matter cannot be known without a mind to know it, or conclusively demonstrates that matter cannot exist without some mind to perceive or think of it. It is sufficient to remark that there appears to be but one way by which it may conceivably be shown that the argument does not establish all that it was meant to do, and that this way is clearly not open to the materialist. Although the knowledge of matter must always be accompanied by a knowledge of mind, matter and mind may, with at least an appearance of reason, be argued to be known as distinct and independent, and therefore, to be distinct and independent. But the materialist is obviously precluded from thus arguing, because his materialism necessarily involves sensationalism, and sensationalism necessarily signifies that all knowledge of matter is dependent on the particular constitution of the senses of the individual. Matter can be for the materialist merely what it is felt to be, or what it is imagined to be in consequence of being felt. He cannot consistently pretend to any knowledge of it as it is in itself, or to any knowledge of its properties as independent objective facts. The doctrine of real presentationism is incompatible with a'materialistic theory of the nature of knowledge; and yet, where this doctrine is not maintained, matter cannot even be seriously argued to precede or to exist apart from mind.

The materialist, then, supposes that there exists a matter which is merely objective or entirely independent of thought; but he has no reply to give to any one who maintains that he can only know matter as that which is inseparably associated with mind, and essentially dependent upon thought, or, in other words, that the matter by which he pretends to explain intelligence is matter which presupposes intelligence. He thus starts with a fatal self-contradiction, from which he cannot free himself by any alteration or amendment of his views of matter short of entire renunciation of the doctrine that matter is the absolute first of existence the original of all things. He may cease to think of matter per se as possessed of definiteness and form-he may drop out of his conception of it one distinctive property after another-he may resolve it into conditioned, and even into unconditioned force,-but the self-contradiction will cling to him at the last as firmly as at the first. To get rid of it he may commit mental suicide by casting himself into the abyss of the "unknowable;" but it will hold on by him there more triumphantly than ever, and will not be shaken off until he confess that the unknowable is at least known not to be devoid of knowledge any more than of force.

Materialism, I remark next, affirms that matter is eternal without justifying the assertion. Materialism is manifestly bound to prove the eternity

of matter, since all that is distinctive of the system. rests on this presupposition. Unless matter be eternal it must have been originated. The whole argumentation of the theist in support of the doctrine of the Divine existence is designed to show that the world is not eternal, not self-existent. That there is something eternal and self-existent, the atheist, pantheist, and theist, the materialist and the spiritualist, agree in acknowledging. None of them calls upon the others to explain the mystery of self-existence. Every sane mind receives that mystery and credits other minds with doing the same. Doubt and difference of

opinion are only possible as to what is self-existent or eternal. Is it mind or matter, personal or impersonal, knowable or unknowable? The theist believes it to be mind, and produces what he deems relevant and conclusive evidence to prove that it is mind. What evidence has the materialist to the contrary, and for believing that matter is that which is self-existent and eternal?

Many materialists have the candour to acknowledge that they have none whatever. They confess entire ignorance on the subject. They are ready to accept as a true statement of their position that made by Professor Tyndall on a celebrated occasion. "If you ask the materialist whence is this matter of which we have been discoursing, who or what divided it into molecules,

who or what impressed upon them this necessity of running into organic forms, he has no answer. Science is also mute in reply to these questions. But if the materialist is confounded and science rendered dumb, who else is entitled to answer? To whom has the secret been revealed? Let us lower our heads and acknowledge our ignorance, one and all. Perhaps the mystery may resolve itself into knowledge at some future day. The process of things upon this earth has been one of amelioration. It is a long way from the iguanodon and his contemporaries to the president and members of the British Association. And whether we regard the improvement from the scientific or from the theological point of view, as the result of progressive development, or as the result of successive exhibitions of creative energy, neither view entitles us to assume that man's present faculties end the series-that the process of amelioration stops at him. A time may therefore come when this ultra-scientific region by which we are now enfolded, may offer itself to terrestrial, if not to human, investigation." Now, what is the precise meaning of these words? Is it not that although until the far-distant future age arrives when there are beings on the earth as much superior to the president and members of the British Association as these are to the iguanodon and his contemporaries, no reason be found for believing that matter

is eternal, self-active, and endowed with the promise and potency of all order, life, and thought, yet men may even now speak and reason as if they were quite certain that it is? But surely, if this be what it means, "the long way from the iguanodon and his contemporaries to the president and the members of the British Association," has been as conspicuously one of progress in absurdity as in science. A man who has no reason for believing that matter is eternal, must not merely bow his head and acknowledge his ignorance, but he must cease ascribing eternity to matter, and confess that he has no right to be a materialist. If, notwithstanding his avowed ignorance and the evidence adduced to prove matter created, he habitually assumes that matter is eternal, what else can be said than that he arbitrarily chooses to believe matter eternal, because he would otherwise be bound to believe it created?

How is it that materialists are in general willing to take their stand in such a position? Is it because they cannot find one more tenable? In other words, is it because the only reasons that can be given for believing matter eternal are worse than none? Perhaps it is. At all events, the only reasons that have been given are so weak that the slightest examination is sufficient completely to discredit them.

A German materialist (Dr Löwenthal) gives the