Page images
PDF
EPUB

which, until this administration, has never, since its adoption, been thoroughly examined or considered. A power, the abuses of which, as developed under this administration, if they be not checked and corrected, must inevitably tend to subvert the constitution, and overthrow public liberty. A standing army has been in all free countries, a just object of jealousy and suspicion. But is not a corps of one hundred thousand dependents upon government, actuated by one spirit, obeying one will, and aiming at one end, more dangerous and formidable than a standing army? The standing army is separated from the mass of society, stationed in barracks or military quarters, and operates by physical force. The official corps is distributed and ramified throughout the whole country, dwelling in every city, village, and hamlet, having daily intercourse with society, and operates on public opinion. A brave people, not yet degenerated, and devoted to liberty, may successfully defend themselves against a military force. But if the official corps is aided by the executive, by the post-office department, and by a large portion of the public press, its power is invincible. That the operation of the principle which subjects to the will of one man the tenure of all offices, which he may vacate at pleasure, without assigning any cause, must be to render them subservient to his purposes, a knowledge of human nature, and the short experience which we have had, clearly demonstrate

It may be asked why has this precedent of 1789 not been reviewed? Does not the long acquiescence in it prove its propriety? It has not been re-examined for several reasons. In the first place, all feel and own the necessity of some more summary and less expensive and less dilatory mode of dismissing delinquents from subordinate offices than that of impeachment, which, strictly speaking, was perhaps the only one in the contemplation of the framers of the constitution; certainly it is the only one for which it expressly provides. Then, under all the predecessors of the President, the power was mildly and beneficially exercised, having been always, or with very few exceptions, applied to actual delinquents. Notwithstanding all that has been said about the number of removals which were made during Mr. Jefferson's administration, they were, in fact, comparatively few. And yet he came into power as the head of a great party, which for years had been systematically excluded from the executive patronage; a plea which cannot be urged in excuse for the present chief magistrate. It was reserved for him to act on the bold and daring principle of

dismissing from office those who had opposed his election; of dismissing from office for mere difference of opinion!

But it will be argued that if the summary process of dismission be expedient in some cases, why take it away altogether? The bill under consideration does not disturb the power. By the usage of the government, not I think by the constitution, the President practically possesses the power to dismiss those who are unworthy of holding these offices. By no practice or usage, but that which he himself has created, has he the power to dismiss meritorious officers only because they differ from him in politics. The principal object of the bill is to require the President, in cases of dismission, to communicate the reasons which have induced him to dismiss the officer; in other words, to make an arbitrary and despotic power a responsible power. It is not to be supposed that, if the President is bound publicly to state his reasons, that he would act from passion or ca· price, or without any reason. He would be ashamed to avow that he discharged the officer because he opposed his election. And yet this mild regulation of the power is opposed by the friends of the ndministration! They think it unreasonable that the President should state his reasons. If he has none, perhaps it is.

But, Mr. President, although the bill is, I think, right in principle, it does not seem to me to go far enough. It makes no provision for the insufficiency of the reasons of the President, by restoring or doing justice to the injured officer. It will be some, but not sufficient restraint against abuses. I have, therefore, prepared an amendment, which I beg leave to offer, but which I will not press against the decided wishes of those having the immediate care of the bill. By this amendment,* as to all offices created by law, with certain ex

*The amendment was in the following words:

Be it further enacted, That in all instances of appointment to office, by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, the power of removal shall be exercised only in concurrence with the Senate; and when the Senate is not in session, the President may suspend any such officer, communicating his reasons for the suspension during the first month of its succeeding session, and if the Senate concur with him the officer shall be removed, but if it do not concur with him, the officer shall be restored to office.

Mr. CLAY was subsequently induced not to urge his amendment at this time

ceptions, the power at present exercised is made a suspensory power. The President may, in the vacation of the Senate, suspend the officer, and appoint a temporary successor. At the next session of the Senate he is to communicate his reasons: and if they are deemed sufficient, the suspension is confirmed, and the Senate will pass upon the new officer. If insufficient, the displaced officer is to be restored. This amendment is substantially the same proposition as one which I submitted to the consideration of the Senate at its last session.— Under this suspensory power, the President will be able to discharge all defaulters or delinquents; and it cannot be doubted that the Senate will concur in all such dismissions. On the other hand, it will insure the integrity and independence of the officer, since he will feel that if he honestly and faithfully discharges his official duties, he cannot be displaced arbitrarily, or from mere caprice, or because he has independently exercised the elective franchise.

It is contended that the President cannot see that the laws are faithfully executed, unless he possesses the power of removal. That injunction of the constitution imports a mere general superintendence, except where he is specially charged with the execution of a law. It is not necessary that he should have the power of dismission. It will be a sufficient security against the abuses of subordinate officers that the eye of the President is upon them, and that he can communicate their delinquency. The State Executives do not possess this power of dismission. In several, if not all, the States, the Governor cannot even dismiss the Secretary of State; yet we have heard no complaints of the inefficiency of State Executives, or of the administration of the laws of the States. The President has no power to dismiss the judiciary; and it might be asked, with equal plausibility, how he could see that the laws are executed, if the judges will not conform to his opinion, and he cannot dismiss them?

But it is not necessary to argue the general question, in considering either the original bill or the amendment. The former does not touch the power of dismission, and the latter only makes it conditional instead of being absolute.

It may be said that there are certain great officers, heads of departments and foreign ministers, between whom and the president entire confidence should exist. This is admitted. But surely if the Presi

dent removes any of them, the people ought to know the cause. The amendment, however, does not reach those classes of officers. And supposing, as I do, that the legislative authority is competent to regulate the exercise of the power of dismission, there can be no just cause to apprehend that it will fail to make such modifications and exceptions as may be called for by the public interest; especially as whatever bill may be passed must obtain the approbation of the chief magistrate. And if it should attempt to impose improper restrictions upon the executive authority, that would furnish a legitimate occasion for the exercise of the veto. In conclusion, I shall most heartily vote for the bill, with or without the amendment which I have proposed.

ON THE LAND DISTRIBUTION.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, DECEMBER 24, 1835..

[Former attempts to procure a Distribution to the several States of the Proceeds of the Public Lands having been baffled by Executive influence and the Executive Veto, Mr. CLAY, on the day above indicated, introduced the plan anew, advocating it as follows:]

ALTHOUGH I find myself borne down by the severest affliction with which Providence has ever been pleased to visit me, I have thought that my private griefs ought not longer to prevent me from attempting, ill as I feel qualified, to discharge my public duties. And I now rise, in pursuance of the notice which has been given, to ask leave to introduce a bill to appropriate, for a limited time, the proceeds of the sales of the public lands of the United States, and for granting land to certain States.

I feel it incumbent on me to make a brief explanation of the highly important measure which I have now the honor to propose. The bill, which I desire to introduce, provides for the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands in the years 1833, '34, '35, '36 and '37, among the twenty-four States of the Union, and conforms substantially to that which passed in 1833. It is therefore of a temporary character; but if it shall be found to have a salutary operation, it will be in the power of a future Congress to give it an indefinite continuance, and, if otherwise, it will expire by its own terms. In the event of war unfortunately breaking out with any foreign power, the bill is to cease, and the fund which it distributes is to be applied to the prosecution of the war. The bill directs that ten per cent. of the nett proceeds of the public lands, sold within the limits of the seven new States, shall be set apart for them, in addition to the five per cent. reserved by their several compacts with the United States; and that theresidue of the proceeds, whether from sales made in the States or Territories, shall be divided among the twenty-four States in pro

« PreviousContinue »