Facts, Values, and Methodology: A New Approach to EthicsScience is not value-free and ethics is not fact-free. Science and ethics should be similar, but they are not. The author indicates how research in ethics is to change in the face of this. Ethicists should accommodate empirical work in their programs and they should take heed of methodologies developed in science and philosophy of science. They should abandon the search for a single overarching theory of morality. Controversies in ethics are often spurious for lack of articulate methodological key concepts. For example, disagreements over the value of general theories are misguided since disputants implicitly use different notions of generality and different notions of theory. An appropriate methodology does not suffice for the resolution of controversies but it is indispensable for consensus. The book argues these theses in a general way and applies them to the subject of egoism and altruism in ethics. Further case studies concern the environment and psychiatric disorders. |
Contents
| 3 | |
| 15 | |
THREE The Facts of Ethics | 37 |
FOUR No Theories for Ethics? | 47 |
Doing Away with Universalizability | 55 |
Casuistry Versus Theory | 64 |
4 | 75 |
Introduction | 81 |
EIGHT Ethics Health Care and Psychiatry | 109 |
Testing Medical Treatments | 110 |
Drugs and Symptoms in Schizophrenia | 112 |
Genetic Determination | 117 |
Bias in Perspective | 123 |
Implications for Ethics | 129 |
Conclusions | 131 |
NINE Responsibility Causal and Moral | 133 |
Moral Ramifications of Rationality | 82 |
Action as a Source of Rational Morality? | 85 |
Choosing Well | 87 |
Conclusions | 90 |
SEVEN The Riddle of Altruism | 93 |
Methodological Preliminaries | 96 |
Expansions of Ethical Egoism | 98 |
Tautologies and Contradictions | 100 |
The Relevance of Empirical Issues | 102 |
Conclusions | 106 |
Interdisciplinarity | 134 |
Causation | 136 |
Causal and Moral Factors | 140 |
Conclusions | 145 |
Works Cited | 147 |
About the Author | 159 |
Index | 161 |
77 | 164 |
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Common terms and phrases
acceptance action analysis argue argument assess assumes assumption behavior bias biased brain Breggin casuistry causal cause Chapter coherence common concepts concerned contextual values controversy criterion critical crucial disciplines disorders dopamine drugs Dynamic Energy Budgets ecology economic ecosystems effects egoism and altruism empirical matters environment environmental ethics ethical egoism ethicists evidence example explain genetic factors genetically determined Gewirth heed the interests human implications influence interdisciplinarity issue Jonsen and Toulmin Longino medical ethics medical treatments medicine methodological criteria monism moral motive neuroleptics normative normative ethics notion overly particular patients persons philosophers play a role pluralism presuppose principles prisoner's dilemma problems psychiatry psychological egoism psychology psychotherapies rational choice theory relevant rescuers schizophrenia science and ethics scientific theories self-interest sense statements Steen subjects substantive symptoms therapy thesis tion trade-offs twins universal universalizability valid value-free value-freedom versus well-being Wenz wrong
Popular passages
Page 19 - I think that a research program in neuroscience and psychology that proceeds on the assumption that humans do possess the capacities for self-consciousness, self-reflection, and selfdetermination, and then asks how the structure of the human brain and nervous system enables the expression of these capacities, will reveal the efficacy of intentional states (understood as very complex sorts of brain states). While this latter assumption does not itself contain normative terms, I think that the decision...
Page 7 - ... naturalism satisfies this demand. It will not be a matter of choice or decision whether an action is cruel or unjust or imprudent or whether it is likely to produce more distress than pleasure. But in satisfying this demand, it introduces a converse deficiency. On a naturalist analysis, moral judgements can be practical, but their practicality is wholly relative to desires or possible satisfactions of the person or persons whose actions are to be guided; but moral judgements seem to say more...
Page 104 - To say that patriots and misers, cowards and heroes all aim exclusively at "their own happiness and welfare" illustrates only how little we can learn about behavior by adducing self-interest. We can always say that the altruist includes the welfare of others in his own utility function. But when the motivational reductionist traces all action to self-love or the rational pursuit of personal advantage, he "makes use of a different language from the rest of his countrymen, and calls things not by their...
Page 19 - ... are surely mediated by our cultures; all we wish to claim is that they are efficacious.) I think further that this desire on Ruth Doell's and my part is, in several ways, an aspect of our feminism. Our preference for a neurobiological model that allows for agency, for the efficacy of intentionality is partly a validation of our (and everyone's) subjective experience of thought, deliberation, and choice. One of the tenets of feminist research is the valorization of subjective experience, and so...
Page 19 - ... the capacities for self-consciousness, self-reflection, and selfdetermination, and then asks how the structure of the human brain and nervous system enables the expression of these capacities, will reveal the efficacy of intentional states (understood as very complex sorts of brain states). While this latter assumption does not itself contain normative terms, I think that the decision to adopt it is motivated by value-laden considerations — by the desire to understand ourselves and others as...
Page 59 - ... bargainers. I find all these three assumptions to be mere Kantian prejudices, whose self-evidence does not survive self-consciousness. They might turn out in the end to be justified claims, but it is time that those who think they are justified produce the justification. Until they do, it remains mere prejudice to demand explicitness, universality, and coercive backing, in any moral guide. For any such guide to be passed on it must be learnable, but one can learn from example. For any such guide...
Page 19 - Doell and I agree. I want to go further and describe what we've done from the perspective of the above philosophical discussion of scientific methodology. Abandoning my polemical mood for a more reflective one, I want to say that, in the end, commitment to one or another model is strongly influenced by values or other contextual features. The models themselves determine the relevance and interpretation of data.
Page 63 - ... balance them intuitively. The aim of this paper is to show that a third, more effective alternative is to specify the norms. (1990, p. 279) Turn now to a case Richardson uses to illustrate his thesis. Consider this seemingly reasonable initial norm and the dubious conclusion to which it leads: (1) it is wrong for lawyers not to pursue their clients' interests by all means that are lawful; (2) in this case of defending an accused rapist, it would lawfully promote the clients's interest to cross-examine...
Page 19 - ... influenced by values or other contextual features. The models themselves determine the relevance and interpretation of data. The linear or complex models are not in turn independently or conclusively supported by data. I doubt for instance that value-free inquiry will reveal the efficacy or inefficacy of intentional states or of physiological factors like hormone exposure in human action. I think instead that a research program in neuroscience that assumes the linear model and sex-gender dualism...
Page 43 - The problem at this stage is not how the interests of others can motivate us to some specific policy of altruistic conduct, but how they can motivate us at all.
References to this book
Animal Consciousness and Animal Ethics: Perspectives from the Netherlands Marcel Dol No preview available - 1997 |