arose in a case upon a judgment rendered in Canada, Mr. Justice COOLEY said:

"The question, then, seems to be narrowed to this: Whether the service of process beyond the jurisdiction of the court issuing it can impose upon the party served the obligation to appear in the suit, and make there his defense, if he has any. If this question must be answered in the affirmative as regards a judgment rendered in Canada, it must receive a like answer when it contemplates a judgment rendered on a like service in New Zealand, or in one of the colonial courts of the Dutch East Indies.

*

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Now, the service of process is for the purpose of notifying the defendant, and giving him a fair opportunity to defend. But the service of process in Michigan, which requires one to appear and answer to a demand in a foreign country, would, in general, be of no value whatever, because a defense abroad would either be practically impossible, or would be so expensive as to exceed in cost the importance of the demand. It may therefore justly and emphatically be declared that such service would give no fair opportunity to defend, and consequently could not accomplish the purpose of process. Were the doctrine accepted which would permit it, it might reasonably be anticipated that fictitious claims would be asserted abroad against Americans who, for business or pleasure, had visited foreign countries, and would become established claims by default in a defense which a party wrongfully charged could not afford to make. We think the doctrine has no foundation in reason or in the principles of international law or international comity."

The same general rule is adopted in Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462; Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457. And in the state of California, where the judgment was rendered, it is held that a judgment obtained by publication of summons against the defendant, then out of the state in which the judgment is rendered, has no binding force in personam, and is a mere nullity when attempted to be enforced in another state. Kane v. Cook, 8 Cal. 449.

There is therefore no theory upon which the action of

the court below can be sustained, and the judgment will be reversed, with costs of this Court to the defendant, and a new trial granted.

The other Justices concurred.

EDWIN F. CONELY ET AL. V. THE COMMON COUNCIL OF
THE CITY OF DETROIT.

Elections-Appointment of inspectors—Vacancies.

Where, in redistricting a city into election districts, some of the former districts remain unchanged, and additional districts are created, the common council has power, under the election law of 1891, to appoint inspectors of election for such additional districts.

Mandamus. Argued November 3, 1892. Denied November 4, 1892.

Relators applied for mandamus to compel respondent to vacate proceedings appointing election inspectors. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Harry F. Chipman and Edwin Henderson, for relators.

John J. Speed and Henry M. Duffield, for respondent. PER CURIAM. Until recently the city of Detroit was divided into 63 election districts. Under an act to amend the charter (Act No. 564, Local Acts of 1887), five inspectors of election for each of said 63 districts had been elected. Recently the common council has redistricted the city, creating 102 election districts. Some of the former districts remain unchanged. On October 4, 1892, the com

mon council, by resolution, appointed five inspectors of election for each of the 102 districts. In the districts which had been undisturbed by the resubdivision, the inspectors who had been elected under the act of 1887 were appointed as inspectors in such districts. On the 2d day of November, 1892, the council adopted an ordinance designating and reappointing the inspectors named in the resolution of October 4, 1892. A mandamus is applied for to compel the common council to vacate the proceedings making such appointments, upon the ground that under the act of 1887 all vacancies are to be filled by the electors in each district at the time of the opening of the polls on election day.

The mandamus must be denied. 1887 provides that—

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Section 2 of the act of

Any vacancy in their number, caused by failure or inability to elect by ballot, or by removal or death, may be filled for the remainder of said term by the electors present by viva voce vote, at the opening of the polls at any general or special election, and any vacancy caused by sickness or absence may in like manner be filled for the time being upon the opening of the polls at any general or special election."

In the present case, however, no inspectors have ever been elected in such new districts as have been carved out of or include new territory; consequently no vacancies can be said to exist in those districts, and the act of 1887 contains no provision to meet such an emergency. In cases where new counties have been formed, the power given to the Governor to fill vacancies does not authorize him to appoint county officers, but in each instance the act creating the new county empowers the Governor to appoint provisional officers. Dingwall v. Common Council, 82 Mich. 568, was a case involving the filling of vacancies under the act of 1887, and has no application to the present case. In People v. Lord, 9 Mich. 227, and Lawrence v. Hanley, 84 Id.

399, the Court held that the death of a person elected to office before he qualified and entered upon the duties of his office created no vacancy, and the reason was simply because there was an incumbent of the office elected to serve until his successor should be elected, qualify, and enter upon the duties of the office. Here there is no vacancy in the office, because no office or officer for that district ever existed.

Section 4 of the general election law (Act No. 190, Laws of 1891), provides:

"In case of townships and incorporated villages so divided, the provisions of chapter 8 of Howell's Annotated Statutes shall apply to and govern all proceedings hereunder, with reference to such division, boards of registration, election inspectors, and all matters arising therefrom not provided for by this act. In cities where no special provisions exist relative thereto, such division, and all matters arising therefrom, not covered by the provisions of this act, shall be provided for by ordinance of the common council of said city; and it is hereby made the duty of such common council to make all necessary rules and regulations in connection therewith to fully carry out the provisions of this section." This provision gave to the council full power to act in the premises, and the mandamus must be denied.

JOSEPH TYLER V. THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF OCEANA
COUNTY.

Mandamus-Failure to frame issue-Compensation of sheriff.

Where the answer of the board of supervisors to the petition of the sheriff for a mandamus to compel the auditing of his account for serving a requisition sets up as a defense the payment of the account by a third party, and the relator proceeds

to a hearing upon the petition and answer, the answer must be taken as true, and the application will be denied.

Mandamus. Argued October 4, 1892. Denied November 18, 1892.

Relator applied for mandamus to compel the allowance of his bill for services rendered in serving a requisition. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Fred J. Russell and John D. S. Hanson, for relator. H. W. Harpster, Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent. PER CURIAM. The relator is sheriff of Oceana county, and presented a bill to respondent for services rendered and expenses incurred in serving a requisition issued by the Governor of the State, and directed to the governor of the state of Montana, for the apprehension of one Charles E. McClure. The petition sets out that these services were rendered at the request of the prosecuting attorney of the county, and that the board of supervisors refused to audit the bill. The answer of the board sets up that one John V. Cahill, who was surety on the appearance bond for McClure, undertook to pay relator for his expenses and services, and that he had made such payment, and that the board so found when the bill was presented.

The relator proceeded to hearing without asking that any issue be framed, and, under these circumstances, the answer of respondent must be taken as true. Merrill v. County Treasurer, 61 Mich. 95; Murphy v. Town Treasurer, 56 Id. 505; Hickey v. Supervisors, 62 Id. 100; Post v. Township Board, 63 Id. 324.

The application must be denied, with costs.

93 MICH.-29.