dividual concerns. In those cases so important to the peace and happiness of society, the execution of your laws is confided to your judges. And therefore are they rendered independent. Before, then, that you violate that independence, pause; there are state sovereignties, as well as the sovereignty of the general government. There are cases, too many cases, in which the interest of one is not considered as the interest of the other. Should these conflict-if the judiciary be gone, the question is no longer of law but of force. This is a state of things which no honest and wise man can view without horror.

Suppose, in the omnipotence of your legislative authority, you trench upon the rights of your fellow citizens, by passing an unconstitutional law: if the judiciary department preserve its vigour, it will stop you short. Instead of a resort to arms, there will be a happier appeal to argument. Suppose a case still more impressive. The president is at the head of your armies. Let one of his generals, flushed with victory, and proud in command, presume to trample on the rights of your most insignificant citizen. Indignant of the wrong, he will demand the protection of your tribunals, and safe in the shadow of their wings, will laugh his oppressor to scorn.

1

Having now, I believe, examined all the arguments adduced to show the expediency of the motion, and which fairly sifted, reduce themselves at last to these two things: Restore the ancient system, and save the additional expense. Before I close what I have to say on this ground, I hope I shall be pardoned for saying one or two words about the expense. I hope, also, that notwithstanding the epithets which may be applied to my arithmetic, I shall be pardoned for using that which I learnt at school. It may have deceived me when it taught me that two and two make four. But though it should now be branded with opprobrious terms, I must still believe that two and

two do still make four. Gentlemen of newer theories and of higher attainments, while they smile at my inferiority, must bear with my infirmities, and take me as I am.

In all this great system of saving; in all this ostentatious economy, this rage of reform, how happens it that the eagle eye has not yet been turned to the mint? That no one piercing glance has been able to behold the expenditures of that department? I am far from wishing to overturn it. Though it be not of great necessity, nor even of substantial importance, though it be but a splendid trapping of your government; yet, as it may, by impressing on your current coin the emblems of your sovereignty, have some tendency to encourage a national spirit and to foster the national pride, I am willing to contribute my share to its support. Yes, sir, I would foster the national pride; I cannot, indeed, approve of national vanity, nor feed it with vile adulation. But I would gladly cherish the lofty sentiment of national pride. I wish my country to feel like Romans, to be as proud as Englishmen, and going still further, I would wish them to veil their pride in the well bred modesty of French politeness. But can this establishment, the mere decorum of your political edifice, can it be compared with the massy columns on which rest your peace and safety? Shall the striking of a few half-pence be put into a parallel with the distribution of justice? I find, sir, from the estimate on your table, that the salaries of the officers of your mint amount to $10,600, and that the expenses are estimated at 10,900; making $21,500.

I find that the actual expenditure of the last year,

exclusive of salaries, amounted to

Add the salaries,

We have a total of,

$25,154 44 10,600

35,654 44

A sum which exceeds the salary of the sixteen judges.

I find further, that during the last year they have coined cents and half cents to the amount of 10,173 dollars and 29 cents. Thus their copper coinage falls a little short of what it costs us for their salaries. We have, however, from this establishment about a million cents, one to each family in America. A little emblematic medal to be hung over their chimney pieces; and this is all their compensation for all that expense. Yet not a word has been said about the mint, while the judges, whose services are much greater, and of so much importance to the community, are to be struck off at a blow, in order to save an expense which, compared with the object, is piriful. What conclusion then are we to draw from this predilection.

I will not pretend to assign to gentlemen, the motives by which they may be influenced; but if I should permit myself to make the enquiry, the style of so many observations, and more especially the manner, the warmth, the irritability, which has been exhibited on this occasion, would lead to a solution of the problem. I had the honour, sir, when I addressed you the other day, to observe, that I believed the universe could not afford a spectacle more sublime than the view of a powerful state kneeling at the altar of justice, and sacrificing there her passion and her pride. That I once suffered the hope of beholding that spectacle of magnanimity in America. And now what a world of figures, has the gentleman from Virginia formed on his apprehensions of that remark. I never expressed any thing like exultation at the idea of a state ignominiously dragged in triumph at the heels of your judges. But permit me to say, the gentleman's exquisite sensibility on that subject, his alarm and apprehension, all show his strong attachment to state authority. Far be it from me, however, to charge the gentleman with improper motives. I know that his emotions arise

from one of those imperfections in our nature, which we cannot remedy. They are excited by causes which have naturally made him hostile to this constitution, though his duty compels him reluctantly to support it. I hope, however, that those gentlemen, who entertain different sentiments, and who are less irritable on the score of state dignity, will think it essential to preserve a constitution, without which the independent existence of the states themselves will be but of short duration.

This, sir, leads me to the second object I had proposed. I shall therefore pray your indulgence, while I consider how far this measure is constitutional. I have not been able to discover the expediency, but will now for argument sake admit it; and here I certainly cannot but express my deep regret for the situation of an honourable member from North Carolina. Bound as he is, by his instructions, arguments, however forcible, can never be effectual. I ought therefore, to wish for his sake, that his mind may not be convinced by any thing I shall say; for hard indeed would be his condition, to be bound by the contrarient obligations of an order and an oath.

I cannot however but express my profound respect for the talents of those who gave him his instructions, and who sitting at a distance, without hearing the arguments, could better understand the subject than the senator on this floor after full discussion.

The honourable member from Virginia has repeated the distinction before taken between the supreme and the inferior tribunals; he has insisted on the distinction between the words shall and may; has inferred from that distinction, that the judges of the inferior courts are subjects of the legislative discretion, and has contended that the word may includes all power respecting the subject to which it is applied, consequently to raise up and to put down, to create and to destroy. I must entreat your

patience, sir, while I go more into this subject than I ever supposed would be necessary. By the article, so often quoted, it is declared "that the judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme court and in such inferior courts, as the Congress may from time to time establish." I beg leave to recal your attention to what I have already said of these inferior courtsThat the original jurisdiction of various subjects being given exclusively to them, it became the bounden duty of congress to establish such courts. I will not repeat the argument already used on that subject. But I will ask those who urge the distinction between the supreme court and the inferior tribunals, whether a law was not previously necessary, before the supreme court be organized. They reply that the constitution says, there shall be a supreme court, and therefore the congress are commanded to organize it, while the rest is left to their discretion. This, sir, is not the fact. The constitution says the judicial power shall be vested in one supreme court, and in inferior courts. The legislature can therefore only organize one supreme court, but they may establish as many inferior courts as they shall think proper. The designation made of them by the constitution is, such inferior courts as congress may from time to time ordain and establish. But why, say gentlemen, fix precisely one supreme court, and leave the rest to legislative discretion? The answer is simple. It results from the nature of things, from the existence and probable state of our country. There was no difficulty in deciding, that one and only one supreme court should be proper or necessary, to which should lie appeals from inferior tribunals. Not so as to these. The United States were advancing in rapid progression-their population of three millions was soon to become five, then ten, afterwards twenty millions. This was well known as far as the future can become an object of human comprehen