chase, under the approbation of the Court of Chancery, certain real estates in Yorkshire out of the residue of personal estate bequeathed to them "for such charitable and pious uses as they in their discretion should think fit." They then appropriated the rents and profits for ever to be applied on certain charitable trusts in North America, which were approved of by the court. The trust estate continued to remain within the jurisdiction of the court. The trusts failing for want of objects, a scheme was entertained for their new appointment, and the administration was entrusted to other hands. Upon these grounds, this case is very capable of being supported, notwithstanding what was lately said of it by the Court of Privy Council (s).

The Court of Chancery will also interpose where there appear to be no instruments of the founder's benevolence; or where he has named such by an official description, and there is no such office; or where there has been such, but it has ceased to exist. For the first object of the court is to provide a trustee ;—and not to part with the trust fund until is satisfied that there is a party to account for the management, either to its own or some other jurisdiction. Thus where a testator bequeathed stock in the funds to the British consul-general and treasurer of the British Contribution Fund in Lisbon, upon certain trusts, for the benefit of widows and orphans in Portugal; but, between the date of the will and his death, the British Contribution Fund was abolished by act of parliament, and the office of treasurer consequently ceased (t); the Master of the Rolls refused to settle a scheme for the future administration of the charity, as the charitable bequest was in no way affected by the non-existence of the office in question. But his honour said that the failure of a trustee would be supplied by the court, and he therefore referred it to the master to

(s) 1 Moore, 296.

(t) Att. Gen. v. Stephens, 3 M. & K. 347.

M

approve of a proper person to be trustee jointly with the

relator.

Thus where a testator devised considerable property in India for charitable purposes, and among others for the establishment of a college in the territories of the King of Oude, but named no persons in that state to carry the trust into effect, and it did not distinctly appear upon the master's report, or in the appended correspondence, that the British resident there, or the governor-general of India, had the means of giving effect to the bequest, but only that the latter was willing to receive the funds (u); it was resolved, on appeal from the supreme court of Calcutta, by the judicial committee of the privy council, that further inquiry should be made as to the power of the governor-general to aid trustees to be appointed by the supreme court for the purpose; and if the court were satisfied that in that or any other way such trustees could give it effect, then the fund was to be paid over to them, and to be administered by them under the direction of the court. It was observed by Lord Brougham, that, although Oude possibly might be an independent state, the court could not shut its eyes to the weight the Indian government had with the court of Lucknow and that it could hardly be said that the authorities there were wholly on the footing of a foreign and unconnected state. "The jurisdiction of the supreme court, moreover, extends over all British subjects residing within the limits of the charter, whether in the British or native dominions: and this affords facilities for the due execution of the charity under the court's superintendence, which could not exist in any of the cases cited" (x).

On the same principle the court will interpose, where there is a trust for a charity that is manifestly intended to be established abroad, but no particular locality has

(u) Mayor of Lyons v. East India (x) Ibid. p. 298. Company, 1 Moore, 272.

been pointed out. In selecting a place for the establishment and management of such a charity, regard will be had not only to situation, jurisdiction of a competent court, and general convenience; but, besides all these, to the probable wishes of the founder. Thus in the case of Cockburn v. Raphael (y), already cited, there being no direction in the will as to where the proposed Armenian college was to be established, the court confirmed the master's report, and directed it to be established at Venice. It appeared from the report that there were far greater facilities for conducting it at Venice than at Constantinople or in Armenia. There was already a famous convent of learned Armenians at Venice, and constant opportunities were afforded for bringing over youths of that nation from Constantinople to that port. The testator, though himself an Armenian, had nominated the Father Pusani, a Venetian Lazarist, residing at Venice at the date of his will, to be his trustee, with power to appoint his own successors: and on that power the father had acted so long back as 1792, by nominating the abbot-general of his convent, and his successors, to be the trustees of the charity. Under these circumstances the decree was pronounced, confirming the master's report, and directing certain specific things to be done, which were founded upon it. The court laid great stress on the presumed intentions of the testator, as evidenced by the appointment of Pusani. His honour was of opinion that the nomination of that gentleman, who was at the time a monk of the convent of S. Lazarus at Venice, was a sufficient intimation of the testator's intention as to where the charity should be established.

The question as to the extent to which the court will go in controlling the administration of a foreign charity, where doubts may arise-1st, As to who are the persons in whom the trust and confidence of the founder appear

(y) Before Sir L. Shadwell, V. C. Ante, p. 159. of England, Hilary Term, 1842.

to have been reposed; and, 2ndly, As to the competence of the foreign tribunal to control or prevent a mal-administration of the funds,-has been raised in a recent case (z). By his will, dated London, July 21st, 1835, Robert Mitford willed, devised, and bequeathed the remainder of his property, of whatsoever kind and description, that might arise from the sale of his effects, (after deducting the annual amount that would be requisite for a certain purpose,) "to the government of Bengal, to the express purpose of that government applying the amount to charitable, beneficial, and public works in the city of Dacca in Bengal; the intent of such bequest and direction being that the amount should be applied exclusively to the benefit of the native inhabitants in the manner they and the government might regard to be most conducive to that end." There was a like provision as to two annuities after lapse. It appeared from the letters patent establishing the supreme court of Calcutta, that that court had the means of controlling the administration of the charity even in the hands of the government of Bengal, by process of sequestration. It also appeared that there was a master of the supreme court, whose duties were analogous to those of the masters in Chancery. The Vice Chancellor of England decided that the bequest was not void for uncertainty, thus establishing the charity as against the next of kin. It appears, however, that his honour gave no direction for transferring more than the dividends of the trust fund. An appeal was made from this decision, which has been argued before Lord Cottenham, C., and again before Lord Chancellor Lyndhurst, in Michaelmas Term, 1841. It now waits for judgment.

Illegal Gifts to Foreign Charities.

It will not be out of place to refer the reader to what

(z) Mitford v. Reynolds. Before

Sir L. Shadwell, V. C., 25th of July,

1838, 2 Jurist, 886. Now on appeal

to the Lord Chancellor.

has been already said concerning the illegality of domestic charities of a certain description, and of the cy-pres application of the fund by the court. In respect of gifts to foreign charities, the old law is still capable of being enforced where the donors or donees are not qualified subjects of relief within the meaning of the Relief Acts (a). The 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 115, which is in terms confined to charities within Great Britain, merely places such charities on the same footing with those of dissenters, "and not further or otherwise." No dissenting charities but such as are duly qualified both in respect of their foundations and of the persons concerned in them, are warranted under their own Toleration Acts. Neither the Catholic Relief Acts, nor the Catholic Charities Act, have a wider operation than what has been given to the acts for the toleration of dissenters. Beyond that operation, the ancient law touching donations made by Roman Catholics within the realm, and certain of its dominions in favour of foreign charities, such as it has been laid down by Duke, and assented to by the courts in several modern cases, still obtains in all its force. Thus much, at least, is certain. But unless the cases of West v. Shuttleworth, and The Attorney General v. Todd, have been erroneously decided, it is impossible to support the legality of gifts by donors here to Roman Catholic charities in any foreign countries, not being parcel of the queen's dominions. If the Relief Acts have not removed the disability, even from qualified Roman Catholic subjects, it is certain that the Charities Act has not, for it was confined to Great Britain. If those decisions, therefore, are now law, all such foreign charities are still within the rule of De Garcin v. Lawson (b). There the testatrix had given legacies to foreign Roman Catholic establishments as well as domestic, among which were the English Black Nuns at Paris, the Benedictine Monks at Cambray, and the English Benedictine Monks of a place in Lorraine.

(a) Vide ante, p. 131.

(b) 4 Ves. 433, note.