properties of water and become water-oil, then the two, being perfectly similar in nature could unite without difficulty. Placed at any point in such a drop, a conscious soul would have the same sensations as at any other, and thus would not experience division of consciousness between the contradictory properties of the originally differing substances.

1.

Vigorous as this effort at a solution of the difficulty is, we must, I think, vote it a failure, for the following reasons:It seems to be mere speculation without foundation in fact. The theory is developed to explain the possibility of the ubiquity of the body of Christ in the sacrament. If the ubiquity of the body of Christ is a fact, then it needs explanation, and so far as this theory is calculated to explain it, it is to be regarded with favor. But is it a fact? I think, as I shall attempt to show, that it is not.

2. At best the difficulty is transferred, not met. If it be impossible to unite two differing natures in one person, how is it possible to unite two contradictory properties in one nature? How can the human nature possess both ignorance and omniscience with any greater ease than the unity of person can possess them when lodged in different natures?

3. The ground upon which Luther supported the ubiquity of Christ was fallacious. If the presence of the body of Christ in the believer is necessary to his sanctification, confusion is introduced into the doctrine of the trinity. It is the office work of the Holy Spirit to sanctify. Inasmuch as each hypostasis takes part in the work of each of the others, Christ is in the heart of the believer in the work of sanctification, but he is this according to his hypostatic union with the divine spirit, that is, in his divine nature. Inasmuch as the humanity is united, not with the Holy Spirit, but with the Logos, there seems to be no necessity for the presence of the humanity in this work. Indeed, it seems to be excluded by it.

4. The theory when applied, as Luther applied it, to the

God-man from the very moment of the incarnation, destroys the true humanity of Christ. This was Zwingli's argument, and it seems to be philosophically sound. For instance, take temptation. If the human nature of Christ possesses omnipotence, how can it be tempted through human weakness, or defect, such as hunger, which as weakness or defect is excluded by its possession of omnipotence? If it possesses omnipotence only as an acquired property, how can it be tempted in its original property of limitation, while it yet really possesses omnipotence? So of the suffering. What, now, does the doctrine lead us to, except to an apparent temptation, without reality, or to what is substantially the ancient and exploded system of Docetism?

5. Philosophically, it is impossible that the limited human body should receive the property of omnipresence. Take whatever theory of space you may, making it objectively valid or invalid, refine the matter to its greatest subtlety, and yet the body of a man is the exercise of the forces of God in a certain way, and God, while exercising those forces in that particular way, cannot, at the same time, exercise them in a contrary way. That is, a thing cannot both be and not be, both be limited and not be limited. The answer which Luther makes, that this is a mystery, is not a valid answer. A flat contradiction is not a mystery, it is an impossibility.

These objections are, possibly, somewhat modern in their tone. But Luther himself had difficulties, though other ones, with his theory. Since he had made the communicatio idiomatum to take place immediately upon the incarnation instead of at the exaltation of Christ, he had to explain the limitations of space under which the historical Christ was placed when upon earth. He could not give up the communicatio idiomatum for this period, since that would overthrow his explanation of the unity of Christ's person. He therefore resorted to a twofold mode of existence which he as

cribed to Christ. As partaking of the property of divinity, the humanity of Christ partook of omnipresence. But this omnipresence was not an omnipresence everywhere in space -it was an illocal mode of existence, that is a mode of existence having no relation to space. But, so far as the humanity was concerned in and for itself, it had a relation to space, and in this relation was circumscribed and limited, like all other bodies. The difficulty here Luther did not care to

explain.

VIII.

CALVINISTIC CHRISTOLOGY.

On this topic there is little to say. Calvinists generally rejected Luther's speculations in toto, and fell back upon the results of the Council of Chalcedon as expressing their minds. There was always a tendency in Calvinistic theology of all the schools to a Nestorianizing form of statement, and the humanity and divinity were sometimes placed so far apart, in dividing up what Christ did between them, that all real unity of person was lost sight of. In general, it cannot be said that Calvinistic schools have done anything of note for this doctrine. It has been handed down with all its difficulties to the present day. We shall try to see, in our next article, whether anything can now be said to further its development.

ARTICLE VIII.

INJUNCTIONS AND STRIKES.

BY HON. WILLIAM H. UPSON.

WITHIN the past few years injunctions have been so often used to prevent the unlawful acts which frequently accompany strikes, that many persons suppose such means to be the result of new rules of law adopted by the courts, rather than the application of long-established principles; and that the judges have usurped the power of legislating, instead of only interpreting and enforcing laws already made. On this account there has been much clamor, and prejudice against the courts, for this resort to what has been called judge-made law in favor of corporations. Public attention has been especially directed to this subject by the great extent and importance of recent strikes. A brief statement will show that there is no ground for the charge referred to, and that the use of injunctions in such cases is not only not new, but is in accordance with the plainest principles of right and justice.

An injunction is a judicial process, or order, requiring the person to whom it is directed to do, or refrain from doing, some particular thing.

This general definition will answer the purposes of this article, without referring to the different kinds of injunctions. Under the name of interdicts injunctions were, more than thirteen hundred years ago, known to the Roman law, from which they were borrowed by the English law, and from that by our own; and they have been used in this country ever since our courts of justice have been established.

Persons are generally obliged to enforce their rights by

actions to recover damages, or by other legal remedies, but there are many cases in which those do not afford complete, or full, protection, and then the party is entitled to an injunction or other equitable remedy, and it certainly seems much better to prevent a wrong than to allow its commission, and then try to punish the wrongdoer, and compensate the injured person.

The general principle, as stated by the best authorities, is that wherever a right exists, or is created by contract, by the ownership of property or otherwise, cognizable by law, a violation of that right may be prohibited by injunction if the ordinary legal remedies are not complete and adequate.

Injunctions are used to prevent the sale of promissory notes obtained by fraud-to prevent the collection of illegal taxes to restrain cities and villages from making contracts in violation of law-to prevent the unlawful use of streets, or of private property, by railroad companies-to prevent infringement of patents and the commission of frauds. Many other examples might be given, but these are enough to illustrate the general principle.

Injunctions may be granted either to prevent the gaining of a lawful object by unlawful means, or the gaining of an unlawful object by any means, whether lawful or unlawful, and it is for such purposes that they are properly granted in connection with strikes.

A strike is a general quitting of work as a coercive measure, as when higher wages, or shorter hours, are demanded, or a reduction of wages is resisted, and strikes have been resorted to for those, and other purposes, for more than two thousand years past. Livy describes one which took place at Rome three hundred and ten years before the birth of Christ, and about the end of the fifth century, in the reign of the emperor Zeno, a Roman ordinance provided that "No one shall hinder another from continuing a work that has been begun by another, as we are advised certain