CHAPTER VI.

FORT DONELSON.

REORGANIZATION.-ORDAR OF MARCH.-MOCLERNAND AND SMITH MOVE.—Å GLANCE AT THE FORT.-RIVER-FRONT.-LAND APPROACHES.-GARRISON AND COMMANDERS.— ASSAULT UPON THE TRENCHES.-UNSUCCESSFUL.-STORM AND COLD.-RE-ENFORCEMENTS UNDER L. WALLACE. THE ATTACK OF THE GUNBOATS.-TERRIBLE CANNONADE.-FOOTE WITHDRAWS.-VALUE OF HIS ATTACK.-REBEL COUNTER-PLANS.-Our RIGHT ATTACKED AND ROLLED BACK.-GRANT'S CONSUMMATE PLAN.-L. WALLACE MOVES.

As Fort Henry was designed to obstruct the navigation of the Tennessee, so Fort Donelson was the work upon which the rebels depended to seal the Cumberland and to protect Nashville. No sooner had the former fallen, than Grant made his dispositions to assault the latter. He saw the importance of taking time by the forelock, and confusing the already dismayed Confederates by the rapidity of his assault. He reorganized his forces, and sent for all available re-enforcements that had been collecting at Cairo. His army was formed for this new service into two divisions: the first, under Brigadier-General J. A. McClernand, containing three brigades, under Colonels Oglesby, W. H. L. Wallace, and Morrison; the second, under Brigadier-General Charles F. Smith, of three brigades, under Colonels Cook, Lauman, and McArthur: a third will appear in our narrative, under Brigadier-General Lewis Wallace, to be composed of his brigade of Smith's division, and of forces that were being sent forward by General Halleck. With McClernand's division were the field-batteries of Schwartz, Taylor, Dresser, and McAllister; and with Smith were the heavy batteries. of Richardson, Stone, and Walker; all Smith's artillery

being under Major Cavender, as chief of artillery. Grant's cavalry consisted of the Fourth Illinois cavalry, with several independent companies. The composition of Wallace's provisional division will be given hereafter.*

By Grant's general field-orders No. 12, of February 11, 1862, we find the order of march arranged as follows: One brigade of McClernand's division was to move by the Telegraph road from Fort Henry directly upon Fort Donelson, and to halt within two miles of the fort; the other three brigades to march by the Dover Ridge road to within the same distance, and then to unite with the first in forming the right wing in the complete investment of the fort.

Two brigades of Smith's (second) division were to follow by the Dover road, and these were to be followed by the troops who had occupied the unfinished Fort Heiman, as soon as they could be sent forward. As the force of the enemy was variously reported, details of the attack could not be given until the ground was reached; but Smith was directed to occupy Dover, if practicable, and thus to cut off all retreat by the river.

In accordance with these general directions, which were to be much modified when they reached the ground, McClernand and Smith marched across the country from the Tennessee River to the Cumberland, on the morning of February 12, to attack the works on the land side; while six regiments, which were to constitute a portion of Wallace's (third) division, were moved by transports, accompanied by the gunboats, from Smithland up the Cumberland, to join in the movement by an attack on the river-front, or to be disposed of as circumstances should afterwards require. In order to gain time, the movement was made after very rapid and unsatisfactory preparation. The gunboats had been overhauled in a very hasty manner, to repair the damages received in the

* General Lewis Wallace belonged to the division of General C. F. Smith, and when Grant moved against Fort Donelson he was left in command of Forts Henry and Heiman, garrisoned from General Smith's command.

attack on Fort Henry; but, impatient of delay, and perhaps determined that they should not again get the start of him, and still more cogently, because Grant knew the immense value of every minute of time just at this juncture, he pushed forward with the two divisions mentioned, to the siege and assault. One of Smith's brigades had been left at Fort Henry, as a garrison, under Lewis Wallace. All boats were deflected from the Tennessee to the Cumberland; many others had joined the great convoy, and the Union army was converging in all its strength upon Fort Donelson.

Let us look for a moment at the work to be attacked. This stronghold was placed upon a high hill on the left bank of the river, where it makes an abrupt turn from north to west, flowing in the latter direction for about a quarter of a mile, and then turning northward again. By this location a large number of guns could be trained directly down the stream, and pour a terrible storm of fire upon the advancing gunboats. At the foot of the hill, riverward, were two strong water-batteries, with massive epaulments; the embrasures revetted with coffee-sacks filled with sand. The armament of the lower, or main battery, consisted of eight thirty-twos, and one ten-inch columbiad; that of the other was one heavy rifled gun, carrying a one hundred and twenty-eight pound bolt, and two thirty-two pound carronades. These batteries were sunken or excavated in the hill-side. The fort itself was of irregular form, its trace following the inequalities of the hill, and inclosing nearly one hundred acres. It was flanked by a creek or back-water below, which is not generally fordable; and just above, a small creek separates it from the town of Dover, which is one mile above the fort, on the river-bank. It needs but one glance at the map to show that the works were exceedingly strong on the river-front.

We turn to the land approaches. Taking advantage of the topography of the field, which presents a conglomerate of hills and valleys, knolls and ravines, the rebels had cleared away all the timber, which could mask an enemy's advance, and erected field-works defended by artillery and infantry, from

the extreme western angle of the fort, following the southern direction of a ridge, and thus presenting a natural flanking arrangement of all the parts. Still in front of this extended line, encircling the fort and the intrenchment, and the town of Dover, was a line of detached rifle-trenches, constructed of logs, forming a slight parapet; and in front of the whole was slashed timber, as an abatis. It seemed quite as strong on the landward side as on the river-front, and the work before Grant appeared still more difficult, when we consider the strength of the rebel garrison.

It consisted of thirteen regiments of Tennessee troops, two of Kentucky, six of Mississippi, one of Texas, two of Alabama, four of Virginia, two independent battalions of Tennessee infantry, and Forrest's brigade of cavalry; and, besides the armament of the fort and water-batteries, six batteries of light artillery and seventeen heavy guns. The force, numbering at least twenty-one thousand men, was skilfully disposed; but the Confederate authorities had erred fatally in their choice of commanders. General Floyd, whom the rebels should have been more sagacious than to have preferred to any office of responsibility and trust, however proper he might have been as an aspirant for a post of profit, had been ordered by General A. S. Johnston to the command of Fort Donelson, and had assumed it, without delay, on the 13th, the day after Grant's movement had begun. Here at once were fatal elements; he was not only a traitor, but he was believed to be a dishonest man, and circumstances were to prove him a coward. Notwithstanding his preferment to the United States secretaryship of war, under Buchanan, it was patent that he knew little of military matters; and it was certain that he knew nothing whatever of the fort, its topography, or its garrison. The next in rank was General Gideon J. Pillow, whom Floyd had assigned to the official command of the rebel left wing, in and around Dover. He too had only arrived there on the 10th, and being by nature as obtuse, and, in spite of some Mexican practice, or rather mal-practice, as ignorant as Floyd, he was of small value as a leader in the defence. The other

prominent commanders were Buckner and B. R. Johnson, both graduates of West Point, and highly esteemed for intelligence and bravery, when subordinates in our army. Buckner had command of the fort, and the ground in its immediate vicinity, while Johnson had a command on the left under Pillow. Such briefly was the work, and such the force, moral and physical, which General Grant rushed to attack with two divisions, not more in all than fifteen thousand men, and with a greater proportional weakness in artillery. This was sublime hardihood; but it was something more; it was at once the impulsion and the intuition of military genius. He knew little of the difficult topography, which maps never can adequately tell; but he meant to fight, and to continue fighting, and to force the rebels to fight. Time was of priceless value, and "confusion magnifying the foe," the rebels were deceived, as he meant them to be, by his boldness and temerity.

And now let us return to McClernand and Smith, who, preceded by the cavalry to clear the front, began their march on the morning of the 12th, from the neighborhood of Fort Henry. They came within view of the fort by early afternoon, without having encountered the enemy, who was stupidly caging himself in the intrenchment, instead of coming out like a man to beat, or at least retard, Grant's advancing columns. Our generals took up, that night, the positions assigned. On the morning of Thursday, the 13th, the fighting began with the dawn, the rebels opening their batteries upon our troops, whose positions were disclosed by the advance of Birge's sharp-shooters upon the enemy's picket line.

Under this as yet desultory fire, Grant rapidly posted his divisions thus: General C. F. Smith on the left, opposite the northwest of the fort; and McClernand on the right, Oglesby's brigade holding the extreme right. The light artillery was placed with proper supports upon the various roads, while most of the heavy guns, under Major Cavender, were directed against the armament of the fort. General Grant's headquarters were at a farm-house, on the Fort Henry road.