1865. COWPER V. FLETCHER. per my et per tout, intending to give the plaintiff exclusive possession of the whole, agreed to let to him those twothirds, and allowed him to have exclusive possession of the remaining third, which was his. In James v. Portman (a) the Judges were not quite agreed, but there is the authority of Lord Coke, in Co. Litt. 186 a, that "one joint-tenant may let his part for years or at will to his companion;" and I cannot understand those words in any other than the ordinary sense of a lease with the incident of distress attached to it. I am inclined to think that the effect of making a separate demise to one is a severance of the joint-tenancy. Here then is a lease with a reversion, and a right of distress. But if a lease by one joint-tenant to another be an impossibility in law, the parties intended that in consideration of an annual sum to be paid by the plaintiff exclusive possession of the whole should be given to him each of the others retires from the possession of his part and gives him exclusive possession of the whole; and though he was entitled to one part, I incline to think that during his exclusive possession he would be estopped from saying that he was not tenant. Such was the argument of that eminent person Plowden, in Pleadall's Case (b), and assented to by the Court, and I do not see why we should not support the validity of the distress on that ground also; but I think the first is the true ground upon which our judgment should rest. MELLOR J. At the trial I inclined to think that the (a) Ow. 102. (b) 2 Leon. 159. transaction operated by way of estoppel against the plaintiff. On the motion for the rule nisi by Mr. Brett, we looked for some authority upon the subject, and not finding any the rule was granted. Although we have not met with much authority, I do not think that if more time were taken more would be found. I prefer to rest my judgment on the ground that one joint-tenant may demise his part to the other; and the usual incidents follow, viz., a reversion and rent for which a distress may legally be made. I do not feel the same confidence on the question of estoppel. The authorities bear us out in discharging the rule on the former ground. ་ SHEE J. The authority of Lord Coke is sufficient for discharging this rule. Difficulties have been pointed out by Mr. Brett, but since the opinion expressed by Lord Coke it never appears to have been doubted that one joint-tenant might let his part to the others, and that if he did so the relation of landlord and tenant was created which entitles him to distrain. Rule discharged. 473 1865. COWPER V. FLETCHER. 1865. Saturday, Cardiff 1862, 25 & 26 s. 4. Music. Dancing. Public entertainment. QUAGLIENI, appellant, MATTHEWS, respondent. The Cardiff Borough Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict. c. cxxiii. s. 4., enacts, in language very similar to stat. 25 G. 2. c. 36. s. 2., that "no house, room, or other place within the borough shall be kept or used for public dancing, music, or other public entertainment of the like kind" without a licence: Held, that to bring a case within the statute, 1. The music and dancing must be an essential part of the enter tainment, and not merely accessories to it. 2. It is not necessary that the dancing should be by the public. CASE stated under stat. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43. s. 2. An information was laid before justices of the peace for the borough of Cardiff, by the respondent against the appellant, under The Cardiff Borough Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. cxxiii. s. 4.), alleging that he, on the 14th November, 1864, "did unlawfully keep a place there called 'The Circus' for public music and dancing, without a license for that purpose first had and obtained from the justices of the borough." This information was supported by the following evidence. Richard Watkins.-I am proprietor of a wooden building in St. Mary Street, Cardiff, which is at present occupied by the defendant Quaglieni. He has occupied it four or five weeks. He pays me rent. He occupied it last year two or three months and the year before for three or four months. He occupied it for a Circus-an equestrian entertainment-and did so each year. Crossexamined.I have been there many times, and what I saw there is an exhibition of equestrian skill and gymnastics. I saw no dancing-never. Richard Taylor.-I am Quaglieni's managing agent -have been for two or three years. I take the money at the entrance from the public. The bill produced (accompanying this case) is one issued for the defendant. It bears date the 14th November last. On that evening I took the money as usual. Richard Lee.-I am in Quaglieni's service as leader of the band, which consists of six instrumental performers, they play upon brass instruments, they play composed music. On the 14th November I was engaged in leading the band in the Circus-was there from half past seven to half past ten. The band played the usual Circus music. We play Waltzes, Polkas, Quadrilles, Galops. I cannot tell whether we played that sort of music on the 14th. I don't recollect whether the character of the music was dance music. The Circus is not I suppose carried on any evening without dance music. Some of the defendant's people play without any musicsuch as comic entries, clowns' business and tumbling. I don't think there was a rehearsal on the 14th. There is music at rehearsals for a fresh horse or something of that kind. Cross-examined. The music is for feats of horsemanship. It is necessary to have music to aid the horses in their performances: without it they would not perform so readily. On the 14th there was no music except for horsemanship and gymnastics: music aids such performances. I never saw a Circus without it. In the intervals of the performances there is no musicthe band ceases the moment the performance ceases. Re-examined.-I suppose music is essential to these performances. Robert Hales.-I am a druggist. I was in the defendant's Circus on the 14th-saw Quaglieni there-heard 1865. QUAGLIENI V. MATTHEWS. 1865. QUAGLIENI V. MATTHEWS. him tell Lee to begin the music when the bell rang. |