judgment non obstante veredicto is not recognized in mandamus proceedings. When the relator has traversed the truth of the return, the granting of the peremptory writ is dependent upon a verdict in his favor, as was the case at common law in an action for a false return. And failing to obtain a verdict, he is not entitled to a peremptory mandamus.1 560. Since it is competent for the respondent to present, in his return to the alternative writ, several different defenses, provided they are not inconsistent with or repugnant to each other, if he prevails on either of the grounds relied upon, the peremptory writ will be refused.2 These several defenses, however, should be consistent with each other, and if inconsistent or repugnant the return may be quashed in toto, and the peremptory writ awarded. 3 § 561. Great particularity is necessary in stating in the peremptory writ the precise thing which is required, in order that the respondent may be definitely apprised of all that he is commanded to do. And where a peremptory mandamus has been awarded to compel the treasurer of a school district to pay certain orders against the district, but the writ contains no description of the orders, either by number or amount, and this does not appear in any of the pleadings or other proceedings, the defect is fatal and will warrant the reversal of the judgment. But where the writ is directed to public officers, commanding the performance of a public duty required of them by law, a reasonable degree of certainty in describing the thing to be performed is deemed sufficient, especially where the facts are within the personal knowledge of the officers to whom the writ is directed." 562. The authorities are not altogether reconcilable as to whether a peremptory mandamus may be amended, but the better doctrine seems to be, that no amendment should be allowed. In any event, a motion to amend and enlarge the peremptory writ, which fails to point out specifically the particulars in which it is alleged to be defective, will be disregarded. And where the peremptory mandamus demands more than the relator is entitled to by his alternative writ, the better practice is, instead of allowing an amendment to the peremptory writ, to set aside the order granting it, and to allow the relator to amend the alternative writ, that he then be entitled to a peremptory mandamus." may § 563. If the petition on which the mandamus is asked is insufficient, and fails to make out a prima facie case, the court will refuse the peremptory writ, notwithstanding the verdict of a jury finding the facts as alleged in the petition. And the action of the court in denying the peremptory mandamus in such a case, is analogous to that in arresting judgment in an ordinary action at law.4 § 564. With regard to the form of the peremptory writ and its contents, it is to be tested by the same general principles applicable in construing the sufficiency of the alternative mandamus, the principal difference in form being the omission of the alternative clause in the peremptory writ. For these principles of construction, and the tests to be applied in determining the sufficiency of the writ, the reader is referred to the preceding chapter." 1 State v. County Judge of Johnson, 12 Iowa, 237. Commissioners of Columbia v. King, 13 Fla. 451. 'People v. Commissioners of Highways, 52 Ill. 498. • Id. See Chapter IX, ante. CHAPTER XI. OF THE VIOLATION OF THE WRIT. § 565. Implicit obedience required; violation punished by attachment for contempt. 566. Literal compliance not exacted. 567. Reversal by appellate court no justification; effect of injunction. 568. Irregularities do not justify violation. 569. Violation by judges of inferior courts; effect of resignation of judge. 570. Violation by corporation when personal notice dispensed with. 571. Quashing the writ, effect on proceedings in attachment. 572. Attachment allowed by kings bench for failure to make return. 573. Attachment against municipal officers for violation; personal service not requisite. 574. Attachment directed to persons guilty of disobedience; rule as to joinder of parties. 575. Injunction from state court no justification for violation of mandamus from federal court. 576. When rule to show cause dispensed with. $565. The granting of the peremptory writ of mandamus, being the exercise of one of the highest powers vested in common law courts, implicit obedience is in all cases required to the mandate of the writ, and a violation thereof constitutes a gross contempt of the court out of which the writ issued. The usual process resorted to, both in England and America, for punishing persons who have been guilty of violating a writ of mandamus, is by proceedings in attachment against the offending party for contempt of court. These proceedings are substantially the same as those resorted to for the punishment of any other contempt of court, and they are usually instituted upon sworn allegations setting up the fact of the 'See People v. Pearson, 3 Scam. 270. violation, accompanied by a rule upon the offender to show cause why he should not be attached for a contempt of court. Differences in the details of the practice upon proceedings of this nature exist in the different states, which need not be noticed here, it being presumed that each practitioner is sufficiently familiar with the rules of practice prevailing in his own state. $566. In the first place, it may be observed, that a strictly literal compliance with the terms of the writ is not exacted, if it be apparent that it has been substantially complied with in spirit, and such a compliance with the material requirements of the mandate of the court will exonerate the respondent from further responsibility. An attachment will not, therefore, be allowed upon the ground that the respondent has not himself done the act required to be performed, where it is shown by his return that the act commanded has been done, although it does not appear that it was done by the respondent in person. And where a change has been made in the law requiring the performance of the particular act which has been commanded by mandamus, and the officer to whom the writ is directed, acting in good faith, and according to his best judgment as to the effect of such change in his legal liability, refuses further obedience to the mandamus, he should not be punished by attachment, even though mistaken in his judgment. In such case, a new application should be made for a mandamus, that a new decision may be had upon the facts and the law. 2 And where, to an attachment for 1 United States v. Kendall, 5 Cranch C. C. 385. * State v. Harvey, 14 Wis. 151. By the court, PAINE, J.: "This is a motion for an attachment against the respondent, founded upon affidavits setting forth a refusal on his part to continue to comply with the peremptory writ of mandamus previously awarded by this court, requiring him to furnish to the relators copies of the laws for publication in a newspaper. We held, in the opinion awarding that writ, that chap. 240, Laws of 1860, provided for an additional publication of the laws in a newspaper to that provided for in sec. 17, chap. 6, R. S., and did not interfere with the right of the person having the contract for the state printing, to make the publication required by the latter section. It appears upon this motion, that the secretary of state obeyed the writ and furnished the relators copies of the laws,until said refusing to obey a mandamus, the party attached shows that he is willing to comply with the mandate of the court, he will not be punished for disobedience, but he may still be compelled to do the act required by the writ.1 § 567. Obedience to the writ is required during the entire time that it remains in force and unreversed by a higher tribunal, and the fact that the proceedings are subsequently reversed by an appellate court, affords no justification for a violation of the mandamus committed before such reversal.2 Nor does it afford a sufficient excuse for failure to obey the writ, that since it was granted, the respondent has been enjoined in another court from performing the act required, since a peremptory mandamus, when once issued, can not, like an ordinary execution upon a judgment at law, be staid by injunction, and to allow such interference would necessarily lead to a conflict of jurisdiction and interrupt the whole course of judicial proceedings. 3 section 17 was repealed by the legis lature. He then ceased to furnish them, and this attachment is asked to compel him to continue. It was claimed by the counsel for the relators, that the decision awarding the writ was conclusive upon the question now presented. But we think this is clearly not so. A decision requiring an officer to perform some act which the law then enjoins upon him, can not have the effect of compelling him to continue to perform that act after the law has ceased to require it. It is true that a question is made here whether the repeal of section 17 changes in any respect the rights of the relators? But assuming that it did, so that if the writ should be now asked for the first time, it must be refused, the position certainly can not be correct that the court is required, by its former decision, awarding the writ when the relators were entitled to the copies, to con- |