gress, which was law in the statute book, and a nullity on the judicial records! was it not the wisest to wait the natural dissolution of the corporation rather than accelerate that event by a repealing law involving so many delicate considerations?

When gentlemen attempt to carry this measure upon the ground of acquiescence or precedent, do they forget that we are not in Westminster Hall? In courts of justice, the utility of uniform decision, exacts of the judge a conformity to the adjudication of his predecessor. In the interpretation and administration of the law, this practice is wise and proper, and without it, every thing depending upon the caprice of the judge, we should have no security for our dearest rights. It is far otherwise when applied to the source of legislation. Here no rule exists but the constitution, and to legislate upon the ground merely that our predecessors thought themselves authorized, under similar circumstances, to legislate, is to sanctify error and to perpetuate usurpation. But if we are to be subjected to the trammels of precedent, I claim on the other hand, the benefit of the restrictions inder which the intelligent judge cautiously receives them. It is an stablished rule, that to give a previous adjudication any effect, the nind of the judge who pronounced it, must have been awakened to he subject, and it must have been a deliberate opinion, formed after full argument. In technical language, it must not have been sub silentio. Now the acts of 1804 and 1807, relied upon as pledges for the rechartering this company, passed not only without any discussion whatever of the constitutional power of Congress to establish a Bank, but I venture to say, without a single member having had his attention drawn to this question. I had the honor of a seat in the Senate, when the latter law passed, probably voted for it, and I declare with the utmost sincerity, that I never once thought of that point, and I appeal confidently to every honorable member who was then present, to say if that was not his situation.

This doctrine of precedents, applied to the legislature, appears to me to be fraught with the most mischievous consequences. The great advantage of our system of government over all others, is, that we have a written constitution, defining its limits, and prescribing its authorities; and, that, however, for a time, faction may convulse the nation, and passion and party prejudice sway its functionaries, the season of reflection, will recur, when calmly retracing their deeds,

all aberrations from fundamental principle will be corrected. But once substitute practice for principle-the exposition of the constitution for the text of the constitution, and in vain shall we look for the instrument in the instrument itself! It will be as diffused and intangible as the pretended constitution of England :-and must be sought for in the statute book, in the fugitive journals of Congress, and in reports of the Secretary of the Treasury! What would be our condition if we were to take the interpretations given to that sacred book, which is, or ought to be, the criterion of our faith, for the book itself? We should find the Holy Bible buried beneath the interpretations, glosses, and comments of councils, synods, and learned divines, which have produced swarms of intollerant and furious sects, partaking less of the mildness and meekness of their origin than of a vindictive spirit of hostility towards each other! They ought to afford us a solemn warning to make that constiution which we have sworn to support, our invariable guide.

I conceive then, sir, that we were not empowered by the constitution, nor bound by any practice under it, to renew the charter of this Bank, and I might here rest the argument. But as there are strong objections to the renewal on the score of expediency, and as the distresses which will attend the dissolution of the Bank, have been greatly exaggerated, I will ask for your indulgence for a few moments longer. That some temporary inconvenience will arise, I shall not deny; but most groundlessly have the recent failures in New York been attributed to the discontinuance of this Bank. As well might you ascribe to that cause the failures of Amsterdam and Hamburg, of London and Liverpool. The embarrassments of commerce -the sequestrations in France-the Danish captures-in fine, the belligerent edicts, are the obvious sources of these failures. Their immediate cause in the return of bills upon London, drawn upon the faith of unproductive or unprofitable shipments. Yes, sir, the protests of the notaries of London, not those of New York, have occasioned these bankruptcies.

The power of a nation is said to consist in the sword and the purse. Perhaps at last all power is resolvable into that of the purse, for with it you may command almost every thing else. The specie circulation of the United States is estimated by some calculators at ten millions of dollars, and if it be no more, one moiety is in the vaults of

this Bank. May not the time arrive when the concentration of such a vast portion of the circulating medium of the country in the hands of any corporation, will be dangerous to our liberties? By whom is this immense power wielded? By a body, who, in derogation of the great principle of all our institutions, responsibility to the people, is amenable only to a few stockholders, and they chiefly foreigners. Suppose an attempt to subvert this government-would not the traitor first aim by force or corruption to acquire the treasure of this company? Look at it in another aspect. Seven-tenths of its capital are in the hands of foreigners, and these foreigners chiefly English subjects. We are possibly on the eve of a rupture with that nation. Should such an event occur, do you apprehend that the English premier would experience any difficulty in obtaining the entire control of this institution? Republics, above all other governments, ought most seriously to guard against foreign influence. All history proves that the internal dissentions excited by foreign intrigue, have produced the downfall of almost every free government that has hitherto existed; and yet, gentlemen contend that we are benefitted by the possession of this foreign capital! If we could have its use, without its attending abuse, I should be gratified also. But it is in vain to expect the one without the other. Wealth is power, and, under whatsoever form it exists, its proprietor, whether he lives on this or the other side of the Atlantic, will have a proportionate influence. It is argued that our possession of this English capital gives us a great influence over the British government. If this reasoning be sound, we had better revoke the interdiction as to aliens holding land, and invite foreigners to engross the whole property, real and personal, of the country. We had better at once exchange the condition of independent proprietors for that of stewards. We should then be able to govern foreign nations, according to the reasoning of the gentleman on the other side. But let us put aside this theory, and appeal to the decisions of experience. Go to the other side of the Atlantic, and see what has been achieved for us there by Englishmen holding seven-tenths of the capital of this Bank. Has it released from galling and ignominious bondage one solitary American seaman bleeding under British oppression? Did it prevent the un. manly attack upon the Chesapeake ? Did it arrest the promulgation, or has it abrogated the orders of council-those orders which have given birth to a new era in commerce? In spite of all its boasted effect, are not the two nations brought to the very brink of war?

Are we quite sure, that on this side of the water, it has had no effect favorable to British interests? It has often been stated, and although I do not know that it is susceptible of strict proof, I believe it to be a fact that this Bank exercised its influence in support of Jay's treaty and may it not have contributed to blunt the public sentiment, or paralyze the efforts of this nation against British aggression.

The duke of Northumberland is said to be the most considerable stockholder in the Bank of the United States. A late lord chancellor of England besides other noblemen, was a large stockholder. Suppose the prince of Essling, the duke of Cadore, and other French dignitaries owned seven-eighths of the capital of the Bank, should we witness the same exertions (I allude not to any made in the Senate) to re-charter it? So far from it, would not the danger of French influence be resounded throughout the nation?

I shall therefore give my most hearty assent to the motion for striking out the first section of the bill.

ON THE BANK CHARTER.

AT LEXINGTON, KENTUCKY, JUNE 3, 1816.

[Mr. CLAY's speech on the question of chartering the Bank of the United States in 1816 was not reported; but in an Address to his Constituents, published in the Kentucky Gazette, Lexington, June 3d, 1816, he gave the substance of it, as follows:]

On one subject, that of the Bank of the United States, to which, at the late session of Congress, I gave my humble support, I feel particularly anxious to explain the grounds on which I acted. This explanation, if not due to my own character, the State and district to which I belong have a right to demand. It would have been unnecessary, if my observations, addressed to the House of Representatives, pending the measure, had been published; but they were not published, and why they were not published, I am unadvised.

When I was a member of the Senate of the United States, I was induced to oppose the renewal of the charter of the old Bank of the United States, by three general considerations. The first was, that I was instructed to oppose it by the Legislature of the State. What were the reasons that operated with the Legislature, in giving the instruction, I do not know. I have understood from members of that body, at the time it was given, that a clause, declaring that Congress had no power to grant the charter, was stricken out; from which it might be inferred, either that the Legislature did not believe a bank unconstitutional, or that it had formed no opinion on that point. This inference derives additional strength from the fact, that, although the two late Senators from this State, as well as the present Senators, voted for a National Bank, the Legislature, which must have been well apprised that such a measure was in contemplation, did not again interpose, either to protest against the measure itself, or to censure the conduct of those Senators. From this silence on the part of a body which has ever fixed a watchful eye upon the pro

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