3. The limitation, of eight years, in this section does not embrace time served in either of the offices named, under a pro tem. appointment or the simple holding over to fill a vacancy; Carson v. M'Phetridge, 15-327.

4. Where one has held, by election, the office of clerk of the circuit court for eight years consecutively, he can not, under this section, hold over, on the death without qualifying of the person elected to succeed him. Upon the expiration of such period a vacancy arises, which the board of county commissioners may fill by appointment; Gosman v. State etc., 106-205.

5. A county surveyor is recognized, by section 152, as an administrative officer. His duties, however, are ministerial as well as administrative; State etc. v. Johnson, 105-467.

6. County surveyors in office at the adoption of this constitution did not continue in office after it took effect; Starry v. Winning, 7–311.

153. County and township officers. Judges of circuit courts and prosecuting attorneys are not state, county or township officers; State 2. Tucker, 46-355.

2. If a county officer vacate and abandon his office, by removing to a foreign state, he can not, lawfully, resume the office. Leaving his family in the county, paying his poll tax and voting therein, however, it is no abandonment that he leaves his office in charge of a deputy and is temporarily absent, at Washington city, acting as a door keeper to senate or house of representatives; Yonkey v. State, 27-236.

154. Qualifications of county officers. An inhabitant of a county during one year preceding his appointment to the office of county superintendent is not ineligible thereto because not a citizen thereof during that length of time. A citizen is a native or naturalized person. An inhabitant is one having a fixed and permanent residence in a county; State etc. v. Kilroy, 86-120.

2. A declaration to become a citizen of the United States, with the requisite residence in the state, confers, upon male persons of foreign birth, eligibility to hold any office in the state, except governor, lieutenant governor, senator and representative in the legislature; M'Donel v. State, 90-323; see M'Carthy v. Froelke, 63-507.

156. Residence of officers. Semble; an act which allows civil officers, who enlist in the army, to retain their offices and occupy them by deputy (Stat., 1861, p. 40) so far as applicable to the county auditor is unconstitutional; State v. Allen, 21-516.

2. A county officer who leaves his family in the county, pays his poll tax and votes therein, does not abandon his office, by leaving it in charge of his deputy while he temporarily acts as a door keeper to one of the houses of congress; Yonkey v. State etc., 27-236.

160-1. County Boards. It is competent, for the general assembly, to provide by law that the board of commissioners, of each county, shall constitute a court of inferior jurisdiction and to clothe such court with original jurisdiction and judicial power over claims and accounts against the county, as a corporation, and other matters of local interest; providing for appeals, from its decisions, to courts of superior jurisdiction; State v. Board etc., 101-71.

161. Judicial powers. All judicial powers are vested in the courts of the state. The legislature has no authority to invest any other tribunals, than the courts, with judicial power. It is certain that the legislature can not exercise judicial power; Columbus etc. Co. v. Board etc., 65–427; Doe v. Douglass, 8 B., 10; Young v. State B'k, 4-301.

2. It is not within the power of the legislature, by a special act, directed to a particular case, then pending in court, to direct or change the course of decision in such case; C. C. & I. C. R. Co. v. Board etc., 65-427; see Waldo v. Wallace, 12-569; Trustees v. Ellis, 38-3.

3. It is well settled that the legislature can not confer judicial power on other than judicial officers; Elmore v. Overton, 104-548. The constitutional restraint, as to conferring judicial power upon other than judicial officers, does not, however, prohibit the legislature from entrusting large discretionary powers, in certain cases, to executive, administrative and ministerial officers in matters pertaining to the duties of their respective offices; State etc. v. Johnson, 105-467.

4. The jurisdiction of the superior court of Vanderburgh county is less than that of the circuit court and is, therefore, inferior to the latter. The legislature has power to establish such courts; Smith v. Smith, 77-81; citing Guetig v. State, 66-94; Cropsey v. Henderson, 63-268; Vickery v. Chase, 50-461; Ex p. Wiley, 39-546; Clem v. State, 33-418; Anderson v. State, 28-22; Combs v. State, 26-98.

5. When the judge of a court, in vacation, is engaged in doing acts in vacation

as the appointment of a receiver- he is exercising-quoad hoc the judicial power of the state. His acts and proceedings, in the premises, although had in vacation, are the judicial proceedings of the court, whereof he is judge; Pressley v. Lamb, 105-185. 164. Jurisdiction, of supreme court. The supreme court, by taking and exercising jurisdiction in a cause where the right of appeal does not exist, can not acquire jurisdiction, so as to give force and effect to its rulings, which would be merely obiter dictum; Davis v. Davis, 36-160.

165. Decisions in writing. The provision of this section should receive such construction as to obviate its inconvenience and objectionable character, so far as can be consistently done. Before a question, within the meaning of the section, arises in a record, such question must be fully stated in the transcript. There must be an assignment of error and it must be a question, the decision of which is necessary to the final determination of the cause; Frayser . Trustees, 39-556.

2. This section applies, only, to cases arising under the constitution of 1851; Hand v. Taylor, 4-409.

166. Publication of decisions. The limitation fixed to the price at which the reports of the supreme court shall be sold is constitutional and binding, not only on the reporter but on other parties. No greater price than that authorized by statute can be collected; although the purchaser may have agreed to pay a greater price; Welling v. Merrill, 52-350; Black v. Merrill, 51-32.

2. The reporter can not collect a greater sum; although, by the act he is not required to publish to exceed five hundred volumes and does publish a greater number and sell for a higher price; Black v. Merrill, 51-32.

3. The printed reports of the decisions and of the opinions, of the supreme court, are not competent evidence for the purpose of proving a particular judgment rendered by the court; Donellan v. Hardy, 57-393.

169. Circuit judges. A vacancy in the office of circuit judge can be filled, only, by appointment of the governor; Case v. State, 5-1; see sect. 144, ante.

2. The words "time to time", used in this statute, do not import any particular period. These words will admit, and the common sense of the case would seem to require, that the legislature may create new circuits "from time to time", as in its opinjon and the exigencies of business may require; Stocking v. Stocking, 7–326.

3. The formation, or creation, of judicial circuits, by legislation, and the repeal of such legislation, or its amendment, are matters wholly within the discretion and power of general assembly. Of course, the legislature can not, by any legislation, abridge the constitutional term of office of an elective judge; State v. Johnston, I01-223.

169, 171. Circuit judges - Prosecuting attorneys. General assembly has the power, at discretion, to divide a judicial circuit, at any time, during the terms of the judge and prosecuting attorney of such circuit; subject, only, to the restrictions that the legislature can not, by any legislation, abridge the official terms of either of such officers, nor deprive them of a judicial circuit, wherein each of them may serve out the constitutional term for which each was elected; State v. Johnston, 101-227.

170. Special judges. A statute (1838) which authorized the presiding judge of one circuit to preside in and hold a court for one term, or for a single trial, in another circuit, whose presiding judge was absent, was held not to be invalid; Beauchamp v. State, 6 B., 299.

171. Prosecuting attorneys. Prosecuting attorneys are not state, county or township officers; State v. Tucker, 46-355.

2. Under this section, in connection with section 169 the prosecuting attorney, like the judge of each judicial circuit, is required to reside within his circuit; State v. Johnston, 101-228.

174. Justices of the peace. Justices of the peace are township officers, and must be elected by the qualified voters of the township; Town Spencer v. Cline, 28-51. 176. Ineligibility of judges. One holding a judicial office may, under this section, be elected to an office not judicial, the term of which will commence when his judicial term expires; Smith v. Moore, 90-298.

2. One elected, with his consent, to a judicial office, but, who does not accept the office may, under this section, be afterward elected to a non judicial office, the term of which will run beyond the judicial term to which he was elected. The language used in Waldo v. Wallace, 12-569; Gulick v. New, 14-93 and Howard 7. Shoemaker, 35-111 is limited to cases where the judicial term would run beyond the commencement of the term of the non judicial office to which the person is chosen; Smith v. Moore, 90-298.

3. A judicial officer may be elected to a non judicial office, the term of which will commence after the expiration of the judicial term. The disability, of the constitution, has reference to the taking and holding of the office, merely. So, where the term of a justice of the peace does not expire until midnight of the sixteenth day of the month he is ineligible to hold the office of township trustee, where the term of that office begins on the same day; Vogel v. State, 107-380; see Smith 7. Moore, 90-299.

4. The mayor of a city, under this section, is ineligible to any office, other than a judicial one, during the term for which he was elected. Voters of the county in which he is elected as mayor have notice of such ineligibility; Gulick v. New, 14-93.

5. The office of mayor of a city, organized under the general law, is a judicial office. The incumbent thereof is ineligible to the office of prison director during the term for which he was elected mayor; Howard v. Shoemaker, 35-111.

6. The office of city clerk is not an office "under the state", within the meaning of this section; Mohan v. Jackson, 52-599; nor is a councilman of a city; State v. Kirk, 44-401. 177. Grand jury system. This section confers, upon the legislature, a large discretion as to the manner in which criminal offenses shall be prosecuted; Elder v. State, 96-164.

181. Lawyers. Statute of March 6, 1865 (sect. 2020) disqualifying county recor ders from practising law is not unconstitutional; M'Cracken v. State, 27-491.

2. One who has been practising as an attorney, will be presumed to have been licensed to practise; Ex p. Tripp, 66-531.

182. Common schools. The provisions of this section do not require the legislature to levy all school taxes; nor prohibit it from providing, by a general law, for the levying of school taxes by the local school authorities; Robinson v. Schenck, 102–301. 2. The classification of scholars, on the basis of race or color, and their education in separate schools, involve questions of domestic policy, which are within the legis lative discretion and control and do not amount to an exclusion of either class. The system is equally open to all and is not denied to either white or black. Such classification and requirement, for separate schools for white and black, is lawful; Cory v. Carter, 48-327.

3. The policy of maintaining public common schools, comes within the power possessed by every sovereign state and is, clearly, without the grants to the federal government. Since the 14th amendment to the federal constitution, the common school system, in order to be general, uniform and equally open to all, must provide for the education of colored children; Cory v. Carter, 48-327.

4. This article of the constitution requires that such discrimination be made between that portion of the people who were already provided for and that portion who were not; Quick v. Springfield Tp., 7-636.

183. Common school fund. This section, in so far as it provides for the sale of county seminaries and property held by them, for the purpose of establishing a general system of common schools, is void. It is in violation of section 10 of article I, of the federal constitution, prohibiting the passage of laws impairing the obligations of contracts; Edwards v. Jagers, 19-407; sed vide Com'rs of Randolph Co. v. Heaston, 20–398. 2. The counties of the state are required to bear the expense of protecting, investing and collecting the school fund; State v. Board etc., 90-359; Vanarsdall v. Board etc., 65-184; Board etc. v. State, 103-497; (see sect. 187.)

3. The fact that the penalty prescribed by section 6339, when recovered, is to be paid, in to the county treasury, for the use of the county, does not bring the statute into conflict with this section. Such penalty is not a fine, in the sense in which the word is used in this section; Burgh v. State, 108-135.

183-4. Common school fund-Principal. An act converting the moneys arising from the sale of estrays and property taken up adrift in to the common school fund (stat., 1844, p. 86) is in force and, under its provisions and those of section 4325, all moneys arising from the sale of estray animals and property taken up adrift, so soon as the same shall have vested, absolutely, in any county, become a part of the common school fund of the state; Board etc. v. State, 92-355.

2. Statute of December 21, 1865 (sect. 829), providing for the adoption of children and for their right to inheritance, is not in conflict with these sections. The school fund is composed of the proceeds of escheated lands and the land never becomes a part of the fund; State v. Meyer, 63-33.

184, 187. School fund perpetual-Counties' liability. Action to recover school fund, by the state, is not barred by the statute of limitations; State v. Board etc., 90359; Board etc. v. State, 103-497; Board etc. v. State, 106-272.

2. The statute of limitations (1852) does not bar recovery, against a county, for a misappropriation of funds donated, by the constitution and laws, exclusively to tuition in common schools. The appropriation of any part of it to the payment of officer's fees, for collecting or managing the fund, is wholly unauthorized and in violation of the trust and it is not in the power of a county to repudiate the wrong; State v. Board etc., 90-362.

3. The statute of limitations is not available, as a defense to an action, by the state against a county, to recover the amount of fees erroneously paid, out of the common school fund, to county officers, for collecting and disbursing the same; Board etc. v. State, 106-533.

4. The constitution requires that the interest derived from the congressional township fund shall be distributed to, or remain with, the congressional townships alike unequally, as the fund is, itself, unequal, as between such townships. The proceeds of the entire school fund (of which the congressional township fund is to be considered, in the distribution, as a part) are to be distributed so as to produce equality and uniformity, in the school system, throughout the state. The proceeds of said fund, other than the interest of the congressional township fund, must be unequally distributed; Quick v. W. W. Tp., 7-570.

185, 187. Investment and distribution-Counties' liability. In order to harmonize these sections, the word "invest", in section 185, must be construed to embrace loans at interest; Shoemaker v. Smith, 37-122.

188. Trust funds inviolate. A statute which diverts the proceeds of the sale of sixteenth sections from the use of schools, in the several congressional townships, respectively, to the use of the school system of the state at large (school law, 1852) is in contravention of this section; State v. Springfield Tp., 6-83; sed vide modifications; Linch. Springfield Tp., 7-636; Edwards v. Jagers, 19-407; Davis v. State, 44-38.

193. Assessment and taxation. The exception of certain properties from taxation, by law, provided for, in this section, do not contravene the provisions of section 68; City Ind'polis v. Sturdevant, 24-391.

2. This section does not require that the rate of assessment shall be uniform and equal for all purposes throughout the state. Its meaning is that the rate of assessment and taxation must be uniform and equal throughout the locality in which the tax is levied. If for state purposes the tax must be equal and uniform in all parts of the state; if for county purposes the tax must be uniform in all parts of the county. So in townships, if for township or road purposes; L., M. & B. R. R. Co. v. Geyer, 34-185; Bright v. M'Cullough, 27-223.

3. This section does not mean that the rate of assessment shal! be "uniform and equal", for all purposes, throughout the state (City Richmond v. Scott, 48-568). It, however, does, clearly, require a uniform and equal rate throughout the locality in which the particular tax is levied; if for state purposes, then in all parts of the state alike; if for county purposes, in the entire county; and, so in township, town or city, for the local purposes of each (Lafay, etc. R. R. Co. v. Geiger, 34-185; Bright v. M'Cullough, 27-223); Loftin v. Cit. Nat. B'k, 85-345. 4. The word " assessment", as used in this section, is the act of adjudging the shares of contribution of several, toward a common beneficial object, according to the benefit received; and it is “uniform and equal”", when it is so throughout the locality where imposed; Palmer v. Stumph, 29-329.

5. A charitable purpose", means a public charity, use or purpose, which affects the public alike, without reference to an individual class or any particular domestic relation: State v. City Ind'polis, 69-375.

6. This section can have no reference to municipal taxation. There can not be a uniform rate of taxation for municipal purposes; it is regulated by the necessities of respective cities: City Richmond v. Scott, 48-568.

7. This section does not forbid local taxation, under general law; Anderson 7. Kerns Drain. Co., 14-199; Goodrich v. W. & D. Turnp. Co., 26-119; thus, taxes (Stat., March 6, 1865), for turnpike purposes, are permitted; Goodrich v. W. & D. T. Co., 26-119; and, assessments on land, for benefits thereto (stat., June 12, 1852), for drainage purposes, to promote the public health; Anderson v. Kerns Drain. Co., 14199; and, assessments for street improvements, under the statute for the incorporation of cities; Palmer v. Stumph, 29–329.

8. It is competent, for the legislature, to delegate the power of assessing taxes, for local school purposes, to the inhabitants of the various localities. The provision of the law, providing for such local taxation, must, however, be open to all such school

corporations of like character and the statute must be general in its nature and operation; Robinson v. Schenck, 102-310, over'g Greencastle Sch. Tp. v. Black, 5-557 and citing, as adverse to the ruling therein, Root v. Erdelmeyer, 37-225; S. P., Adamson v. Auditor, 9-174; Rose v. Bath Tp., 10-18; City Lafayette v. Jenners, 10-70; Conwell v. O'Brien, 11-419; Covington etc. Co. v. Auditor, 14-331; Niel v. Jenkinson, 15-425; Combs v. State, 26-99; Clem v. State, 43-421; Gentile v. State, 29-409; State v. Tucker, 46-355; Cory v. Carter, 48-327; Kelly v. State, 92-236; Wishmier v. State, 79-162; State v. Gray, 93-303; Mount v. State, 90-29; Gardner v. Haney, 86-17; Sauer v. Twining, 81-366; State v. Board etc., 101-96.

9. Indirect taxation, in the form of license on particular pursuits, is not within the meaning of this section; Bright v. M'Cullough, 27-223.

10. A statute (March 11, 1867), authorizing plank road and the like road companies to procure assessments on land, in aid of the construction of roads, is constitutional; R. R. T. Co. v. Scott, 32-37; S. C., 32-325; Law v. M., S. & G. T. Co., 30–77.

II. Local taxation for local purposes is not unconstitutional; Anderson v. Kerns Drain. Co., 14–199.

12. A statute conferring authority to tax must be general; but, the exercise of the authority need not be uniform throughout the state. Township trustees may levy a tax for building a school house; Adamson v. Auditor, 9-174.

13. A statute providing that persons residing outside of and electing to be transferred to any city or town, for educational purposes (sect. 4474), or who shall send their children to a school taught in any building in such city or town, on which a debt has been contracted, shall, with their property, be liable to taxation, for the purpose of paying such debt, is constitutional; Kent v. Town Kentland, 62–291.

194. Payment of public debt. State officers have no authority to pay interest on the state debt, unless appropriations be made for that purpose. State revenues, designed for the liquidation of such indebtedness, must, first, be paid in to the treasury of the state and paid out, only, in accordance with law. An appropriation of money to a specific object is an authority to the proper officers to pay money. Such an appropriation may be made in different modes and it may be prospective; but, the pledge of the faith of the state that revenues shall be provided, in the future, and applied in discharge of certain claims, against the state, will not authorize state officers to apply the general fund to the payment of those claims; Ristine v. State, 20-328, 345.

195. Appropriations. Separate resolutions of each branch of the general assembly, authorizing payments, can not amend or vary the provisions of a statute making appropriations; Rice v. Drapier, 95-47.

2. Setting apart (stat. April 6, 1885, p. 129, § 10) of so much of the county revenue as is necessary to pay the cost of repairs provided for, by the statute, is a sufficient appropriation, made by law, within this section; State v. Johnson, 105-468.

3. The justice of a claimant's claim (in this case apparent and unquestioned) does not authorize courts to require, by mandate, the auditor of state to issue his warrant, or the treasurer of state to pay such warrant, for the amount of such claim, where no money is set apart for such purpose, by an appropriation made by law; State v. Potter, 89-267.

198. Counties can not take stock. The phrase "incorporated company ", in this section, refers to those associations which are created for the public benefit, to which is delegated some sovereign power, to be exercised for public utility; such as turnpike and rail road companies; L., M. & B. R. R. Co. v. Geiger, 34-185.

2. Counties may be authorized to subscribe for stock, in rail road companies, if they pay money for it, at the time of subscription, but, only then; L., M. & B. R. R. Co. v. Geiger, 34-185; see City Aurora v. West, 9-74.

3. A county may not issue bonds in aid of a rail road company unless authorized by express affirmative legislation. Bonds issued without such authority are void; Board etc. v. M'Clintock, 51-325: Harney v. I., C. & D. R. R. Co., 32–244.

4. Statute of May 12, 1869, section 17, is constitutional, inasmuch as, under it, counties can not take stock in any incorporated company (for aiding rail roads) without paying the money down; Board etc. v. L., N. A. & St. L., A., L. R. R. Co., 39-192. 5. The prohibition of this section does not reach townships. No such prohibition in regard to townships is to be found in the constitution; Scott v. Hausheer, 94-13; see Bittinger v. Bell, 65-457.

200-1. Incorporation of banks. No bank of issue, except a state bank and free, or private, bank pursuant to the provisions of a general banking law, can be established; Brown v. Killian, 11-449.