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bour's house, and told him he expected every moment to be arrested, upon which he concealed himself, and desired his neighbour to watch, but returned home immediately after the officer was gone, such temporary absence was held to be an act of bankruptcy: Chenoweth v. Haley, 1 M. & S. 676; Bayly v. Schofield, ib. 338. And, if the party go to a distant place, among strangers, it may be an act of bankruptcy, though he is visible there; and going only to the next house may also be the same, if he is not visible: p. Buller, J., cited Aldridge v. Ireland, cited 1 Taunt. 273. Where a man rode out of town in order to avoid being arrested, and returned in the evening, and the next morning sent for the bailiff, and told him [*225] he went out in order to get the term of the plt., this was held to be such a departing from the dweiling-house as was sufficient to constitute an act of bankruptcy: Maylin v. Eylve, 2 Str. 809. And, if a trader, on being applied to for payment by a creditor, leaves his house under pretence of getting money, but goes to a billiard-table and remains there the whole evening, this has also been held an act of bankruptcy: Bigg v. Shooner, 2 Esp. Rep. 651.

The departure must be with the intention to avoid his creditors; and it is, in such case, immaterial whether any creditor was delayed or not in his absence, Robertson v. Liddell, 9 East, 487, Hammond v. Hicks, 5 Esp. Rep. 1 ib. 334, Williams v. Man, 1 Taunt. 270; or whether or not he departed from a groundless apprehension of being arrested: ex. p. Bamford, 15 Ves. 449. The intention may, as in other cases, be presumed as the necessary consequence of the party's act: ante, 224. When the departure is evidently for a laudable purpose, although creditors be delayed, it is not an act of bankruptcy; as, leaving home to reeover a debt, Fowler v. Padget, 7 T. R. 509; or to arrange with a ereditor, leaving word where he is gone, Aldridge v. Ireland, cited 1 Taunt. 273, sed vide Deffle v. Desanges, 8 Taunt. 671, 3 Moo. 7; or for any other lawful purpose, 9 East, 492, 4 Taunt. 603; or for avoiding altercation, ib.

Otherwise Absenting Himself.] These words are not confined to an absenting from a dwelling-house; for, if a trader absent himself from any place, with intent to delay his creditors, it is an act of bankruptcy: Hallen v. Homer, 1 C. & P. 108; Curteis v. Willis, ib. 211. Hence, where, a trader, who carried on business at a counting-house, went away, taking his books with him, Fudine v. Da Cossen, 1 N. R. 234; or where a trader went into the back shop in a neighbour's house, to avoid being seen by an officer, who, he said, had a writ against him, Chenoweth v. Hay, 1 M. &. S. 676; or if a man, being arrested for debt, escapes to the house of another person, and is there denied to the officer, Bayley v. Schofield, ib. 338; and a trader secretly withdrawing himself after he has been arrested, Phillips v. Peak, Green, B. L. 52. If a trader has no dwelling-house or counting-house, his withdrawing himself from the usual place where he transacts his business, or is to be found, is an act of bankruptcy; therefore, if a man takes up a temporary abode at a public-house, and leaves it for fear of his creditors, Holroyd v. Gwynne, 2 Taunt. 176; so, if a man having no known place of abode, but who is in the habit of attending the Royal Exchange, to transact his business there, leaves it on the approach of his creditors, desiring a friend to say

he is not there, or breaks an appointment he has made with a creditor to meet him there, to pay his debt, if it be done with the intention to delay his creditors, Ginmingham v. Laing, 2 Marsh, 236, 6 Taunt. 532; or where the proprietor of a theatre retired behind the scenes to avoid a sheriff's officer, desiring to be denied to him, ib. Where a party makes an appointment to meet a creditor at a particular place, and fails to do so, it will not constitute an act of bankruptcy, unless it afford strong evidence of an intention to delay his crèditors: Tucker v. Jones, 2 Bing. 2; Schooling v. Green, 3 Stark. 149. A trader leaving his shop, and desiring his servant to make some excuse for his absence, in the event of a creditor's calling, is sufficient evidence to lay before a jury of an act of bankruptcy: Deffle v. Desanges, 8 Taunt. 671; 3 Moo. 7, 4. Where a trader of the creditor's attorney goes to the office of the latter, to avoid being arrested in the street, it has been held, that, by so doing, he did not commit an act of bankruptcy: Mills v. Elton, 3 Price, 142.

Beginning to keep his house.] If a trader seclude himself up in his house, to avoid the fair importunity of his creditors, who are thus de

prived of the means of communicating with him, he begins to [*226] keep house: *p. Ld. Ellenb., Dudley v. Vaughan, 1 Camp. 271. Proof of a denial is not in all cases requisite to substantiate an act of bankruptcy, by the trader beginning to keep his house, though formerly it was indispensable, Garrat v. Moule, 5 T. R. 575; as, where a trader removed from his country-house to his parlour, to avoid personal application to him, Dudley v. Vaughan, 1 Camp. 271; or where he retired from the place where he usually sat into a back room, and drew the curtains, King v. Bebb, 1 M. & S. 354; or where he confined himself for nearly a month to his bed-room, except Sundays, Bayley v. Schofield, ib., 338; or where he ordered his doors to be kept shut, and not opened till it was ascertained from the window who the person was who sought admittance, Harvey v. Ramsbottom, 1 B. & C. 55, 2 D. & R. 142; but shutting up a banking-house is not evidence of a keeping-house on the part of a partner, whose residence is elsewhere: ex. p. Mavor, 19 Ves. 543. A trader's secreting himself in the house of a friend, where persons have been in the habit of calling on him, will constitute a sufficient act of bankruptcy: Curteis v. Willis, R. & M. 58; 4 D. & R. 224, s. c.

A general order to be denied is alone sufficient evidence of a beginning to keep house: Lloyd v. Heathcoat, 2 B. & B. 388; 5 Moo. 129. The order to deny must be proved to have been given by the trader himself, Dudley v. Vaughan, 1 Camp. 271, ex. p. Foster, 17 Ves. 416; and an order given by a trader to his wife to deny him, is sufficient evidence of keeping house: Lloyd v. Heathcoat, 2 B. & B. 388; ex. p. Hall, 1 Atk. 201. If a trader give a general order to be denied, and is denied to a particular creditor, it is evidence of keeping house, though the party calling is not the objectionable person, and such fact is made known to him: Muclow v. May, 1 Taunt. 479; Colkett v. Freeman, 2 T. R. 59. It will still be evidence of a keeping house, though the trader be seen by the creditor at the time of denial: ex. p. Bamford, 15 Ves. 451. A denial on a Sunday has been deemed not to be evidence of a keeping house, even though the trader appointed the creditor to come on that day

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for the purpose of settling accounts: ex. p. Preston, 2 V. & B. 312. A denial to a person merely demanding payment of a debt, but not demanding an interview with the trader himself, is not evidence of a beginning to keep house, Dudley v. Vaughan, 1 Camp. 271; nor is the denial to a person calling to obtain the trader's execution of a bailbond, according to a promise made by him when arrested: Schooling v. Lee, 3 Stark. 149; but see Deacon, 56, n. But a denial made to a creditor, under an idea that his object in calling was to demand payment of a debt, is evidence of keeping house, though, in fact, that was not his object: ex. p. White, 3 V. & B. 128; ex. p. Harris, 2 Rose, 67, s. c. It matters not whether the denial be to a creditor or not: Eden, 23. denial to several persons, whom the trader's servant supposed to be creditors, is evidence for a jury as to the trader's intention: Jameson v. Eamer, 1 Esp. Rep. 381. So, a denial to a collector of taxes is evidence of a beginning to keep house, Sanderson v. Laforest, 1 C. & P. 46, 336; or where the party called in consequence of the dishonour of a bill, and was denied, Bleasby v. Crossley, 2 C. & P. 213; or a denial to the collector of the church and highway rates, Lloyd v. Heathcote, 2 B. & B. 3SS, 5 Moo. 129; for it is the intention of the party in being denied, and not the object of the person calling, which will be considered to constitute a keeping house, Deacon, 55; the act of bankruptcy depending on the intent to delay, and not on the intent being productive of the effect: p. Bayley, J., Chenoweth v. Hay, 1 M. & S. 679. A banker stopping payment, or refusing to pay money when called on for that purpose, does not there by commit an act of bankruptcy, if he keeps his shop open, and does not conceal himself: 7 Mod. 139.

The period during which the trader keeps his house is not material: Palm. 325. A denial once having been made, is evidence of a beginning to keep house, though the creditor be afterwards admitted in consequence of his importunity, Wood v. Thwaites, 3 Esp. Rep. [*227] 245; and though the trader deny himself, and afterwards appear in public, and pay the debt: Colkett v. Freeman, 2 T. R. 59. Where a general order to be denied is given, the fact of the trader's being subsequently denied on account of illness will not affect the act of bankruptcy, as the intention will be referable to his previous orders: Lazarus v. Waithman, 5 Moo. 863. Where a trader was in the rules of the K. B., and had come to his house out of the rules, and was there denied, it was held to be evidence of keeping his house, Hughes v. Gilman, 2 C. & P. 32; and a denial at the trader's lodgings, not his usual place of residence, is also evidence: Park v. Prosser, 1 C. & P. 176.

The intention in a trader's being denied may be explained away, and the presumption of its having been done with the supposed intent to delay creditors may be repelled; as, by his being denied whilst at dinner, or engaged in business, Shew v. Thompson, Holt, 159, Lloyd v. Heathcote, 2 B. & B. 392; or at an unseasonable hour; and, on many other occasions, which may easily be imagined, he may refuse to see his creditors, without meaning to delay them, and therefore without committing an act of bankruptcy, although they should for a time be delayed; p. Ld. Ellenb., Smith v. Currie, 3 Camp. 350. So, as we have just seen, a denial on a Sunday is not evidence of an act of bankruptcy: ex. p. Hall, VOL. I.

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1 Atk. 201; Stafford v. Clarke, 1 C. & P. 27; ex. p. Preston, 2 V. & B. 312.

Suffering himself to be Arrested for any Debt not Due.] The object of this enactment, as observed by Mr. Deacon, is, no doubt, to provide against a voluntary submission to an arrest for a fictitious debt; but the suffering himself to be arrested upon a bill of exchange not due, or, indeed, for any debt solvendum in futuro (if the intention is to defeat or delay a creditor), would, it is apprehended, come within the meaning of the statute: Deacon, 61.

Yielding himself to Prison.] Where a trader, capable of paying, from fraudulent motives, voluntarily goes to prison, it is a sufficient act of bankruptcy: ex. p. Barton, 7 Vin. 61; Rex v. Page, 7 Price, 616. It must be done, however, with the intent to delay his creditors: ante, A bona fide surrender in discharge of bail will not constitute an act of bankruptcy within the meaning of this clause.

Suffering himself to be outlawed.] To render outlawry an act of bankruptcy, it must have been suffered with an intent to defraud creditors, Radfor v. Bludworth, 1 Lev. 13: and the outlawry must be in England or Wales. An outlawry in a county-palatine will be sufficient, Stone, 124, Co. Dig. Bankrupt; an outlawry in Ireland will not, ib., Deacon, 62.

Procuring himself to be Arrested, or his Goods, Moneys, or Chattels, to be Attached, Sequestered, or taken in Execution.] Any ar- rest made by a man's own procurement will come under this provision; it being immaterial whether the arrest is for a real or a fictitious debt, 7 Vin. Ab. 61; and, if the party procure himself to be outlawed, it will be equally an act of bankruptcy, whether the debt be a just debt or not: ex. p. Barton, ib. The last words of this provision were not included in 1 Jac. 1, c. 15, s. 2; under which it had been held, that a fraudulent execution, though void as against creditors, was not a procuring of goods to be attached, which meant only a proceeding by foreign attachment: Clarey v. Hayley, Cowp. 427; Cooke, 118. An attachment out of any court for mere default or laches would not be an attachment within the meaning of the statute: for such an attachment could not be considered as done by deft.'s own procurement: see Com. Dig. Bankrupt, C. 2.; Deacon, 63. Where a trader, hearing that a writ of fi. fa. is [*228] issued against him, clandestinely conveyed his goods out of his house, and concealed them privately, in order to prevent them from being levied in execution, this, it was held, though a palpable fraud, was not an act of bankruptcy: Cole v. Davies, 1 Ld. Raym. 724. The arrest, attachment, sequestration, or execution, must be proved to have been procured by the bankrupt, with intent to defeat or delay his creditors.

Fraudulent Conveyance.] Making or causing to be made, either within this realm or elsewhere, any fraudulent grant or conveyance of any of his lands, tenements, goods, or chattels; or making, or causing to be made, any fraudulent gift, delivery, or transfer, of any of his goods or chattels. These two acts of bankruptcy will be considered together, as there is in principle a strict analogy between them: for all those acts which have heretofore been deemed to be fraudulent prefer

ences will, under the latter of these provisions, be henceforth considered as acts of bankruptcy: Eden, 25.

This provision has created a new act of bankruptcy, by extending the operation of the 1 Jac. 1, c. 15, s. 2, to deeds executed abroad. It has also created a new act of bankruptcy by the words "any fraudulent gift, delivery, or transfer, of any of his goods or chattels ;" thereby removing a great inconsistency that formerly prevailed in the bankrupt law: for, though a fraudulent gift, or transfer by deed was held an act of bankruptcy, it was decided that a sale, or any transfer of goods not by deed, however fraudulent the scheme might be in preference of one creditor to another, and as such void, was, nevertheless, not an act of bankruptcy: Deacon, 75; 4 Burr. 2478.

The fraudulent conveyances contemplated by this provision are those which are void at common law, or under the stat. of Fraudulent Conveyances, 13 El. c. 5; and those which are fraudulent, as being in contravention of the policy of the bankrupt laws, in preventing a fair and equal distribution amongst the creditors, or in preferring one creditor to another. Those conveyances which are void at common law, or under the Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances, will be considered, post, "Trover," "Sheriff;" the present considerations will be confined to those conveyances which are fraudulent, as being in contravention of the policy of the bankrupt laws.

To constitute an act of bankruptcy under the first part of this clause, the conveyance must appear to have been made by deed, Martin v. Pewtress, 4 Burr. 2478, 17 Ves. 202, and the deed must be a valid one, therefore, a conveyance by deed without a stamp, Whitwell v. Dimsdale, Pea. 168, or not executed by a person who must have been a party to it, Antram v. Chase, 15 East, 212, Beech v. Gouch, Holt, C. 15, does not constitute an act of bankruptcy; nor does it where, in evidence, it appears that the conveyance was made contrary to the intention of the bankrupt himself: ex. p. Norris, 1 G. & J. 233. Where the deed was intended for execution by three persons, and was incapable of operation unless executed by them all, the court was of opinion that it could not be considered an act of bankruptcy where executed only by one: Dutton v. Morrison, 17 Fes. 190.

An assignment of all a trader's effects may be an act of bankruptcy, whether it be upon trust for the benefit of one creditor, Wilson v. Day, 2 Burr. 877, or of several, Compton v. Bedford, 1 W. Bla. 362, or of all, to the exclusion of one, ex. p. Foord, cited 1 Burr. 477. And, as it is the execution of the deed that creates the act of bankruptcy, the conveyance produces that effect, although there be a proviso that it shall be void if the trustees think fit, ib., 4 East, 230; or if any one of the ereditors refuse his acquiescence, Kettle v. Hammond, 1 Cooke, B. L. 106, Earhart v. Wilson, 8 T. R. 140; or if all the creditors do not sign, or if a commission of bankruptcy be taken out within a given period: Dutton v. Morrison, *17 Ves. 199; 1 Rose, 213. [*229] It is immaterial whether the assignment is made to secure a pre

sent debt, or to indemnify a surety who is only likely to become a creditor: Hassells v. Simpson, Doug. 89.

An assignment of all a trader's property for the benefit even of all hist

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