able as a fair and reasonable allowance for the care and keeping of his sister during the period which intervened between the 30th of June 1863 and the 12th of August 1864, the date of her death: Maryland Hospital v. Foreman, 29 Md.

CRIMINAL LAW.

Disturbance of a Meeting.-Maliciously disturbing a meeting of school directors is indictable at common law: Campbell v. Commonwealth, 59

Pa.

It is too late to make objections to the form of an indictment in the Supreme Court: Id.

ESTOPPEL.

Silence when there is Duty to speak.-Positive acts tending to mislead one ignorant of the truth, which do mislead him to his injury, are good ground of estoppel, and ignorance of title on the part of him who is estopped will not excuse him: Chapman v. Chapman and Gansamer, 59 Pa.

Silence will postpone a title when one knowing his own right should speak out: Id.

One led by such silence ignorantly and innocently to rest on his title, believing it secure, and to expend money and make improvements, without timely warning, will be protected by estoppel: Id.

Sale of Public Property.-A., an officer of the United States army, took a horse belonging to the government, and having had the brand removed used him as his individual property for some time, and then sold him to B., who for nearly a year hired him out as a public liveryhorse to parties, both civil and military, in the city of Baltimore. No steps were taken during this time by any agent of the United States Government to recover the horse. B. finally sold the horse to C., and shortly thereafter he was taken out of his possession under an order of the assistant provost-marshal, as the property of the United States Government. In an action against B., by the last purchaser, to recover what he had paid for the horse, it was held :

1. That the government was not estopped from reclaiming the horse as its property;

2. That persons dealing with agents or officers in regard to public property, are bound to know the extent of their authority;

3. That the bare possession of the horse by A., with the consent of the officers of the government, and the sale by him to B., were not sufficient to pass title to the purchaser;

4. That although A. may have obtained possession of the horse from the quartermaster, and B. may have been a bonâ fide purchaser, a sale thus made, without the authority or assent of the government, could not operate as a transfer of title against the latter: Johnson v. Frisbie, 29 Md.

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See Contract.

INSURANCE.

Partnership Property.-Goods were owned by two jointly; in effecting an insurance the agent told one that to insure the interest of both,

it made no difference whether or not both names were in the policy; he received a premium proportionate to the whole, and a policy was issued in the name of one. Held, that these facts showed a mistake in the agent and were admissible in evidence, and that upon a total loss the whole interest might be recovered in a suit in the name of the one to whom the policy had been issued: Manhattan Ins. Co. v. Webster, 59 Pa.

Each partner being liable in solido for the firm engagements, has a right to have the firm assets applied in the first instance to the payment of the firm debts: Id.

The interest of a partner is only his proportion of the capital or profits after all the debts are paid: Id.

A partner has an insurable interest in the entire stock, and on the receipt for a loss of insurance he must account to the firm: Id.

MASTER AND SERVANT. See Negligence.

NEGLIGENCE.

Injury by Act of Fellow-servant.—When several persons are employed as workmen in the same general service, though in different parts of it, and one of them is injured through the carelessness of another, the employer is not responsible unless he had employed unfit persons for the service: O'Donnell v. Allegheny Valley R. R. Co., 59 Pa.

Ryan v. The Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 11 Harris 384, remarked on: Id.

A carpenter working as such for a railroad company, was carried on the company's cars to and from his work as part of his contract of hiring. He was not to be esteemed as employed in the same general service with the hands running the train or repairing the track of the road, so as to relieve the company from responsibility for injury to him from their negligence: Id.

The master is bound to use ordinary care in providing suitable structure, machinery, tools, &c., and in selecting proper servants, and is liable to other servants in the same employment, if they are injured by his own neglect of duty: Id.

A railroad company is bound to furnish a safe and sufficient roadway to its servants, as well as others travelling over it. The remote negligence of servants as to the roadway will not excuse the non-performance of such duty: Id.

If the substructure of a road be suffered to lie until it has become rotten and unsafe, it is the negligence of the company: Id.

Casualty from such cause is not an ordinary peril which one taking service in the company is presumed to incur: Id.

In a suit by an employee of a railroad company who held the relation of a passenger, the court charged, that the baggage-car is an improper place for a passenger to ride; whether the rule against it was communicated to him or not, if he left his seat in the passenger-car and went into the baggage-car it was negligence, which nothing less than a direction or invitation from the conductor would excuse; such invitation should not be inferred from his having ridden there frequently with the

knowledge of the conductor, and without objection. Held, to be error: Id.

The conductor is the person to administer the rules of the company, and apply them according to the circumstances. The passenger-travel is under his directions and should conform to them. From the nature of his position he must exercise some discretion: Id.

Contributory Negligence of Plaintiff.—In an action whose gravamen is negligence, it is the duty of the plaintiff to show a case clear of contributory negligence. There must be shown a prima facie case resulting exclusively from the wrong of the defendant, before he can be called to answer: Waters v. Wing, 59 Pa.

The plaintiff's horse was killed by the shaft of the defendant's carriage running into him, both being on a public highway. The defendant asked the court to charge: "That the defendant had a right to be on the public highway, and if the jury believe that at the time of the alleged accident he was travelling in an ordinary manner, he is not liable for an injury resulting from such use of the public thoroughfare." Held, that the point should have been affirmed; Id.

PARTNERSHIP. See Insurance.

RAILROAD. See Negligence.

Negligence. It is the duty of a railroad company as of a natural person to exercise its rights with a considerate and prudent regard for the rights and safety of others: Pennsylvauia R. R. Co. v. Barnett, 59 Pa.

It is not a justification that the act producing the injury was lawful or done in exercising a lawful right, if the injury arose from doing it negligently: Id.

The engine of the defendants having given no notice of its approach whistled under a bridge whilst a traveller was passing over it: his horses took fright, ran off, and injured the traveller. Held, that if danger might be reasonably apprehended, it was the duty of the company to give some warning: Id.

If it would have been negligence in the traveller to drive upon the bridge just as the train was about to pass under it, had he been aware of its approach, he was entitled to notice, and it was the duty of the company to give it: Id.

Negligence is always a question for the jury, when there is any doubt as to the facts or the inference to be drawn from them: Id.

If danger to the person or property of others at any point may be reasonably apprehended, or is likely to result from the running of trains without notice, it is the duty of the company to give notice: Id.

Sounding the whistle under a bridge as a traveller was passing over, which causes the horses to run away through fright and injure the traveller, was a sufficiently proximate cause of injury to create a liability on the company: Id.

INDEX.

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.

Where there is no dispute between parties as to the facts, or amount of claim,
a receipt of less than full amount does not constitute an accord and satisfac-
tion. Beardsley v. Davis, 377.

ACTION. See ESTOPPEL, 2; LIMITATIONS, 2; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 17;
WASTE.

1. Will lie against conveyancer for error in judgment, and rule of liability
is the same as in the case of lawyers and physicians. Watson v. Muirhead, 310.
2. Will not lie to compel one to render an account and to re-convey real
estate, which he holds under a conveyance made to defraud creditors. Sweet
v. Tinslar, 438.

1864, June 11.
1864, June 30.
1865, Feb.
1867, Feb. 5.
1867, March 2.

See TAXATION.

See BANKRUPTCY, 1.

ADMINISTRATOR.' See EXECUTOR.

ADMIRALTY See COMMON CARRIER, 9.

1. A cause of action to be cognisable in admiralty must relate to the busi-
ness of commerce and navigation. People v. Steamer America, 182.

2. A state pilot law, enacting that all vessels shall take a pilot, but con-
taining no clause exempting the vessels from liability for the pilot's misman-
agement, does not protect a vessel, with a pilot on board, from liability for
torts done by it, though such torts are the result of the pilot's negligence.
The China, 437.

3. State statutes authorizing actions in rem against vessels for causes cog-
nisable in admiralty are statutes conferring admiralty jurisdiction, and are
therefore unconstitutional. Jackson v. Steamer Kinnie, 470.

4. A lien created by a state law against a domestic vessel for supplies fur-
nished in a home port cannot be recognised or enforced in a court of admiralty.
Id.

ADMIRALTY.

The

5. Where in case of collision, there is reasonable doubt as to which vessel
is to blame, the loss must be sustained by the one on which it has fallen.
Grace Girdle, 438.

AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENCE.

AGENT. See BAILMENT, 2;

See PRACTICE, 3.

BROKER, 1, 3; DAMAGES, 7; STATUTE OF
FRAUDS, 5; INSURANCE, 9; INTERNATIONAL LAW, 10; VENDOR AND
PURCHASER, 13.

1. A local board of directors, established by a foreign corporation in New
York, under regulations of the statute of that state, no matter how complete
its organization or how full its authority to transact business without consulta-
tion with its principal, is still a mere agency, and not a distinct corporation.
Robinson v. Life Assurance Co., 166.

2. Therefore a contract, as of insurance, made by this New York board
with the plaintiff, a citizen of Virginia, was the contract of the foreign cor-
poration with plaintiff, and the government of the foreign corporation being
a neutral and having recognised the government of the plaintiff as a be-
lligerent, the contract was not suspended by the civil war in America, and
payment of premiums to a sub-agent of the corporation, at Richmond, was a
valid payment to the corporation. Id.

3. A party dealing with an agent for a special purpose must ascertain at
his own peril the agent's power. The National Iron Co. v. Bruner, 244.

4. An agent with restricted power to sell land at a given price, cannot
bind his principal, by representations as to quantity or quality. Id.

5. The fact that an instrument is made payable at a bank does not make
the bank an agent of payce to receive payment, unless he actually deposits
the instrument there, or in some express manner authorizes the bank to act
for him. Ward v. Smith, 354.

6. When an instrument is lodged with a bank for collection, the bank
becomes the agent of the payee or obligee to receive payment. The agency
extends no further, and without special authority an agent can only receive
payment of the debt due his principal in the legal currency of the country, or
in bills which pass as money at their par value by the common consent of the
community. Id.

7. Authority to receive payment implies authority to receive it in whatever
was regarded as money at the time and place of payment. Confederate notes
being so regarded and being received in good faith by the agent were a valid
medium of payment, as between the plaintiff and the corporation. Id.

8. Accepting employment hostile to the interests of his employer, is guilty
of breach of contract and may be discharged therefor. Morrison v. Ogdens
burgh & Champlain Railroad, 382.

AGREEMENT. See ATTORNEY, 1; STATUTE OF FRAUDS, 1-6; INTEREST, 1.

It is not necessary to constitute an agreement that a proposition made by
letter should be accepted expressly, it is sufficient if acted upon and complied
with. Beardsley v. Davis, 377.

ALIEN.

1. The Act of Congress of February 10th 1855, which declares "that any
woman, who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws, married,
or who shall be married to a citizen of the United States, shall be deemed
and taken to be a citizen," confers the privileges of citizenship upon women
married to citizens of the United States, if they are of the class of persons for
whose naturalization the previous Acts of Congress provide. Kelly v. Owen
et al., 444.

2. The terms "married" or "who shall be married," in the act, do not
refer to the time when the ceremony of marriage is celebrated, but to the state
of marriage. Id.

3. The citizenship of the husband wherever it exists, confers citizenship on
the wife. Id.

4. Any woman being a free white person, and an alien friend, married
after the approval of the Act of February 10th 1855, to a man who was, at the