to an action by the assignee, that the invention was not new: Hayne v. Maltby, 3 T. R. 439, 441. In actions of use and occupation, when the tenant has occupied by plt.'s permission, he cannot dispute his title, Pea. Ev. 244, Doe d. Nepean v. Budden, 5 B. & A. 626; but he may show he was compelled to *pay the rent to another party: [*47] Taylor v. Zamira, 2 Marsh. 220, post, "Landlord and Tenant." So, a landlord, by allowing a tenant to expend money in improvements, admits a consent to alterations: Doe d. Sheppard v. Allen, 3 Taunt. 78. If a wife brings dower and recovers, she is estopped afterwards from claiming land settled upon her for her jointure; and this, though she entered clandestinely into the land settled for her jointure before the writ of dower brought: 1 Rol. 862, l. 20, 25; 4 Co. 5; Com. D. Estoppel, A. 3. So, a man may be estopped by acceptance of rent, Co. Lit. 352, a.; or by entry or livery, &c.: ib. By offering money to bribe a voter, a person admits that the party solicited his vote: 3 Bur. 1590. A man who cohabits with a woman, and treats her as his wife, thereby admits her to be such: Watson v. Threlkeld, 2 Esp. Rep. 637; Robinson v. Nahon, 1 Camp. 245; Munro v. De Chemant, 4 ib. 215. So, a defendant is estopped, by the recognisance of bail entered into for him by the name by which he is sued, from pleading a misnomer, although he is no party to the recognisance, for, by these acts, he takes a benefit, and is conclusively bound by them: 2 N. R. 453. So, a party, admitting or representing his name to be Thomas, cannot afterwards say it is William; Price v. Harwood, 3 Camp. 108; Bass v. Clive, 4 M. & S. 13; ante, "Misnomer," 10.

By Acquiescence and Silence of a Party.] Where the existence of a debt, or of a particular right, has been asserted in the presence of a party, and he has not contradicted it, such acquiescence and silence will amount, prima-facie, to an admission of the debt or right. So an acquiescence and endurance, when acts are done by another which, if wrongfully done, are encroachments, and call for resistance and opposition, are evidence as a tacit admission that such acts could not be legally resisted: Jarrett v. Leonard, 2 M. & S. 265; Morris v. Burdett, 1 Camp. 218; Steel v. Prickett, 2 Stark. 471; 2 Stark. Ev. 37. Where a notice to quit is served personally on a tenant, and he makes no objection to the time specified in the notice, it is prima-facie evidence of the correctness of such notice, if the party reads or understands the tenor of it at the time of the service: Doe d. Baker v. Wombwell, 2 Camp. 559; Doe d. Clarges v. Forster, 13 East, 405; Doe d. Leicester v. Biggs, 2 Taunt. 109. If the occupier of a house submits to a distress for rent, described. in the notice of distress to be due from him as tenant of the distrainor, it is an admission of the tenancy: Panton v. Jones, 3 Camp. 372; 1 H. B. 311. If a party, holding goods as a lien, claim them on another ground when they are demanded, and do not make mention of the lien, he is precluded afterwards setting it up: Boardman v. Sill, 1 Camp. 410, n.; Martini v. Coles, 1 M. & S. 147; post, "Lien." A person, by allowing his name to appear as a partner, is precluded in general, from showing he is not: 7 Price, 193; 2 Chit. R. 120; post, "Lien.” A deft. who has never applied for a title, is not allowed to set up the want

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of it against the plt., who has obtained one after the commencement of an action for not completing the purchase: Thompson v. Miles, 1 Esp. Rep. 184.

The omission of a debt by an insolvent in his schedule, is evidence against him, although it does not estop him from suing, Hart v. Newman, 3 Camp. 13; and, if he does not include the whole amount of a debt in his schedule, he may be sued for the amount not inserted: Taylor v. Buchanan, 4 B. &. C. 419.

The not having an attorney's bill taxed, is an admission that the charges therein are reasonable: Peake's Ev. 262, 264; Anderson v. May, 2 B. & P. 237; 1 Doug. 198; Lee v. Jones, 2 Camp. 496.

In a late important case on this subject, where the paymaster of a military corps, had given credit in amount to an officer in that [*48] corps, from the 1st January, 1817, to the 6th November

1820, for certain increased pay, erroneously supposed to be granted by a general order of the 27th August, 1806, to an officer of his situation, and a statement of that account was delivered to the officer in 1821: in December, 1816, the paymasters were informed, by the Board of Ordinance, that the increased pay granted by the order of 1806, would not be allowed to persons in the situation of the officer in question: the paymasters did not communicate this information to the officer until 1821; and, subsequently to that time, they continued to receive his pay: it was held, in an action brought by his personal representatives to recover such pay, it was not competent to the paymaster to retain any such sums of money on account of the sums which they had credited him for by way of increased pay, and which they had allowed him to consider as his own for so long a period of time: Skyring v. Greenwood, 4 B. & C. 281; Shaw & Ors. v. Picton, ib. 715; and vide E. I. Company v. Tritton, 3 B. & C. 280; Hume v. Bolland, 1 R. & M. 371; E. I. Company v. Prince, ib. 407; Show v. Dartnall, 6 B. & C. 56.

Parol admissions may be given as to the contents of letters and other writings, but their non-production must be accounted for: Bloxam v. Elsie, R. & B. 187. And, though an admission have reference to an account signed, it cannot be given in evidence; but a verbal admission by the deft., of his having had certain articles and sums of money exceeding 40s., which are inserted in a book signed by him, may be referred to by witness to refresh his memory as to deft.'s admissions. As, where the plt. entered an account in writing of goods and cash furnished to the deft. from time to time, each page of which was authenticated by the deft.'s acknowledgement, in writing, of the receipt of the contents, it was held that, although such an acknowledgement in writing could not be given in evidence per se, in respect of the sums exceeding 40s. in each page, for want of receipt stamps, yet that plt. might prove that, upon calling over each article to deft. he verbally admitted that he had received the same: Jacob v. Lindsay, 1 East, 460.

Admissions of Debts.] A debt may frequently be admitted by the acts of a party, so as to render no further proof of it necessary: see instances, ante, 39, to supra. Where deft. said that he could not pay a debt for which he had been arrested, but would give a bill for it, such admis

sion will entitle plt. to a verdict for £10, as the deft. could not have been arrested for a less sum: Brathwaite v. Churchill, 2 C. & P. 341; Fletcher v. Froggatt, Chit. B., 230; 2 C. & P. 569, s. c. And, where deft. admitted that he owed a debt, and that he would pay it, on such an admission, the plt. on proving the amount due, will have a verdict with nominal damages: Dixon v. Deveridge, 2 C. & P. 109; sed vide 4 Moore, 542. A qualified acknowledgment of a sum due to plt., who does not prove any consideration on which the deft. became indebted to him, will not entitle him to recover upon an account stated: Evans v. Verity, R. & M. 239. And see further as to evidence of an account stated, ante, 22, 31. Where the plt., in assumpsit, gave in evidence an admission of the deft. that he owed £147 on a bill of exchange which had been returned dishonoured, it was held that such acknowledgment was admissible, though no notice to produce the bill had been given: Fryer v. Brown, R. & M. C. 145. See "Statute of Limitations."

Admissions of Liability.] A liability may also be so admitted by a party as to render no further proof of it necessary. Thus an acknowledgment by a deft., that his trade is a nuisance, is admissible, though not conclusive against him: Rex v. Neville, Pea. Rep. 91. In an action for criminal conversation, an admission by the deft., that he had committed adultery with the wife of the plt., is not sufficient without proof of a marriage, in *fact; unless, indeed, the deft. had [*49] seriously and solemnly recognised that he knew the woman was plt.'s wife: Bur. 2057, 2 Wils. 399.

Admissions of a particular Character.] Persons, by acting in a particular character, in general admit that character. Thus, peace-officers, justices, &c., admit themselves liable in those characters, and proof of their so acting is sufficient evidence, without regular proof of their appointment: Berryman v. Wise, 4 T. R. 366.

And,

Where a clergyman is sued for non-residence, his acts as parson, and receipt of the emoluments of the church, admit the character in which he is sued: 1 N. R. 210; Bevan v. Williams, 3 T. R. 635, n. And, in an action of slander of an attorney, words spoken by the deft. concerning him in that character, are evidence of his being an attorney, without further proof: Berryman v. Wise, 4 T. R. 366; Pearce v. Whale, 5 B. & C. 39. So, in the case of a physician, 1 N. R. 196; 8 T. R. 303, 5, n.; and see Yrisarri v. Clement, 3 Bing. 432. where deft. has treated with the plt. in the capacity in which he sues, it is an admission of his character: as, proof that deft. accounted with plt. as farmer of the post-horse duties, is evidence of plt.'s appointment as such: Radford v. McIntosh, 3 T. R. 632. And proof that deft. has paid tithes to the plt., is evidence of his title to receive them: 3 T. R. 635, 4 T. R. 367. So, having paid tolls to a party, is evidence of his character of collector: Peacock v. Harris, 10 East, 104; ante, 46; Lister v. Priestley, Wightw. 67. And, where a party describes himself as holding a certain situation, no farther proof is necessary: as, where an officer signed false returns, the proof of his having signed them was evidence of his appointment: Rex v. Gardner, 2 Canp. 513,

supra. And, where a person styled himself an "M. D." he could not recover the amount of his fees: Lipscombe v. Holmes, 2 Camp. 441; Chorley. Bolcot, 4 T. R. 317. So, in an action brought against deft. as publisher of a newspaper, proof that he had given a bond to the Stamp Office, and from time to time attended at the Stamp Office respecting certain duties, was held evidence of his being publisher: R. v. Topham, 4 T. R. 126.

Admissions of Handwriting.] The handwriting of a party may be proved as against him by his admission; and, if such admission was made so as to obtain a benefit to the party making it, he will be conclusively precluded afterwards from disputing the fact, or showing the handwriting was a forgery: Leach v. Buchanan, 4 Esp. Rep. 226, 2 Str. 1051, 12 Mod. 809, Chit. Bills, 185. Evidence of such admission may be collected from a notice or letter impliedly admitting it; ante, 45. Promise to pay the amount of a bill, &c., or a part payment after it is due, admits the handwriting to such bill, &c.: Helmsley v. Loader, 2 Campb. 450; Jones v. Morgan, ib. 474; Bosanquet v. Anderson; 6 Esp. Rep. 43. Proof of a party's paying several other bills of the same character as the one in litigation will be sufficient evidence of such party's signature and liability: Barber v. Gingell, 3 Esp. Rep. 60. An admission of a handwriting made by the party pending a treaty for compromising a suit is evidence against him, Waldridge v. Kennison, 1 Esp. Rep. 143.. And see further, as to handwriting, post, "Handwriting.”

Admission, of no Interest in Suit.] If a plt. admit he has no interest in the action, he will be nonsuited: Bauerman v. Radenius, 7 T. R. 664. And, in an action on a bill of exchange, evidence of an admission by the plt. that he has no interest in the bill, will be ground of nonsuit. ib. An admission by the lessor of the plt. in ejectment, that he had assigned his interest in the premises, is evidence against him: Doe v. Watson, 2 Stark. 230.

[*50] *III. Effect of with Reference to, by whom made.

Who bound by.] It is a general rule, that the estoppel and admission of a party bind all parties and privies to it; whether in blood, as the , heir, Co. Lit. 352, a., Com. D. Estop. B.; Pol. 61, 66; Jones, 460; in estate, as the vendee, 1 Salk. 276; in law, as the lord by escheat, Co. Lit. 352, a.; or claiming under the same judgment, 1 Salk. 276; or by act of law, or in the post, Co. Lit. 352, a.; tenant in dower, or by the courtesy, ib., Pollex. 61. One who claims under a bond or deed-poll is as much estopped as the obligee: 2 Rep. 4. Matter of estoppel, strictly so called, is reciprocal, and binds both parties to it: Co. Lit. 352, a.; Cr. E. 700; Gould v. Barnes, 3 Taunt 504; Lutw. 894; Dy. 279, b. Courts and juries are not bound by estoppel: ante, 38.

Who may take advantage of] Every one who claims under, or is affected by, an estoppel or admission, may take advantage of it: but a mere stranger cannot: 1 Rol. 868, l. 47; Co. Lit. 352, a. Thus, the

purchaser of a reversion of lands demised may take advantage of matter of estoppel, for the estoppel runs with the land: Str. 817; 2 Ld. Raym. 1550. A woman who claims dower may take advantage of an estoppel, by deed between her husband and his tenant: 1 Rol. 868, l. 47. If A. demises by indenture to B. for life, and afterwards by fine grants the reversion, the conusee shall estop B. in a quia juris clamat, to say that A. had nothing: ib., l. 10. An officer, in the execution of process, may take advantage of an estoppel upon record in the same action, as if a feme coverte be sued as a feme sole, or there be a misnomer, &c.: 1 Rol. R. 869, l. 50, 45; 1 Salk. 310. The king shall take advantage of an estoppel, though he be not, in fact, a party to the record; for he is always present in court: 2 Inst. 39. So every person may take advantage of a disability which appears by record, as outlawry, attainder, &c., though he be a stranger to the record, Co. Lit. 352, b., 128, b.; so of bastaady, &c., ib. But a stranger cannot take advantage of the misnomer of any one upon record; for he is not bound by it: ib. What a man writes or says for himself cannot be evidence for himself or his representative: 2 Ves. 43; Rex v. Debenham, 2 B. & A. 187. A survey of a manor made by the owner is not evidence against a stranger in favour of a succeeding owner, 1 Str. 95; when otherwise, 1 Ld. Raym. 734, post, 58. Admissions made by a deceased person, under whom deft. claims, acknowledging the receipt of rent for the premises in question, are not admissible in evidence for the deft.: Outram v. Morewood, 5 T. R. 123. And see further, as to the effect of admissions, &c., made by third persons, entries by deceased servants, &c., post, 57.

By PARTY to the SUIT, though NOT BENEFICIALLY INTERESTED.] The admissions made by the parties to the suit, as to facts within their knowledge and against themselves, are generally evidence, though he be not the party beneficially interested, and are always so if he be interested: as, where a party sues as a trustee, &c., for the benefit of another: Bauerman v. Radenius, 7 T. R. 663; ib., 670, n.; Rex v. Hardwicke, 11 East, 578. So, where plt.'s admission of their having no interest in the suit, was given in evidence by deft. to defeat the action, Lawrence, J., said, "I have looked into the books to see if I could find any case, in which it has been held that the admission of a plt. on the record is not evidence, but have found none :" 7 T. R. 669. Where an obligee, who has assigned a bond, sues on it, his admissions are evidence: 7 T. R. 670, n., 668. But the admissions by a guardian, although the plt. on record, are not evidence against the infant, 3 Mod. 258, Cowling v. Ely, 2 Stark. 366; nor can the answer of a guardian in Chancery be read against the infant: ib. And the declarations of *a prochein amy, made before action brought, are not admissible [*51] for the deft.: Webb v. Smith, R. & M. 106.

By PARTIES really INTERESTED, though not Party to the Suit.] The admissions of a party really interested in the cause of action, though he be no party to the suit, are always evidence; for the parties interested are, in this respect, looked upon as parties to the suit; and what will be a defence against them would, in many instances, be a defence against the plt. VOL. I.

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