And here, while he stands in our narrative at the parting of the ways, let us briefly advert to the retrospect, and then glance at the prospect before him.

RETROSPECT.

First, let us see what he had done to make himself, in violation of the maxim of the French philosopher,* a necessary man to the American people. From the day of his second entry into the service as a colonel of volunteers, he had been continually in the field, and not sunning his uniform in the streets of our great cities. He had been constantly enlarging his sphere of action. His name became speedily known to the country, and the laconic philosophy of his dispatches gave the people something to take hold of and ring the chimes upon; some undesignedly eloquent epigram of each great victory. At Fort Donelson, the "unconditional surrender" which he demanded gave a new significance to the initial letters of his name. "I propose to move immediately upon your works," struck a popular chord. Hard pressed at Pittsburg Landing, he told Sherman a characteristic story on the field, illustrating the secret of victory, and ordered him to assume the offensive.

After the great campaign which concluded with the capture of Vicksburg, he received from President Lincoln an autograph letter, magnanimously confessing that he had not been in favor of the plan of the campaign, and ending thus: "I now wish to make a personal acknowledgment, that you were right and I was wrong." He had opened the Mississippi from the head-waters to the mud-islands of the Delta.

In really serious straits at Chattanooga, his animals dying by thousands, and his men in danger of starving-not, however, by any fault of his own, for he only assumed command to find the situation such-he had received Bragg's merciful message to remove the non-combatants, and had heard

* La Rochefoucauld says: "Il n'y a pas d'homme nécessaire."

Bragg's characteristic boast that in three days' time Grant's army would be flying in hungry disorder to Nashville; whereas, in three days' time, Bragg's disordered hosts, flanked and beaten in front, were flying southward before Grant's attack.

He had asked for nothing from the Government; had refused to make capital by making speeches; would not be approached on political questions; escaped, except when cornered, from public demonstrations, public dinners, and the like; and now the young man, unknown to the public four years before-wood-dealer, collector, farmer, leather-dealer, and yet always an honest man and a gentleman-had come to Washington to receive his reward, the very greatest to which an American had ever attained.

PROSPECT.

But it was something far more and far different. We have glanced at the retrospect: let us look for a moment at the nature of the prospect-not simply, as before, one of partial trial and danger and glory, but of a sole and crushing responsibility. As his hand grasped the glittering wreath, it turned magically into a flaming sword, and a voice, like apocalyptic thunders, cried "Onward!" The stars shone, indeed, but only to disclose dimly in the darkness new dangers, new struggles, vigils never intermitted; and it was a very bold man indeed-one of sleepless soul, indomitable courage, and undying patriotism, who, amid the roaring Red Sea of battle, the breakers of official dictation, the misapprehension of profound plans by an impatient and impressible public, who saw only the surface, and last, but not least, the Syrtis Major of politics-could assume such a charge at such a time, even with all its honors. Would he flutter and flounder and fall, like the historical dignitaries of other days, and like the many experimental generals of our own times, who were tasked above their powers, and failed miserably? Or would he succeed completely, and achieve a colossal, an unrivalled fame? Surely, in the latter case, would be applicable to him the

words uttered by the eloquent Tully to the clement Cæsar, in which he declares, that in the praise then accorded, the great general has neither rival nor sharers; it is beyond the power of cohort, centurion, or prefect.* He stands alone.

"At vero hujus gloriæ, C. Cæsar, quam es paulo ante adeptus, socium habes neminem: totum hoc quantum cumque est, quod certe maximum est, totum est, inquam, tuum. Nihil ex ista laude centurio, nihil præfectus, nihil cohors, nihil turma decerpit."-ORAT. PRO M. MARCELLO, II. 7.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

GRANT'S CONVICTIONS.-EVILS TO BE REMEDIED.-THE NEW PLAN.-THe great theATRE-HOW OCCUPIED.-THE REBEL ARMIES.-LEE AND JOHNSTON.-OUR OPPOSING ARMIES.-BANKS IN VIRGINIA.-DIRECTIONS TO GENERAL BUTLER.-SIGEL'S IN

STRUCTIONS.

BEFORE proceeding to follow the personal movements of Lieutenant-General Grant, as he accompanied the Army of the Potomac, shared its fortunes, and generally directed its movements, let us now pause for a moment to glance at the whole field, and present a summary of his plans and purposes as the director and supervisor of all the campaigns. His clear and capacious mind had been silently at work on the great problem, before his appointment as general-in-chief. He had long been impressed with the idea that the operations must be continuous and unremitting, without regard to weather, season, or climate.

We had an active, brave, and desperate enemy. The absolute despotism of the Confederate government enabled it to bring into the service every man and boy capable of bearing arms; and if the enemy was inferior in numbers and in resources, that was more than counterbalanced by manifest advantages. He was able to move always upon interior lines, and stood upon a general defensive, which he could easily turn into an offensive. He could transport troops with ease, in order to mass the same bodies, at different times, against our separate armies. Seeking the strong points, he could abandon territory at pleasure, without losing in a military

point of view. While our armies were resting or inactive, by reason of weather and roads, he could furlough a portion of every force, to plant crops or provide supplies, calling them together, as soon as threatened, to resist our new advance. Those who were unfit to take the field, were employed in general preparations, and as provosts in collecting and returning deserters.

On the other hand, we had a very large territory to hold and garrison, surrounded by a hostile population; extensive communications by land and water to protect; and increased difficulty in providing supplies, the further we advanced. Independent action of our armies, at the East and West, had been productive of great evil. As in a baulky team, the “pull all together" was wanting; and it had frequently happened that a victory in the East was partially neutralized by disasters at the West, and vice versa. All this Grant had seen and deplored.

GRANT'S PURPOSE.

The plans of the lieutenant-general may be thus epitomized. Starting with the postulate that the sole object confided to him was to destroy the military power of the rebellion, and feeling sure that, this done, its whole power, its life indeed, would be destroyed, Grant proposed-First: To counterpoise the enemy's interior advantages, by engaging him at all important points at once and continuously, that he might not shift his troops as before, without exposing weak points where he would readily be beaten. Second: To make unrelenting war against his main armies. Beat them if possible; but if that could not be done at once, wear them out by constant shocks and constant attrition. In the latter case, he saw that force of numbers alone would, in the end, produce the desired result. He depended greatly, also, and not without reason, upon the valor and skill of our armies; and the country depended, with entire confidence, upon him.