ON INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MARCH 13, 1818.

[The subject of Internal Improvement, and of the aid which ought to be afforded it by the Federal Government, began deeply to agitate the public mind, soon after the close of our last War with Great Britain. New York commenced her gigantic undertaking, (as it then truly seemed,) and called upon Congress for assistance. Other sections also presented claims, and urged them with earnestness and force A report in favor of appropriating the bonus paid for her charter by the United States Bank to this purpose, was made by a Select Committee. The general question being under discussion, Mr. CLAY addressed the House as follows:]

I HAVE been anxious to catch the eye of the Chairman for a few moments, to reply to some of the observations which have fallen from various gentlemen. I am aware that, in doing this, I risk the loss of what is of the utmost value-the kind favor of the House, wearied as its patience is by this prolonged debate. But when I feel what a deep interest the Union at large, and particularly that quarter of it whence I come, has in the decision of the present question, I cannot omit any opportunity of earnestly urging upon the House the propriety of retaining the important power which this question involves. It will be recollected, that if unfortunately there should be a majority both against the abstract proposition asserting the power, and against its practical execution, the power is gone for ever the question is put at rest so long as the constitution remains as it is; and with respect to any amendment, in this particular, I confess I utterly despair. It will be borne in mind, that the bill which passed Congress on this subject, at the last session, was rejected by the late President of the United States; that at the commencement of the present session, the President communicated his clear opinion, after every effort to come to a different conclusion, that Congress does not possess the power contended for, and called upon us to take up the subject in the shape of an amendment to the Con

stitution; and, moreover, that the predecessor of the present and late Presidents, has also intimated his opinion that Congress does not pos- . sess the power. With the great weight and authority of the opinions of these distinguished men against the power, and with the fact, solemnly entered upon the record, that this House, after a deliberate review of the ground taken by it at the last session, has decided against the existence of it, (if such, fatally, shall be the decision,) the power, I repeat, is gone-gone for ever, unless restored by an amendment of the constitution. With regard to the practicability of obtaining such an amendment, I think it altogether out of the question. Two different descriptions of persons, entertaining sentiments directly opposed, will unite and defeat such an amendment; one embracing those who believe that the constitution, fairly inter preted, already conveys the power, and the other, those who think that Congress has not and ought not to have it. As a large portion of Congress, and probably a majority, believes the power to exist, it must be evident, if I am right in supposing that any considerable number of that majority would vote against an amendment which they do not believe necessary, that any attempt to amend would fail. Considering, as I do, the existence of the power as of the first importance, not merely to the preservation of the Union of the States, paramount as that consideration ever should be over all others, but to the prosperity of every great interest of the country, agriculture, manufactures, commerce, in peace and in war, it becomes us solemnly, and deliberately, and anxiously to examine the constitution, and not to surrender it, if fairly to be collected from a just interpretation of that instrument.

For

With regard to the alarm sought to be created as to the nature of the power, by bringing up the old theme of "State Rights," I would observe, that if the illustrious persons just referred to are against us in the construction of the constitution, they are on our side as to the harmless and beneficial character of the power. it is not to be conceived that each of them would have recommended an amendment to the constitution, if they believed that the possession of such a power, by the General Government, would be detrimental, much less dangerous, to the independence and liberties of the States. What real ground is there for this alarm? Gentlemen have not condescended to show how the subversion of the rights of the States is to follow from the exercise of the power of internal im

provements by the General Government. We contend for the power to make roads and canals, to distribute the intelligence, force, and productions of the country through all its parts; and for such jurisdiction only over them as is necessary to their preservation from wanton injury and from gradual decay. Suppose such a power is sustained and in full operation; imagine it to extend to every canal made, or proposed to be made, and to every post-road, how inconsiderable and insignificant is the power in a political point of view, limited as it is with regard to place and to purpose, when contrasted with the great mass of powers retained by the state sovereignties! What a small subtraction from the mass! Even upon these roads and canals, the state governments, according to our principles, will still exercise jurisdiction over every possible case arising upon them, whether of crime or of contract, or any other human transaction, except only what immediately affects their existence and preservation. Thus defined, thus limited, and striped of all factitious causes of alarm, I will appeal to the candor of gentlemen to say if the power really presents any thing frightful in it? With respect to post-roads, our adversaries admit the right of way in the general government. There have been, however, on this question, some instances of conflict, but they have passed away without any serious difficulty. Connecticut, if I have been rightly informed, disputed, at one period, the right of passage of the mail on the Sabbath. The general government persisted in the exercise of the right, and Connecticut herself and every body else, have acquiesced in it.

The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. H. Nelson) has contended that I do not adhere, in the principles of construction which I apply to the constitution, to the republican doctrines of 1798, of which that gentleman would have us believe he is the constant disciple. Let me call the attention of the committee to the celebrated state paper to which we both refer for our principles in this respect-a paper which, although I have not seen it for sixteen years, (until the genteman had the politeness to furnish me with it during this debate,) made such an impression on my mind, that I shall never forget the satisfaction with which I perused it. I find that I have used, without having been aware of it, when I formerly addressed the committee, almost the same identical language employed by Mr. Madison in that paper. It will be recollected that I claimed no right to excrcise any power under the constitution, unless such power was ex

pressly granted, or necessary and proper to carry into effect some granted power. I have not sought to derive power from the clause which authorizes Congress to appropriate money. I have been contented with endeavoring to show, that according to the doctrines of 1798, and according to the most rigid interpretation which any one will put upon the instrument, it is expressly given in one case, and fairly deducible in others.

[Here Mr. Clay read sundry passages from Mr. Madison's report to the Virginia legislature, in an answer to the resolutions of several States, concerning the Alien and Sedition laws, snowing that there were no powers in the general government but what were granted, and that, whenever a power was claimed to be exercised by it, such power must be shown to be granted, or to be necessary and proper to carry anto effect one of the specified powers.]

It will be remarked, that Mr. Madison, in his reasoning on the constitution, has not employed the language fashionable during this debate; he has not said that an implied power must be absolutely necessary to carry into effect the specified power, to which it is appurtenant, to enable the general government to exercise it. No! This was a modern interpretation of the constitution. Mr. Madison has employed the language of the instrument itself, and has only contended that the implied power must be necessary and proper to carry into effect the specified power. He has only insisted that when Congress applied its sound judgment to the constitution in relation to implied powers, it should be clearly seen that they were necessary and proper to effectuate the specified powers. These are my principles; but they are not those of the gentleman from Virginia and his friends on this occasion. They contend for a degree of necessity absolute and indispensable; that by no possibility can the power be otherwise executed.

That there are two classes of powers in the constitution, I believe has never been controverted by an American politician. We cannot foresee and provide specifically for all contingencies. Man and his language are both imperfect. Hence the existence of construction and of constructive powers. Hence also the rule that a grant of the end is a grant of the means. If you amend the constitution a thousand times, the same imperfection of our nature and our language will attend our new works. There are two dangers to which we are exposed. The one is, that the general government may relapse into the debility which existed in the old confederation,

and finally dissolve from the want of cohesion. The denial to it of powers plainly conferred, or clearly necessary and proper to execute the conferred powers, may produce this effect. And I think, with great deference to the gentlemen on the other side, this is the danger to which their principles directly tend. The other danger, that of consolidation, is, by the assumption of powers not granted nor incident to granted powers, or the assumption of powers which have been withheld or expressly prohibited. This was the danger of the period of 1798-9. For instance, that in direct contradiction to a prohibitory clause of the constitution, a sedition act was passed; and an alien law was also passed, in equal violation of the spirit, if not of the express provisions of the constitution. It was by such measures that the Federal party, (if parties might be named,) throwing off the veil, furnished to their adversaries the most effectual ground of opposition. If they had not passed those acts, I think it highly probable that the current of power would have continued to flow in the same channel; and the change of parties in 1801, so auspicious to the best interests of the country, as I believe, would never have occurred.

I beg the committee-I entreat the true friends of the confederated union of these States, to examine this doctrine of State rights, and see to what abusive, if not dangerous consequences, it may lead, to what extent it has been carried, and how it has varied by the same State at different times. In alluding to the State of Massachusetts, I assure the gentlemen from that State, and particularly the honorable chairman of the committee to whom the claim of Massachusetts has been referred, that I have no intention to create any prejudice against that claim. I hope that when the subject is taken up, it will be candidly and dispassionately considered, and that a decision will be made on it consistent with the rights of the Union, and of the State of Massachusetts. The high character, amiable disposition, and urbanity of the gentleman to whom I have alluded, (Mr. Mason of Massachusetts,) will, if I had been otherwise inclined, prevent me from endeavoring to make impressions unfavorable to the claim whose justice that gentleman stands pledged to manifest. But in the period of 1798-9, what was the doctrine promulgated by Massachusetts ? It was that the States in their sovereign capacity had no right to examine into the constitutionality or expediency of the measures of the general government.