him not to venture on Scottish ground, unless supported by a foreign military force.

The question most easily answered is, whether the French cabinet knew of the prince's design? Such knowledge has frequently been denied, but an affair of the kind could hardly have been concealed from the court of Versailles, after it had become known to Cardinal de Tencin, and to many other distinguished individuals, of whom we shall shortly have occasion to speak. Nor was it likely that Charles should have been so little observed while in France, that the ministry and the court would remain in ignorance of the important preparations which were going on. That the prince, however, believed his design a secret to the French government, is evident from his own letters. He feared that steps might be taken to prevent the execution of his plan, and that little or no value was attached by the court of Louis to the promises and invitations of Charles's friends in Great Britain. It was only a fortnight before his embarkation that he made an unreserved communication on the subject to his father; but there is every reason to believe that James had been for some months fully aware that

his son had it in contemplation to attempt some coup de main, and neither James nor the French court was mystified to the extent that Charles himself believed.

English historians have again asserted in recent times that the enterprise of Charles was undertaken without the knowledge and "in spite of France," and Lord Mahon refers to some secret papers recently discovered in support of this opinion; but the letters in question, of which further notice will be taken in the following pages, are easily accounted for, by supposing Charles himself to have been deceived on the subject. Till more satisfactory proofs have been discovered, the opinion of Mahon must remain undemonstrated, and the more cautiously to be adopted, as it is entirely at variance with probability.*

* Smollet says that the prince was "furnished with a supply of money and a supply of arms, on his private credit, without the knowledge of the French court :" it is difficult, however, to suppose that Charles should, unknown to the French government, have obtained the services of a vessel belonging to the French navy. Voltaire indeed says:-" C'était alors l'usage que le ministère de la marine pretât des vaisseaux de guerre aux armateurs et aux négociants, qui payaient une somme au roi, et qui entretenaient l'équipage à leurs depens pendant le temps de la course. Le ministre de la marine et le roi lui-même ignoraient à quoi ce vaisseau devait

servir." This may be true enough as a general remark, but can scarcely apply on the present occasion, more especially as it was through the medium of a lieutenant-general in the French army that Charles was put in possession of the Elizabeth. Nor is Home literally correct when he calls the expedition one "which it was easy to keep secret, for nobody could possibly believe that it was intended against the government of Britain." The same writer probably comes nearer to the truth when he says:-"When the French ministers were made acquainted with this peremptory resolution, they did not choose to commit themselves by appearing openly to aid and abet an enterprise which they were not prepared to support; but, willing to procure a diversion in favour of their master's arms, they contrived in a very underhand and indirect manner to enable Charles to leave France as he did." Mahon, on the contrary, says: "It must be owned that the charm of this romantic enterprise seems singularly heightened, when we find, from the secret papers I have now disclosed, that it was undertaken, not only against the British government, but without and in spite of the French."(Vol. iii. p. 340.)

CHAPTER VII.

FORCE AND OBJECT OF THE PRINCE'S ARMAMENT.- HE SAILS FROM THE LOIRE FOR SCOTLAND.

AT the commencement of 1745, Charles had fully resolved on his adventurous undertaking. Murray, in the mean time, had returned to Edinburgh from the mission entrusted to him by the Jacobites, and had informed them that Charles was not to be dissuaded from the idea of landing in Scotland, even without an army. One voice only in the council of his friends approved of the determination. All, with the exception of the Duke of Perth, blamed the resolution; and Murray undertook once more, in writing, to warn the prince against an enterprise to which his friends were so decidedly opposed. Had this letter, which was despatched in January, been received by the prince, it would probably have deterred him as little as the oral remonstrances of its author had

done; but the prince never received the letter, which was returned to Murray in the ensuing April, no safe medium having presented itself for forwarding so dangerous a paper. Murray afterwards went to the coast, that he might be at hand, should the prince arrive there, to warn . him immediately to return to France. Murray remained there through the whole month of June, when, seeing no signs of the expedition, he returned to his own seat in the south of Scotland, fully persuaded that the prince had abandoned his design as hopeless.

An event, however, had occurred during the spring, calculated to strengthen Charles in his resolution. This was the victory obtained over the English army by Marshal de Saxe, at Fontenoi, on the 11th of May, after which it seemed less probable than ever that English troops could be spared from Flanders. Even James, with all his natural timidity, could not but have admitted, that a multitude of fortunate circumstances combined at the moment to favour the project of his heroic son; but we have already seen that the prince, notwithstanding the habitual respect which he showed to his father on all other occasions, had