every man for himself, merely from the abstract reason and fitness of things.

I shall conclude this chapter with observing, that as this writer is for discarding all authority in matters of religion and morality, so he would endeavour to persuade us that the gospel does so too. That our Saviour and his apostles, especially St. Paul, disclaim all pretence to authority, and place the whole proof in the nature of the doctrines they taught, which was to make its way to the hearts and consciences of men merely by its own force and energy. pp. 23, 24, 33, 41, 42. Our author often affects to talk of the intrinsic evidence of the doctrines of the gospel, and would put it upon the world, as if he was a better friend to Christianity who puts the proof of its doctrines upon their own internal immutable evidence, than others who put the proof upon a divine authority or testimony, confirmed by miracles. But the design of all this, when examined and compared with other parts of his scheme, is plain enough. It is that no regard is to be paid to the authority of Christ as a teacher sent from God; nor are we to believe any thing he delivers upon his testimony as divine. as divine. The doctrines and laws of the gospel, taught and delivered by Christ and his apostles, are on a level, in point of authority, with the dictates of those philosophers and moralists that never pretended to any extraordinary revelation. And the people are still left to find out the whole of religion and their duty, from the reason and fitness of things, as they were before. But this is entirely to destroy the peculiar use and advantage of the gospel-revelation, which was, leaving all the proofs from nature and reason, to stand in their full force, to assure men of the great important truths and doctrines of religion, and to urge and enforce the duties and precepts of it upon them by a divine authority and testimony.

When our Saviour speaks of a future judgment, and describes the process of the great day; when he assures men of his own coming to judge the world, and of the resurrection of the dead; when he makes the most express promises and declarations of the pardon of sins, the terms upon which it is to be obtained, of the gracious assistances of the Holy Spirit, and of eternal life to be conferred as the reward of our sincere though imperfect obedience; when he proposes himself as the Saviour of mankind, and urges the most pure and excellent laws, and self-denying precepts, &c. does he urge these things merely by reasoning at large upon them, after the manner of philosophers and moralists, by arguments drawn from the nature of the thing? It is evident, that he assures men of these things, and urges them upon their own consciences in a way of divine authority, as one who spoke in the name and by the authority of God himself, and who was extraordinarily sent by him to instruct mankind; and to whose doctrines and laws they were therefore obliged to pay an entire submission and regard. And to convince the world that he was indeed sent of God, as he professed to be, he wrought the most illustrious miracles, visibly transcending all human power, and appealed to these miracles as the evident

proofs of his divine authority and mission; and at last confirmed all by his own resurrection from the dead, and ascension into heaven. And his apostles, who were commissioned by him to preach his gospel to all nations, and to teach what he commanded them, were also enabled, in his name and in attestation of the gospel, to perform the most wonderful works, bearing all the signatures of an extraordinary divine interposition, for a series of years together. How great soever the excellency of Christianity is in itself, yet it is plain that it was not by the mere force of its own intrinsic evidence that it prevailed. Yea, as the state of mankind then was, sunk in ignorance and vice, idolatry and superstition, its pure and self-denying precepts, its sublime and heavenly doctrines, the spiritual worship it introduced, in opposition to the reigning admired superstitions and pompous rites of their ancestors, and to the darling vices, passions, and prejudices of mankind, would have proved a great hindrance to men's receiving it. And he must certainly know little of mankind, that can suppose that such a religion as this, propagated and preached by a few poor fishermen and a tent maker, and urged in the name of a person that had been ignominiously crucified by his own nation, should be able to make its way, and establish itself in a wicked, an ignorant, and idolatrous world merely by the force of reason; when it had the power of the magistrates, the interests and artifices of the priests, the eloquence of the orators, the learning of the philosophers, the prejudices of the vulgar, the darling opinions and passions of mankind engaged against it; and had no worldly advantages on its side; but exposed its followers to contempt, obloquy, and reproach, to the most grievous sufferings and persecutions, and even to death itself. That which chiefly rendered Christianity victorious at its first publication, and made way for its reception in the world, was the manifest proofs of an extraordinary interposition from heaven, and a divine power and authority attending it and its first publishers; whereby their hearers were convinced that they were indeed extraordinarily sent of God, and that Jesus Christ was what he professed himself to be, the great appointed teacher and Saviour of mankind, of which God had given assurance, as by the many illustrious and supernatural works he performed, so especially by raising him from the dead.

I doubt not our author will be ready to charge me here, as he has already done, with rejecting the internal rational evidence of the doctrines as appearing to the understanding,' p. 51 or 52. But I am far from rejecting or undervaluing any internal rational evidence that can be brought for any of the doctrines of Christianity. These are left in their full strength, and have the additional attestation and enforcement of a divine authority or testimony. I am persuaded that none of the doctrines of the gospel can be proved to be contrary to any clear principles of right reason; and that they are all of an excellent tendency. But their being agreeable to reason, or having a good tendency, will not alone prove them to be true. Thus. e. g. when St. Paul, whom this au

thor represents as placing the whole stress not upon any external proofs, but solely upon the intrinsic evidence of the doctrines themselves, when he declares in that excellent passage, I Thess. iv. 14-17, that those that sleep, or die 'in Jesus, will God bring with him; that the Lord Jesus will descend from heaven,' &c. and the dead in Christ shall rise first; and that those that remain, and are alive, shall be caught up together in the clouds to meet the Lord in the air; and so shall be for ever with the Lord:' And when in the 15th chapter of his first epistle to the Corinthians, he gives such an excellent account of the resurrection of the dead, and of the glorious change that shall be made upon the bodies of good men at Christ's second coming, and that in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye; this must be owned to be an admirable doctrine; it has something in it very noble, and full of comfort. But nobody will say, that there is any proof of it from the nature of the thing that makes it necessarily trne. It may pass for a fine speculation, but cannot engage or determine the assent of the mind merely by its own intrinsic evidence. But if it comes confirmed by a divine testimony or authority, if I consider it as received by extraordinary revelation from God himself, then I regard what before I might wish to be true, as most certainly true, and to be depended on as such.

But our pretended moral philosopher is for depriving us of this advantage. He sometimes affects to extol the great usefulness of the Christian revelation, for bringing men to a certainty, as to several things of importance, as to which they were uncertain before. But, at the same time, he is for utterly depriving it of its proper authority, as an extraordinary revelation from God. Whatsoever, therefore, was uncertain to the reason of mankind before is so still, since the testimony of this revelation can give no additional weight to it at all. Its heavenly doctrines are of no more force than the speculations of philosophers. Its divine promises are stripped of that which gives them their greatest weight and comfort to the minds of good men, i. e. the word and testimony of God himself. Its glorious hopes are greatly weakened, and amount to little more than some pleasing conjectures, which may amuse, but cannot yield a satisfying certainty. The force of its divine laws, and its powerful and amazing sanctions, are in a great measure defeated, and must very much lose their influence upon mankind, when instead of being regarded. as bound upon us by the express authority and testimony of God, they are regarded as having no greater authority than those proposed by Plato, or any other philosopher, and which men will be apt to slight, and think themselves at liberty to reject, when appetite or interest stands in the way. And this may help us to judge what obligations the world is under to this writer, and of what mighty benefit the scheme he proposes must needs be to mankind.

CHAPTER II.

The question concerning the proper proofs of truth, as coming from God, stated. The author's ambiguities detected. Our not being able to explain the particular manner of extraordinary revelation, or immediate inspiration, no objection against the reality of it. Things originally received in a way of extraordinary revelation from God, capable of being communicated to others, to whom the revelation was not immediately made. Exceptions against this considered and obviated. In what sense miracles may be proofs and evidences of the Divine authority of persons or doctrines. The true notion of miracles, explained. The propositions the author lays down relating to them, examined. His objections against the proof of doctrines from miracles, shown to be vain and inconclusive.

HAVING considered the general principles of our author's book, and which he repeats and refers to on all occasions, and particularly his attempt to show that no authority can be of any use, or is at all to be depended on in matters of religion; and having shown that a revelation by a divine authority or testimony, would be of great advantage in the present state of mankind; it is now natural to inquire what are the proper proofs whereby we may come to know that such a revelation is really given, and that it may be justly received as coming from God, and as of divine authority. For if we have no way of proving that such an extraordinary revelation was ever given, it is the same thing to us as if no such revelation had been really given, since we cannot in that case depend upon its authority, either with regard to the doctrines to be believed, or the duties to be practised. But we are just left to ourselves, as much as if there was no such revelation at all. Accordingly this is the point the moral philosopher appeared to me to labour in his book; and I therefore took it, that the question between us, related to the proofs or evidences of truth as coming from God in a way of extraordinary revelation. And this was what I considered in my first chapter. But now I am corrected by this writer for supposing that in this debate, by truth as coming from God, is to be understood that which comes in a way of extraordinary supernatural revelation. It seems it might be for my purpose to understand it so, but it is not for his, see p. 12, that is, it is not for his purpose to keep close to the point at all, but to be perpetually shifting and doubling, and perplexing the question by the ambiguous senses of the word revelation, and truth as coming from God. By revelation he can sometimes seem to understand what others mean by it, that which comes in an extraordinary supernatural way; and, at other times, intends no more by it than any discovery of truth to the human mind, though be made in the ordinary and natural use of men's own faculties. like manner, by truth as 'coming from God,' it seems he in

tends any truth that hath its original from God in any way whatsoever. And, he supposes, I will not deny, that all truth is from God as the only true original fountain and conveyer of it, p. 44.* But then he ought to consider, that in this sense, truth, as coming from God,' cannot be the appropriated distinguishing character of what he calls moral truth, which, yet, he every where supposes; for he all along mentions moral or divine truth,' and truth as coming from God, as terms of the same signification. But, according to that general notion of truth as coming from God, which he advances in the passage now mentioned, mathematical and metaphysical truth, all the truths of natural philosophy may be as properly called divine truth, and be as justly said to come from God as what he calls moral truth. But the proper question between us is not concerning the evidences we may have of the truth of any thing which we know by a natural and rational proof in the ordinary exercise of our faculties; but it is really this, whether there can be any proofs or evidences given of truths coming from God in a way of extraordinary supernatural revelation; and what those proofs and evidences are.

*It is pleasant enough to hear this writer complaining of me for using the words Divine truth, truth coming from God, inspiration, revelation, &c. in a loose declamatory way, without ever affixing any clear determinate ideas to them,' p. 83. And again, p. 219, that I use these words in a general, loose, and undefined sense. Whereas the charge lies properly against himself. I take these words in one and the same sense throughout my book, the sense in which they are commonly understood in this controversy, as signifying that which comes from God in an extraordinary supernatural way. But he uses these words in a loose, general, and indeterminate sense, as taking in all truth whatsoever, whether it comes in a natural or supernatural way, in the ordinary exercise of our faculties, or by immediate illumination. And because, in the question between us, I am not for taking truth as coming from God in the same loose and general sense that he does, he thinks fit to represent me as ascribing nothing to God at all, but what is supernatural and extraordinary. He very pertinently observes, p. 82, that all things come from God, evil as well as good, punishments as well as mercies; and that all great events, and all extraordinary degrees of wisdom and knowledge, especially in spiritual matters, may be more especially ascribed to him.' And, as if I denied all this, he very gravely complains, that it is impossible for him to please me; for he sees I am resolved never to suffer him to have any thing from God, but that he hopes God will be more merciful to him, if he ascribes every thing to him, and owns himself to be his creature, subject, and absolute dependent. For my part, I will be no hinderance to his pious resolutions, and should be very glad that he gave the world more convincing proofs than he has done in this book, of his ascribing any knowledge or abilities he has to God, by employing them in his service, and in promoting the valuable interests of truth and religion. I am very willing he should ascribe every thing to God but his faults, his falsehoods, and misrepresentations. These I would have him take the credit and merit of wholly to himself. And in this very passage, where he expresses himself so piously disposed, he does not deal very fairly by me. For he would fain have the reader believe, that I will not allow that any thing can be said to come from God at all, except it comes in a supernatural way. And particularly he observes, speaking of me, This author cannot admit any truth to be divine, or to come from God, unless it comes from him immediately by inspiration or revelation,' p. 83, that is, because I say, the proper question between him and me, is not about that which comes from God in a natural way, and in the ordinary use of our faculties, but about that which comes in a way of supernatural extraordinary revelation, therefore I acknowledge no truth at all to come from God in a natural way. This is our author's excellent reasoning, and his candid way of representing the sense of his adversaries. Though it must be owned, he is a little kinder to me, p. 44, where he allows, that I never have denied, and he supposes, I never will, that all truth is f God, as the only true original fountain and conveyer of it.'