frank confession, that although he will struggle (against his inclination) to support the constitution, even to the last moment, yet when in spite of all his efforts it shall fall, he will rejoice in its destruction. Far different are my feelings. It is impossible that we are both prejudiced, and that in taking the ground on which we respectively stand, our judgments are influenced by the sentiments which glow in our hearts. I, sir, wish to support the constitution because I love it. And I love it because I consider it as the bond of our union; because in my soul I believe that on it depends our harmony and our peace; and without it we should soon be involved in civil war; that this country would be deluged with the blood of its inhabitants; and a brother's hand be raised against a brother.

After these preliminary remarks, I hope I shall be indulged, while I consider the subject in reference to the two points which have been taken, the expediency and constitutionality of the repeal.

In considering the expediency I hope I shall be pardoned for asking your attention to some parts of the constitution, which have not yet been dwelt upon, and which tend to elucidate this part of our enquiry. I agree fully with the gentleman, that every section, every sentence, and every word of the constitution ought to be deliberately weighed and examined; nay, I am content to go along with him, and give its due value and importance to every stop and comma. In the beginning we find a declaration of the motives which induced the American people to bind themselves by this compact. And in the foreground of that declaration we find these objects specified; to form a more perfect union, to establish justice, and insure domestic tranquillity. But how are these objects effected? The people intended to establish justice. What provision have they made to fulfil that intention? After pointing out the courts which should be established, the VOL. II.

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second section of the third article informs us, "The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and the treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more states, between a state and citizens of another state, between citizens of different states, between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state and the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects.

"In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party, the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases beforementioned, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the congress shall make."

Thus then we find that the judicial power shall extend to a great variety of cases, but that the supreme court shall have only appellate jurisdiction in all admiralty and maritime causes, in all controversies between the United States and private citizens, between citizens and different states, between citizens of the same state claiming lands under different states, and between a citizen of the United States and foreign states, citizens or subjects. The honourable gentleman from Kentucky, who made the motion on your table, has told us that the constitution in its judiciary provisions contemplated only those cases which could not be tried in the state courts. But he will, I hope, pardon me when I contend that the constitution did not merely contemplate, but did by express words reserve to the national tribunals a right to decide, and did secure to the citizens

of America a right to demand their decision in many cases evidently cognizable in the state courts. And what are these cases? They are those in respect to which it is by the constitution presumed that the state courts should not always make a cool and calm investigation, a fair and just decision. To form, therefore, a more perfect union, and to insure domestic tranquillity, the constitution has also said there shall likewise be courts of the union to try causes, by the wrongful decision of which the union might be endangered or domestic tranquillity be disturbed. And what courts? Look again at the cases designated. The supreme court has no original jurisdiction. The constitution has said that the judicial powers shall be vested in the supreme and inferior courts. It has declared that the judicial power so vested shall extend to the cases mentioned, and that the supreme court shall not have original jurisdiction in those cases. Evidently, therefore, it has declared that they shall (in the first instance) be tried by inferior courts, with appeal to the supreme court. This, therefore, amounts to a declaration that the inferior courts shall exist; since without them the citizen is deprived of those rights for which he stipulated, or rather those rights verbally granted would be actually withheld; and that great security of our union, that necessary guard of our tranquillity, be completely paralized, if not destroyed. In declaring then that these tribunals shall exist, it equally declares, that the congress shall ordain and establish them. I say they shall; this is the evident intention, if not the express words, of the constitution. The convention in framing, the American people in adopting, that compact, did not, could not presume, that the congress would omit to do, what they were thus bound to do. They could not presume, that the legislature would hesitate one moment, in establishing the organs necessary to carry into effect those wholesome, those important provisions.

The honourable member from Virginia has given us a history of the judicial system, and in the course of it has told us, that the judges of the supreme court knew, when they accepted their offices, the duties they were to perform and the salaries they were to receive. He thence infers, that if again called on to do the same duties, they have no right to complain. Agreed. But that is not the question between us. Admitting that they have made a hard bargain, and that we may hold them to a strict performance, is it wise to exact their compliance to the injury of our constituents? We are urged to go back to the old system; but let us first examine the effects of that system. The judges of the supreme court rode the circuits, and two of them with the assistance of a district judge held circuit courts and tried causes. As a supreme court they have in most cases only an appellate jurisdiction. In the first instance, therefore, they tried a cause sitting as an inferior court, and then on appeal tried it over again as a supreme court. Thus then the appeal was from the sentence of the judges to the judges themselves. But say, that to avoid this incoherency, you will incapacitate the two judges who sat on the circuit from sitting in the supreme court to receive their own decrees. Strike them off: and suppose, either the same or a contrary decision to have been made on another circuit by two of their brethren in a similar case. For the same reason you strike them off, and then you have no court left. Is this wise? Is it safe? You place yourselves in a situation where your citizens must be deprived of a court of appeals, or else run the greatest risk that the decision of the first court will carry with it that of the other.

The same honourable member has given us a history of a law passed the last session, which he wishes now to repeal. That history is accurate at least in one important part of it. I believe that all amendments were rejected,

pertinaciously rejected: and I acknowledge that I joined heartily in that rejection. It was for the clearest reason on earth. We all perfectly understood, that to amend the bill was to destroy it. That if ever it got back to the other house, it would perish.

Those, therefore, who approved of the general provisions of that bill, were determined to adopt it. We sought the practicable good, and would not in pursuit of unattainable perfection, sacrifice that good to the pride of opinion. We took the bill, therefore, with its imperfections, convinced that when it was once passed into a law, it might be easily amended.

We are now told that this procedure was improper: nay, that it was indecent. That public opinion had declared itself against us. That a majority (holding different opinions) was already chosen to the other house; and that a similar majority was expected for that in which we sit. Mr. President, are we then to understand, that opposition to the majority in the two houses of congress is improper, is indecent? If so, what are we to think of those gentlemen, who not only with proper and decent, but with laudable motives (for such is their claim) so long, so perseveringly, so pertinaciously, opposed that voice of the people, which had so repeatedly, and for so many years, declared itself against them, through the organ of their representatives? Was this indecent in them? If not, how could it be improper for us to seize the only moment which was left for the then majority to do what they deemed a necessary act? Let me again refer to these imperious demands of the constitution, which called us to establish inferior courts. Let me remind gentlemen of their assertion on this floor, that centuries might elapse before any judicial system could be established with general consent. And then, let me ask, being thus impressed with a sense of the duty and of the difficulty of