Reymond Building, Baton Rouge, La. '11-S. Edward Hannestead is managing clerk in the firm of Kinnery, Prosser, Anderson, and Marx, Stangenwald Building, Honolulu, H. I. His address is 1266 Matloch Avenue, Honolulu. '11-Clement R. Wood was appointed assistant city attorney of Birmingham, Ala., on Aug. 1. He was elected judge of the Recorder's Court of Birmingham by the city commission on Oct. 25. His address is City Hall, Birmingham, Ala. '11-Charles W. Darling has removed his office from 87 Nassau Street to 100 Broadway, New York City, where he is associated with John C. Coleman, '81. '11-Ernest L. Inglis has been elected town attorney of Middletown, Conn. '12-Henry C. Clark may be addressed in care of the Y. M. C. A., Jacksonville, Fla. '12-Oswald P. Backus, Jr., is practicing law in Rochester, N. Y. YALE LAW JOURNAL Vol. XXII FEBRUARY, 1913 No. 4 THE ESSENTIALS OF A LAW ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL COURT* The First Hague Conference created the permanent Court of Arbitration, which was its highest achievement. The Second Hague Conference proposed the establishment of an International Court of Prize and a Court of Arbitral Justice, and upon these its fame will forever endure. In the First Conference the idea of the creation of an International Court had been promptly laid aside as soon as it was suggested, it being regarded as impracticable, if not impossible. The acceptance of the proposal by forty-five nations in the Second Conference marks the rapid progress of this movement. An International Prize Court presupposes the existence of war as the capture of private property of neutrals is only permitted in maritime warfare. It is a war court and is without jurisdiction of controversies arising in peace. To establish such a court was indeed desirable, but even more desirable was the establishment of a court which should not presuppose the existence of war, but which should be clothed with authority to pass upon controversies arising in times of peace, and which if not amicably settled might lead to war. The Permanent Court established in 1899 lacked the essential qualities of a court. To call it a court at all is decidedly a misnomer, and to apply the term permanent to a tribunal temporary in its character is an even greater fiction. It is a tribunal of arbi * Address delivered in Washington, D. C., on December 20, 1912, before the American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, by Henry Wade Rogers, Dean of the Yale Law School. |